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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Our morality defines us; it is a compass to the social world. 
Within the moral domain, deception is one of the most telling 
phenomena. Lies are told on a daily basis, and deducing the 
trustworthiness of the intentions of others is a fundamental aspect of 
social interactions. Research on the cognitive and affective 
underpinnings of moral behavior and its detection has drastically 
increased in the past years. For example, researchers debate whether 
people are intuitively cooperative (Martinsson, Ove, Myrseth, & 
Wollbrant, 2014; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2013; Tinghög et al., 
2013) and whether moral virtues can be accurately read from the face 
(Porter, England, Juodis, ten Brinke, & Wilson, 2008; Todorov, 
2008). In this dissertation, I contribute to these debates by examining 
deception and deception detection through a novel lens—one that 
stresses the importance of the amount of cognitive effort involved. In 
other words, this dissertation presents an exploration of different 
elements that together make up a deceptive interaction. Both the 
deceiver and the deceived are the object of investigation: Does telling 
a lie require cognitive effort? And, do people perceive deception in 
others effortlessly?  
As a basis of this exploration, I borrow from an often used 
analogy of two modes of cognitive function: one that is effortless, fast 
and automatic, and one that is effortful, slow, and deliberate (Evans, 
2008; Kahneman, 2003). In contrast to research that has focused on 
effortful rational and instrumental considerations that lead to a 
judgment or a decision, the current research does not presuppose the 
amount of cognitive effort needed for such considerations. Rather, in 
the current research I take into account varying amounts of cognitive 
effort underlying both the decision to tell a lie, and judgments of 
whether another person is lying. On the deceiver’s end, the amount of 
cognitive capacity that is available can affect whether people behave 
honest or dishonest. In order to examine whether being honest or 
dishonest is more effortful, it is therefore important to observe 
behavior under circumstances of limited cognitive capacity. On the 
receiving end of deception, the amount of cognitive effort that is 
expended can affect whether (dis)honesty is correctly detected. 
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Because previous research has indicated that deliberately made 
detection efforts are not very accurate, I stress the importance of 
looking at less effortful processes involved in detecting deception.  
The above-mentioned modes of cognitive function are not a 
strict dichotomy (see Keren & Schul, 2009). For instance, some 
processes are conscious, yet require little effort. For this reason, in this 
dissertation I examine conscious yet automatic as well as unconscious 
reactions towards (dis)honesty. I do so by assessing both affective 
indirect judgments of veracity and physiological responses within the 
observer of (dis)honesty. Although I refer to these processes as being 
effortless, it should be noted that this does not mean that there is no 
processing going on—in fact, affective unconscious processing has 
been characterized as effortless yet capable of integrating many pieces 
of information (e.g., Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gutig, 2001; 
Rousselet, & Thorpe, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2004; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977; Zajonc, 1980). Instead, by characterizing these processes as 
effortless, I emphasize that a response is not a result of deliberate 
conscious processing.  
Below I give a brief overview of the literature that has served 
as a starting point for the lens through which I examine deception. 
This lens is focused on a reoccurring theme: Effortless operations of 
honesty. Importantly, this lens is applied to both the deceiver as well 





According to diary studies, lies are told on a daily basis 
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). This means 
people often intentionally make a statement they believe to be false. 
When people decide to tell a lie, their minds may be divided by 
opposing forces: gain something from lying, or forego this gain and 
keep an honest self-view. People are generally averse to lying 
(Gneezy, 2005). However, it seems that they are more accepting of 
lies that are told for the benefit of others instead of for the benefit of 
the liar, and that people are more accepting of lies that they 
themselves tell compared to the lies somebody else tells (see 
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supplemental material, Study 1 and 2)1. People often behave dishonest 
enough to be able to still profit from it, but not to the extent that this 
behavior is no longer justifiable (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). This 
dishonesty could be an automatic tendency—something that people do 
without giving it much thought. Another possibility is that being 
honest takes less effort than being dishonest, and that only after some 
effortful deliberation (and possibly, justification) people decide to be 
dishonest.  
Previous research that has attempted to answer the question 
whether being honest or dishonest is a more automatic tendency has 
resulted in mixed findings. On the one hand, findings suggest that 
intuition, compared with deliberation, results in honest behavior 
(Zhong, 2011). On the other hand, studies find that imposing time 
pressure—a manipulation thought to undermine deliberation—results 
in dishonest behavior (Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 
2012; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). These latter studies 
focus on the amount of time as an indication of the amount of 
reflective thinking. However, in these studies, it is unclear whether 
reflection could have already taken place before, or even during, the 
time pressure manipulation. Taking an approach that focuses on 
cognitive effort, therefore, can shed more light on this question. 
There are several indications from other research areas that 
suggests that lying is more effortful than telling the truth. For instance, 
evolutionary (Byrne & Corp, 2004), developmental (Hala & Russell, 
2001), as well as cognitive and neuroscience research (Spence et al., 
2004) suggests that lying involves complex mental processes. For 
instance, neuroimaging studies show that lies elicit more activation in 
the brain than truths (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thomson, & Yurgelun-
Todd, 2003; Langleben et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2009). Nevertheless, an 
association—however consistent—between neural activity and 
deception is not sufficient to conclude that this neural activity is the 
cause of deception. A way to establish stronger support for a causal 
relationship is to interfere with the mental process. One aim of this 
																																																								
1 See also van ’t Veer & Stel (2014). Deception, attitudes toward. In Levine, 
T. R. (2014). Encyclopedia of Deception. SAGE Publications.  
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dissertation is to do exactly that. In the analogy of the two modes of 




Effortless impressions of honesty 
 
The ease with which the truth is told can reflect itself in how a 
message is conveyed, just as the effort that it takes to be dishonest 
may give this dishonesty away. A good example of this comes from 
early investigations of emotional facial expressions. When Darwin 
showed people photographs—made by Duchenne—of a faked smile, 
it was clear to these people that this expression was not natural 
(Darwin, 1872/1998). In honor of Duchenne, Ekman (1989) suggested 
that the smiles that include the hard to fake contraction of the muscles 
around the eyes would be called ‘Duchenne smiles’. Since then, 
research has confirmed that the Duchenne smile is a sign of true 
enjoyment (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). To observers, these 
spontaneous Duchenne smiles come across more genuine than non-
Duchenne smiles, and this difference is most pronounced when 
observers are judging the smiles in dynamic (i.e., video) rather than 
static (i.e., picture) form (Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009).  
An impression of others “develops effortlessly” (Asch, 1946, 
p. 275). People have a first impulse—an intuition that can either be 
trusted or that they can choose to overwrite. First impulses are there 
for a good reason. Because it takes effort to calculate all alternatives, 
it would be maladaptive to consciously decide what to do or think 
next all the time. Instead, people are equipped to make very quick and 
automatic assessments of stimuli in their surroundings. Intuitions that 
seem to arise without a cause form a basis from which conscious 
judgments arise. Sometimes these judgments can be difficult to 
explain or defend (Haidt, 2001). Similarly, it would be very effortful 
to consciously run through all the reasons why another person may be 
trusted or not: Were they honest in the past? Did they have an 
incentive to be dishonest in this case? Would I lie in this case? 
Relying on an automatically formed impression of the other person 
would undoubtedly be more efficient. 
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Indeed, it has been argued that people make judgments of the 
trustworthiness of others almost effortlessly. From an evolutionary 
perspective, this may be beneficial (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), as 
people who know how to assess trustworthiness of others would have 
more success in cooperating and forming coalitions with others who 
reciprocate when help is needed. Evolutionary accounts assert that 
people have an inborn module to detect cheaters, which is presumed 
to operate automatically (Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010). In line 
with this, trustworthiness detection from faces presented in a still 
picture has been found to be automatic and fast (Bonnefon, et al., 
2013; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009; Todorov, 2008; Willis 
& Todorov, 2006; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002; 
Yang, Qi, Ding, & Song, 2011). Facial features may be an indication 
of character traits, but from situation to situation, a given person may 
be honest or dishonest. Demeanor in the situation, instead of stable 
facial features, may ‘leak’ information about dishonesty (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1969). Meta-analyses show that there is not one single cue 
that can be reliably used to spot deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Instead, a combination of different aspects of a person’s demeanor 
might very well be the basis of an effortless impression formed in the 
observer. 
In order to tap into people’s abilities to automatically and 
accurately assess others, it is therefore important to study these 
abilities with the use of dynamic, rather than static, information about 
the other person. When detecting another person’s (dis)honest intent 
from this rich information, effortless impressions may outperform the 
more traditionally used explicit, deliberated judgments of veracity. In 
other words, as it may be too much to take in all the relevant 
information consciously, correct detection can benefit from 
unconscious processing. In the remaining chapters, I tested theoretical 
notions about people’s ability to effortlessly form a correct impression 
of another person in the realm of deception detection. Specifically, I 
investigated people’s impressions of trustworthiness and likability 
(i.e., warmth; Fiske et al., 2007) as well as their physiological 




Effortless indirect judgments of honesty 
 
Even though impressions of trustworthiness and likability of 
others are suggested to reflect an automatic ability to determine 
whether another person’s intentions are good (Fiske et al., 2007), 
judgments of whether another person has dishonest intentions are 
often biased and wrong. This may be the case because the literature on 
deception detection has primarily focused on asking people to make a 
decision between a ‘truth’ or a ‘lie’ judgment. These so-called direct 
veracity judgments are often biased towards making a truth judgment 
(i.e., a “truth-bias”; Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999). Moreover, 
judgments that explicitly ask people to say whether another person is 
lying are wrong about half of the time; meta-analyses show that 
people perform around chance level at detecting deception (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). A possible reason for this could be that when people 
make a judgment of whether someone else is lying, they expend too 
much cognitive effort. This deliberated judgment may be influenced 
by a truth-bias, and furthermore, it may overshadow correct intuitions.  
In line with this, Albrechtsen, Meissner, and Susa (2009) 
found that when people make veracity judgments while they rely on 
their intuitions, they are indeed better to distinguish truth-tellers from 
liars. In one of their studies, participants made their judgment from 
either a short video fragment that lasted no more than 15 seconds or a 
long 3-minute video of another person. Judgments made on the basis 
of the short videos—presumed to make participants rely on intuitive 
forms of processing (Ambady, 2010; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992)—
were found to be more accurate. In another study that tested the 
beneficial effect of intuitive processing more directly, Albrechtsen et 
al. (2009) found that being under cognitive load also increased 
deception detection performance. These findings point toward the 
potential of effortlessly formed impressions of veracity.  
There are several other indications in the literature that 
suggest that when veracity judgments are made in a less explicit or 
deliberated manner than with the direct judgment of whether someone 
is lying, these judgments are better able to distinguish truth-tellers 
from liars. Early indications of this were found in studies where 
participants were asked whether they thought the target was feigning 
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their reported affect (DePaulo, Jordan, Irvine, & Laser, 1982) or 
whether the target was thinking hard (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). 
Similarly, indirect questions that asked something about the observer 
(e.g., how confident they are of their judgment, how suspicious they 
felt, etc.) also seemed to be better able to differentiate between truths 
and lies (Anderson, DePaulo, & Ansfield, 2002; DePaulo, Charlton, 
Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997). Additionally, subjective 
judgments of the demeanor of a target (e.g., are they blinking a lot?) 
were likewise found to better differentiate between truth-tellers and 
liars than objective counts of these same behaviors by independent 
coders (DePaulo et al., 2003). These findings, however, do not take in 
to account theoretical notions on which kind of judgments should be 
the least effortful. 
It has been suggested that judging (moral) character and 
forming impressions of the intentions of others is an elementary, 
innate ability (e.g., Willis and Todorov, 2006; Fiske et al., 2007; 
Miller, 2007). Specifically, affective impressions of others are 
suggested to be especially automatic and effortless (Fiske et al., 2007; 
Zajonc, 1980). These judgments implicate the self in the sense that 
they concern the observer’s affect (“I like this other person”) instead 
of objective stimulus properties (“This other person is wearing a 
yellow shirt”). A second aim of this dissertation is to test these 
theoretical notions on effortless judgments in the realm of deception 
detection. Both judgments about the demeanor of a target (i.e., their 
ease of expression) as well as the observers’ confidence in their 
judgments and their affective evaluations of the targets (i.e., whether 
participants like the target) are investigated. With these latter affective 
indirect judgments, I aimed to tap into people’s effortless impressions 
of another person’s honesty.  
Furthermore, testing whether even from rehearsed statements 
these judgments still distinguish between truth-tellers and liars can 
assess the robustness of these effortless impressions. The impression 
that a rehearsed compared to a spontaneous story leaves on observers 
has received little empirical investigation thus far. However, next to 
the fact that, in daily life, statements and stories are often repeated, 
this characteristic of a story calls for an effort based approach. 
Rehearsing a story can influence effort in the deceiver, which in turn 
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influences the observer. To illustrate, rehearsing a story could relieve 
a liar from some of the cognitive burdens that are associated with 
lying. After all, the lie does not have to be made up anymore; it 
merely has to be repeated. This lie—now expressed with less effort—
may then no longer be easily distinguished from a truth. Indeed, it can 
be expected that a target person has more ease of expression when 
retelling an untruthful story. Indirect judgments of honesty that ask an 
observer to judge the target’s demeanor may therefore no longer 
differentiate a rehearsed liar from a truth-teller. Yet, if people indeed 
possess an ability to correctly detect deception on a more intuitive 
level, an effortless judgment that taps into this ability should 
distinguish lies from truths even if the targets’ stories are rehearsed. 
Our understanding of deceptive interactions can therefore be advanced 
by examining the impact of whether a story is rehearsed on the 
accuracy of different indirect veracity judgments. 
 
 
Reliance on effortless modes of processing 
 
Just as effortless impressions of honesty may be tapped into 
with the kind of veracity judgment that is made, reliance on these 
effortless impressions can be increased under certain circumstances. 
Some situations call for more reliance on effortless modes of 
processing, meaning they push people to go with their intuition, or in 
other words, to ‘listen to their gut’. It is likely that one of these 
situations is when people have to decide who is friend or foe in a 
novel and stressful environment. Under these circumstances it may be 
especially costly to affiliate with dishonest others. In order to direct 
affiliation and cooperation efforts towards individuals who have 
genuine intentions, one first has to be able to detect (dis)honest 
intentions in others. This ability may be enhanced if stressful 
situations indeed call for the kind of processing that is beneficial to 
the detection of deception. 
Stress triggers neural responses that permit an adaptive and 
fast reaction to the situation. This is often referred to as a ‘fight-or-
flight’ response (Cannon, 1914). Under stress, decision-making 
strategies that are controlled and take up more processing capacity are 
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thought to be hindered, while automatic responses are left relatively 
unaltered. Studies show that stress impairs prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
functioning (Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, & Fernández, 2009) and 
decreases working memory performance (Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 
2008). Stress can thus lead to less deliberative processing (Starcke & 
Brand, 2012). Indeed, under stress people do not perform optimally on 
tasks that require effortful processing (Keinan, 1987; Starcke & 
Brand, 2012). For other tasks, however, less deliberative processing 
can be beneficial. This is the case, for instance, when forming 
impressions of others (Ambady, 2010). As mentioned above, people 
also seem to be able to detect deception especially well when their 
ability to deliberate is hampered (Albrechtsen et al., 2009). Stress may 
thus allow for a better ability to distinguish between liars and truth-
tellers because it increases reliance on effortless modes of processing.  
On top of this, it also seems that sensitivity to social cues is 
heightened during stressful negative experiences. For instance, people 
have been found to be better able to distinguish true smiles from fake 
ones after they were socially rejected (Bernstein, Young, Brown, 
Sacco, & Claypool, 2008). Research further suggests that in stressful 
situations people may automatically direct their attention toward 
relevant social information. For instance, stress has been found to 
increase neural activity and reaction times for emotional stimuli (Li, 
Weerda, Milde, Wolf, & Thiel, 2014). Liars who leak the feelings 
they are trying to mask, or who, for instance, feel guilt associated with 
lying, may be an easy target for an observer who is attuned to these 
emotions. In this dissertation I therefore examine whether evaluations 




Effortless physiological responses to dishonesty 
 
Physiological responses within the observer of dishonesty 
could provide additional insight into the effortless mechanisms of a 
deceptive interaction. Although research has investigated neural 
circuits underlying, for instance, judgments of the intentions of others 
(Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004) and the emotional processing 
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involved in making moral judgments (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001), research on the psychophysiological 
mechanisms underlying deception has mainly focused on the 
physiology of deceivers (e.g., Podlesny and Raskin, 1977; Vrij, 
Oliveira, Hammond, & Ehrlichman, 2015; Wang et al., 2010). In 
order to come to a more comprehensive understanding of deceptive 
interactions, physiological reactions in the observer of deception 
should also be taken into account, especially because the observer’s 
impressions are suggested to be affective and require little cognitive 
effort. 
Assessing the psychophysiology of observers of (dis)honesty 
has several benefits. First of all, it allows for the measurement of 
people’s responses while they observe dishonesty of others in an 
online fashion. Second, it serves as a way to measure unconscious 
reactions that are not yet overshadowed by explicit judgments. 
Physiological responses within the observer of dishonesty can 
therefore provide additional insight into the underlying mechanisms of 
a deceptive interaction. It has been suggested that physiological 
markers can precede explicit knowledge (Bechara et al., 1997), and 
that these markers influence decision-making (Bechara and Damasio, 
2005, see Dunn et al., 2006, for a critical evaluation). In the case of 
deception detection, a physiological marker may precede explicit 
judgments of a liar.  
A third aim of this dissertation is to explore the possibility of 
a physiological marker (i.e., an unconscious indicator) of deception 
detection while simultaneously replicating the aforementioned 
investigations regarding direct and affective indirect veracity 
judgments. Two different physiological responses within the observer 
of (dis)honesty are investigated. The first, finger skin temperature, 
reflects trust and unfolds slowly over time. The second, pupillary 
response, is a more fine-grained measure of mental processing. 
Building on classical (Bowlby, 1969; Harlow, 1958) as well as more 
recent work (IJzerman & Koole, 2011; Kang, Williams, Clark, Gray, 
& Bargh, 2011; Szymkow, Chandler, IJzerman, Parzuchowski, & 
Wojciszke, 2013) that relates temperature to trust and perceptions of 
trustworthiness, it is examined whether picking up on the deception of 
others reflects itself in skin temperature. Temperature can be seen as a 
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physiological proxy of social interactions, and as such it could be an 
important indicator of people’s effortless impressions of (dis)honesty. 
Temperature changes take a while to unfold over time, yet, 
often a lie consists of a brief answer to a question. In order to examine 
whether people unconsciously pick up on the dishonesty of others, the 
observers’ physiological responses are therefore also examined with a 
more time-sensitive measure, namely the observers’ pupillary 
response. Pupil dilation occurs together with, amongst other things, 
increased cognitive load (Beatty & Kahneman, 1966), emotional 
arousal for both positive and negative stimuli (Bradley, Miccoli, 
Escrig, & Lang, 2008), and changes in mental states that occur outside 
of awareness (Laeng, Sirois, & Gredeback, 2012). Further, pupillary 
responses can reveal processing of information that takes place even 
before there is conscious perception of this information 
(Chapman, Oka, Bradshaw, Jacobson, & Donaldson, 1999; Laeng, et 
al., 2012). Deception detection could therefore be reflected in 
differentially affected pupillary responses when observing an honest 
compared with a dishonest other. By exploring the above-mentioned 
physiological responses in the observer of (dis)honesty, I aim to shed 
light on effortless, unconscious reactions towards deception. 
 
 
Overview of chapters and an additional note on honesty 
 
In the following chapters I describe how I turned from 
manipulating the cognitive effort expended by possible liars, namely 
their working memory capacity (Chapter 2), to investigating how a 
manipulation of whether their stories were spontaneous or rehearsed 
influences the impression they give off (Chapter 3). I further describe 
how manipulating the observers’ state—both in terms of vigilance and 
being forewarned—affects the ability to detect (dis)honesty (Chapters 
4-5), and I end with my exploration of the inner state of the observer, 
namely with several investigations of physiological responses when 
observing (dis)honesty in others (Chapters 5-6). The chapters in this 
dissertation are based on individual papers that are either published or 
under review. Because they are all co-authored they are written in the 
‘we’ form instead of ‘I’. These chapters can be read separately or as a 
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set of examinations of the ‘effortless’ elements of a (dis)honest 
interaction: from the mind of the deceiver to the physiology of the 
deceived.  
An additional note on honesty deserves a place in a 
dissertation on deception. As a social psychologist studying moral 
psychology, it is sometimes unavoidable to tempt participants to cheat 
in the lab. In the end I hope the knowledge that we gain from research 
on dishonesty will outweigh the costs by giving us a better 
understanding of how cheating can prevail in, for instance, the 
financial world, and why people are gullible enough to keep being 
duped by fraudsters. I have always tried to avoid having to deceive 
participants myself; when I promised them they would get paid for 
reporting something—whether they did so honestly or dishonestly—
they got paid. When I told participants to prepare to give a public 
speech in front of psychologists, they actually gave this speech even 
though no relevant dependent variables were assessed after it. 
Furthermore, studying these topics made me ever more aware of the 
ease with which I myself, and other researchers like me, can fall prey 
to the biases and justifications that lead to, for instance, dishonest 
reporting of our outcomes. This led me to realize that the only way to 
prevent this is to call the shots ahead of time (see also, van ’t Veer & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2015). Several of the studies reported in this 
dissertation are therefore pre-registered. Additionally, several studies 
that did not make it into the main chapters are presented in 
supplementary material that, like the data on which I base the main 
chapters, is available online. 
 
Chapter 2. This chapter focuses on the question whether the 
decision to tell a lie is born out of an automatic tendency to do so or 
whether this unethical behavior is a result of deliberation. The 
argument is made that this question is best addressed from a cognitive 
effort point of view; by hindering participants’ capacity to deliberate, 
the behavioral tendency that takes the least cognitive effort can be 
brought to light. A key finding of this chapter is that cognitive effort is 
a prerequisite for self-serving lies.     
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Chapter 3. This chapter focuses on the observer’s ability to 
detect (dis)honest others. Next to examining anticipated veracity 
detection, this chapter was designed as a first test of the strength of 
affective judgments—as compared to other indirect veracity 
judgments—in discerning dishonesty. By presenting participants with 
targets who either tell a spontaneous story or who tell a rehearsed 
story, the question whether different types of indirect veracity 
judgments—if any—are enduring guides to detect (dis)honesty is 
addressed. This chapter demonstrates the merit of effortlessly formed 
affective veracity judgments. 
  
Chapter 4. This chapter adds to the findings concerning 
effortless judgments from the previous chapter by examining whether 
being in a state of stress enhances dishonesty detection and 
trustworthiness detection from dynamic (video) material of liars and 
truth-tellers. Insights from evolutionary accounts about people’s 
survival promoting abilities to judge the moral intentions of others are 
applied in a deception detection setting. It is suggested that the ability 
to detect (dis)honesty is enhanced under circumstances that call for 
effortless cognitive processing.  
 
Chapter 5. This chapter explores both conscious direct 
evaluations of a target person’s veracity as well as more effortless 
evaluative and physiological responses to observing (dis)honesty. 
Participants’ finger skin temperature is studied in order to arrive at a 
more comprehensive understanding of deceptive interactions. This 
chapter is innovative in several respects. Next to investigating the 
physiology of the observer, this pre-registered research directly tests 
the magnitude of the effects of a direct and two related affective 
indirect veracity judgments against each other. 
Chapter 6.  This chapter describes an investigation of the 
pupillary responses of the observer of (dis)honesty. Participants’ pupil 
dilation is measured while they observe a target person in a video who 
is asked about having cheated in a trivia game. Although all targets 
spontaneously deny having cheated, only half is telling the truth. The 
most important finding in this chapter is that pupil dilation is 
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differentially affected when observing a lie or a truth. Furthermore, 
results of the previous chapters pertaining to the merit of affective 
indirect veracity judgments are replicated in this chapter.  
Chapter 7. This chapter contains a summary of the findings 
described in Chapters 2-6 and discusses these findings in terms of the 
cognitive effort lens that has been forwarded in this dissertation. 
Furthermore, in this chapter I discuss directions for future research 
and provide information on additional experiments that did not make 









In this chapter the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making are 
tested by hindering participants’ ability to deliberate about the 
decision to be dishonest. As telling a lie is believed to be more 
cognitively taxing than telling the truth, we hypothesized that being 
under concurrent cognitive load would interfere with being dishonest. 
Participants anonymously rolled a die three times and reported their 
outcomes—of which only one outcome would be paid out—while 
either under high or low cognitive load. For the roll that determined 
pay, participants under low cognitive load, but not under high 
cognitive load, reported outcomes that were significantly different 
from a uniform (honest) distribution. The average reported outcome of 
this roll was also significantly higher in the low load condition than in 
the high load condition, indicating that participants in the low load 
condition lied to get higher pay. This pattern was not observed for the 
second and third roll where participants knew the rolls were not going 
to be paid out and where therefore lying would not serve self-interest. 
Results thus indicate that having limited cognitive capacity will unveil 
a tendency to be honest in a situation where having more cognitive 
capacity would have enabled one to serve self-interest by lying.   
 
 
This chapter is based on: van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. 
(2014). Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being 




Chapter 2: Effortless honesty 
 
Deception—intentionally misleading another person—is an 
omnipresent phenomenon that at times can greatly facilitate social 
interaction, but at other times can cause immense harm, pain, and 
have grave financial consequences. Telling a lie often comes with 
justifications and biases that permit people to lie (e.g., a self-serving 
bias) that likely happen out of conscious awareness. Yet, arguably, 
even these biases may take up some cognitive capacity. Here we test 
whether the decision to tell a lie is born out of people’s intuitive, 
automatic tendency to do so or whether this unethical behavior is a 
result of more effortful cognitive processing. We do so by 
manipulating the availability of processing resources in an 
anonymous, tempting situation where dishonest behavior is typically 
observed. In other words, we test whether having a limited cognitive 
processing capacity makes people more honest than when they do 
have processing resources available.  
Thus far, research on social decision-making has made use of 
a framework that divides the decision process into two systems (i.e., a 
dual-system framework; e.g., Evans, 2003; Haidt, 2001; Kahneman, 
2011, but see Keren & Schul, 2009, for a critical evaluation). When 
making a decision, people are believed to rely both on automatic, 
sometimes called intuitive, processes, and more deliberative or 
controlled processes. In the case of moral decision-making, this dual-
system framework has left researchers with evidence pointing in 
opposite directions. On the one hand, some have argued people have 
an intuitive sense to be prosocial and ethical. For instance, Rand, 
Greene, and Nowak (2012) find in several studies that people are 
intuitively cooperative. Some of these findings, however, have 
recently been questioned by Tinghög and colleagues (2013). The 
issues raised seem to center mainly around studies that use time 
pressure to bring about an automatic response, but not around other 
studies that use different manipulations, like inducing an intuitive 
mindset. Using methods to elicit intuitive decision-making, Zhong 
(2011) found intuition decreased the use of deception and increased 
altruism, strengthening to the notion the people are intuitively 
prosocial. On the other hand, others have argued that it takes 
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deliberation to decide to do the right thing; it was found that people’s 
response under time-pressure was to be dishonest (Shalvi, Eldar, & 
Bereby-Meyer, 2012) and that contemplation leads to more ethical 
decisions (Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012). 
Findings from studies investigating moral behavior—and especially 
those investigating deception—thus paint an inconsistent picture.  
A broad range of findings suggests that deception is 
cognitively taxing. First, evidence from evolutionary (Byrne & Corp, 
2004) and developmental (Hala & Russell, 2001) research suggests 
deception involves complex cognitive processes. Second, relative to 
truthful responding, lying shows an increase in response time (Farrow 
et al., 2003; Spence et al., 2001) and an increase in cognitive effort as 
measured by pupil dilation (Wang, Spezio, & Camerer, 2010). 
Neuroimaging studies typically find lies elicit more activation in the 
brain than truths (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-
Todd, 2003; Langleben et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2009), and consider the 
truth the “baseline” (Spence et al., 2004). Third, in the lie-detection 
literature, telling a lie is assumed to be more cognitively taxing: One 
has to make up a story, tell it coherently, monitor one’s own and the 
other person’s demeanor, and, arguably, regulate one’s feelings about 
being unethical at the same time (Vrij et al., 2008; Zuckerman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Fourth, a process of justifying 
dishonest behavior is likely to take place when there is ample 
opportunity to do so (Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011), 
assumingly in order to maintain a positive self-image (Mazar, Amir, 
& Ariely, 2008). Even this kind of self-serving tendency, however 
widespread or unconscious, seems to take up some form of cognitive 
processing. Given the evidence outlined above, we argue that lying is 
cognitively taxing, and that it thus should not be observed when 
cognitive capacity is unavailable.  
However, a study in which participants had the opportunity to 
lie to serve their self-interest indicated that participants were more 
dishonest with time-pressure than without it (Shalvi et al., 2012). 
Authors of this study interpreted this finding by suggesting that 
dishonesty is people’s automatic tendency when self-interest can be 
served. In reply, however, Foerster, Pfister, Schmidts, Dignath, and 
Kunde (2013) noted that this finding might be due to specifics in the 
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procedure, namely that participants could have decided on their 
response while apprehending the task. Foerster et al. did not impose 
time-pressure but manipulated response time by asking their 
participants to report an outcome of a die roll immediately, or after a 
short delay. Their findings suggest that immediate responses are more 
honest than delayed responses, and that these differences disappear 
when participants are more familiar with the task due to doing it a 
second time. It could thus be the case that the relationship between 
response time and honesty is not linear, but that honesty depends on 
other factors like the level of cognitive processing capacity that is 
available. We argue here that manipulating cognitive load is better 
suited to further this debate. Because imposing cognitive load can 
effectively reduce the available processing capacity, it can distinguish 
between responses that draw on more or less processing resources.  
As previous experiments have demonstrated, individuals 
under cognitive load have a more pronounced tendency to respond in 
accordance with their automatic, affective intuition. For instance, it 
leads people to choose chocolate cake over fruit (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 
1999). In the moral judgment literature, cognitive load has been found 
to make people less likely to make an utilitarian judgment 
(Trémolière, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012) and respond slower for this 
kind of controlled cognitive judgment (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Valdesolo and DeSteno (2008) saw the 
self-serving bias that is typically observed in the hypocrisy literature 
disappear when imposing their subjects to high cognitive load; these 
subjects judged a moral transgression performed by themselves as 
unfair as when it was performed by another individual, indicating they 
had no cognitive capacity to make self-serving justifications under 
cognitive constraint. Similarly, although lying might be a quick 
response, it could still require some additional cognitive resources. On 
the basis of this, and on the basis of the four previously mentioned 
arguments, we predict dishonesty to be reduced under cognitive load.  
To measure deceptive behavior we employ the “Die under the 
cup” paradigm that has been used in similar research settings 
(Fischbacher & Heusi, 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011). In this paradigm, 
participants anonymously report the outcome of their die roll for 
money—where a higher outcome equals higher pay—giving them an 
28 
incentive to lie. This paradigm does not allow assessment of 
individual dishonesty, yet the distribution of reported outcomes can be 
compared to a distribution expected by chance, which would indicate 
no dishonesty. Conversely, if more high numbers are reported than 
can be expected by chance, this result indicates dishonesty. For our 
purposes, a setting wherein participants report their first die roll for 
payment and roll the die a second and third time for no payment is 
especially appropriate. Under these circumstances—where desired 
numbers might be observed on the second and third roll—it is found 
that people are especially inclined to lie because the lie is justified 
more easily (Shalvi et al., 2011). To minimize the possibility that 
participants decide what to report before they even roll the die, we 
amended this paradigm such that the participants learned which of 
their three rolls would be paid out only just before reporting them.  
In the current experiment, participants thus have the 
opportunity to serve self-interest by being dishonest in an anonymous 
setting. During this opportunity, we ask them to perform a concurrent 
task that imposes either high or low cognitive load. We argue that 
under high cognitive load the main executive function with which the 
working memory will be engaged is the concurrent task, thereby 
leaving less room to process or manipulate information needed to tell 
a lie (i.e., the ramifications or the fabrication and justification of the 
lie, respectively) while at the same time leaving less room for the 
monitoring and regulation required to do so (i.e., the assimilation of 
emotions or withholding of factual information, respectively). We 
therefore expect less dishonesty when under higher cognitive load. 
Additionally, for those who do have enough cognitive capacity to lie, 
we expect dishonesty to occur only when self-interest can be served, 





Participants and design  
A total of 173 participants (117 females, Mage = 21.26, SD = 
2.61) took part in this experiment. Participants were randomly 
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assigned to either a high cognitive load or a low cognitive load 
condition. Participants were paid the outcome of their first reported 
die roll in Euros and received additional money for their performance 
in other experiments later in the same experimental hour. Sample size 
was a result of terminating data collection after one week (as was 
decided beforehand). We report all data exclusions (if any), all 
manipulations, and all measures in the study.  
 
Materials and procedure  
An experimenter showed the participants how to roll a die 
underneath a cup by shaking the cup back and forth, then told them all 
to practice rolling the die this way at least three times. Participants 
were asked to look through a hole in the bottom of the cup each time 
they rolled the die to see their outcome. They then proceeded 
individually, using a computer on their desks separated by partition 
screens, while the experimenter remained outside of the view of the 
participant in the far front of the room. Participants read that the study 
was about multitasking and memory, and that they would be asked to 
memorize a string of letters while rolling a six-sided die three times. 
An example of a string was given with the same number of letters 
participants would encounter later in the experiment. Participants were 
told one of the three rolls—to be randomly assigned by the computer 
at a later time—would be paid out and that their pay was conditional 
on their performance on the memory task. Participants in the high 
cognitive load condition memorized a string of eight letters2 (i.e., 
NWRBRKPJ), and participants in the low cognitive load condition 
memorized a string of two letters (i.e., KL). In both conditions 
participants were given ten seconds to memorize their letter string. 
They were then instructed to roll the die three times (the screen auto-
advanced after 30 seconds), and subsequently they were asked to 
report all three outcomes. After this, they were asked to reproduce 
their letter string. Importantly, just before reporting the outcome of the 
first roll—but after having rolled the die three times—all participants 
																																																								
2 Letters were chosen instead of numbers (see for the manipulation with 
numbers Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) to prevent interference with the numbers 
seen on the die. 
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were told the computer had decided their first roll would be paid out.  
Participants then completed three manipulation check 
questions. First, to ensure that participants in the high load condition 
were in fact occupied with the letter string, we asked them to indicate 
how much they agreed with the following statement: While rolling the 
die, I was mainly thinking of the string I had to remember (scale from 
1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree). To ensure that any observed 
differences between the two load conditions would not be due to 
participants in the high load condition having trouble perceiving the 
outcome of all three rolls, we asked them whether they agreed with: I 
took a good look at all three rolls (scale from 1 = totally disagree to 5 
= totally agree). To make sure any differences observed between 
conditions would not be due to participants having trouble 
remembering their outcomes, we asked participants to indicate: How 
many of the rolls did you remember seeing? (0 = none, 1 = one, 2 = 
two, 3 = all three rolls). Next, participants answered one question 
pertaining their feelings of entitlement to full payment: I feel I have 
the right to earn six Euros (slider from 0 = totally disagree to 100 = 
totally agree). This question enabled us to ensure that observed 
differences were not due to varying feelings of entitlement to 
payment.  
For exploratory reasons, participants were then presented with 
emotion items. We assessed emotions because being dishonest might 
cause people to feel negative emotions, especially when they have no 
means of justifying their behavior (Shalvi et al., 2012), or positive 
emotions, caused by the thrill of cheating (Ruedy, Moore, Gino, & 
Schweitzer, 2013)3. Participants were then probed for suspicion, yet 
																																																								
3 Four positive items (e.g., “happy”, “content”; α = .87), and sixteen negative 
items (e.g. “sad”, “tense”; α = .93; all scales ranging from 0 = not at all, 7 = 
very much) were randomly presented, and one overall mood scale (slider 
from -50 = “very bad”; 50 = “very good”). Due to technical failure, five 
participants’ answers to the mood questions were not recorded (3 in low load, 
2 in high load). Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare the 
mean of the positive emotion items between conditions and the mean of the 
negative emotion items between conditions. Participants in the low load 
condition felt more positive emotions (M = 4.94, SD = 1.00) than the 
participants in the high load condition (M = 4.40, SD = 1.24), t(166) = 3.10, p 
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We performed separate independent-samples t-tests with 
condition as the independent variable and the manipulation check 
questions as dependent variables. These analyses indicated that 
participants in the high load condition were thinking of their string of 
letters more (M = 3.97, SD = 1.60) than participants in the low load 
condition (M = 2.79, SD = 1.50), t(171) = −4.97, p < .001.4 There was 
no difference in how good a look participants had at their three rolls 
between the high load (M = 4.68, SD = 0.69) and the low load 
condition (M = 4.79, SD = 0.49), t(154.86) = 1.24, p = .22. Almost all 
participants in both the high load condition (M = 2.95, SD = 0.21) and 
the low load condition (M = 2.98, SD = 0.22) remembered seeing all 
three rolls. This memory did not differ between the conditions, t(171) 
= 0.70, p = .48. Participants in the high load condition did not feel 
significantly more entitled to full pay (M = 73.22, SD = 29.28) than 
																																																																																																																							
< .01. For the negative emotions, there was a marginally significant 
difference between the low load condition (M = 1.93, SD = .83) and the high 
load condition (M = 2.21, SD = 1.12), t(166) = -1.84, p = .07. However, there 
was no difference between overall mood between the low load condition (M 
= 26.13, SD = 12.98) and the high load condition (M = 22.02, SD = 18.34), 
t(166) = 1.67, p = .10. None of the three mood scales correlated with the 
reported die rolls in the two conditions, all p’s > .23. 
4 Although all participants in the low load condition remembered their letter 
string correctly, only 58.6 % of participants in the high load condition were 
able to remember their eight letters correctly and in the right order, indicating 
this task was indeed cognitively taxing. 37.9 % got 6 or more letters correct, 
but the letters were not in correct order. 3.4 % got 5 or less letters correct. 
Distributions of the three reported outcomes of these participants that did not 
get the letter string correct in the high load condition were not significantly 
different from uniform, all ps > .38, meaning their results did not deviate 
from our main findings. 
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participants in the low load condition (M = 70.16, SD = 29.05), t(171) 
= −0.69, p = .49. These results indicate that our manipulations worked 
as intended. Additionally, the time participants took to submit the 
page on which they reported the outcome of their first die roll did not 
differ between the low load condition (M = 7.41, SD = 3.81) and the 




Table 2.1. Frequency and corresponding percentage (in parentheses) 
of the reported outcomes of all three die rolls for both conditions  




                                Reported outcome of die roll  
 







































































































Figure 2.1. Bars represent the proportion of participants who reported 
having outcome one through six on the roll that determined pay, for 
low and high cognitive load conditions. The horizontal line represents 
the proportion of each of the outcomes of a fair die roll according to 
chance (.16667 for each outcome). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the proportion. 
 
Distribution of reported outcomes  
Table 2.1 shows the frequencies of reported outcomes for 
each possible outcome of a six-sided die. We tested whether the 
reported outcomes in both conditions differed from a uniform 
distribution with a chi-square test in order to examine whether the 
reported rolls resemble a distribution that can be expected by chance 
(i.e., a fair distribution). In the high load condition, the distribution of 
the first die roll—the roll that was going to be paid out—was almost 
significantly different from a uniform distribution, due to a tendency 
for the number 4 to be over reported, χ2(5, N = 87) = 9.76, p = .08. 

















either, χ2(5, N = 87) = 10.03, p = .07 (if anything, this small effect was 
also caused by four being the most reported roll, see Table 2.1), nor 
did the third roll, χ2(5, N = 87) = 8.10, p = .15. In the low load 
condition, however, the reported outcomes for the first die roll did 
differ from a uniform distribution, χ2(5, N = 86) = 25.77, p < .001, 
indicating dishonest reporting of the to be paid out roll (see Figure 
2.1). The second and third rolls did not differ significantly from a 
uniform distribution in the low load condition, χ2(5, N = 86) = 1.35, p 
= .93 and χ2(5, N = 86) = 7.21, p = .21 respectively. 
Importantly, the average reported outcome of the first roll of 
the die was higher in the low load condition (M = 4.24, SD = 1.49) 
than the high load condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.57), Mann-Whitney Z 
= −2.61, p = .009, indicating that participants in the low load 
condition lied to get a higher pay. As hypothesized, for the second 
roll, the outcome in the low load (M = 3.58, SD = 1.66) and the high 
load (M = 3.75, SD = 1.61), did not differ, Mann-Whitney Z = −0.63, 
p = .53. Similarly, the outcome of the third roll did not differ between 
the low load (M = 3.91, SD = 1.71) and the high load (M = 3.61, SD = 





 In the current chapter we tested whether having limited 
cognitive capacity impairs people’s ability to lie. We found a 
considerable amount of dishonesty when cognitive capacity was not 
limited, but no detectable dishonesty when cognitive capacity was 
limited. This pattern of deception—lying when cognitive processing 
was possible and being honest when it was not—was observed only 
for the outcome of the die roll that had financial consequences. This 
suggests that when enough cognitive capacity is available and people 
can serve self-interest by being dishonest, they will often do so. Yet 
without this cognitive capacity, people are honest regardless of the 
fact that self-interest could have been served.  
In anonymous situations, not unlike the one we created in the 
current experiment, cognitive control might be needed to override 
self-serving biases. We argue, however, that a certain amount of 
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cognitive processing might also already be in place to shape the bias 
itself. Comparing our results with findings by Valdesolo and Desteno 
(2008), it could be argued that, in both studies, imposing cognitive 
load led to a diminished capacity to serve the self. In other words, 
although people have an automatic tendency to be self-serving, this 
automatic reaction requires some mental processing still. A parallel 
can be drawn with research on stereotyping, where cognitive load is 
found to make the activation of a stereotype less likely to occur; yet 
when the stereotype is already activated, cognitive load increases its 
usage (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). This suggests that although the 
activation of a stereotype is fairly automatic, to be able to activate the 
information some cognitive resources are still required.  
Our findings are in line with several other lines of research 
that invoke a dual-process framework. For instance, activating an 
intuitive mindset, in contrast to deliberative mindset, can lead people 
to deceive less (Zhong, 2011). Likewise, in a recent paper, it was 
argued that people are intuitively cooperative, for those who decide 
quickly (either by instruction or on their own) and those who are 
induced to rely on their intuition, contribute and cooperate more in 
economic games (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012, but see Tinghög et 
al., 2013, for a different perspective on the time pressure data). Next 
to this, people who have a generally preferred thinking style of relying 
on their intuition may be more inclined to show sharing behavior and 
altruistic punishment (Kinunnen & Windmann, 2013). Another 
corresponding notion is that working memory is indirectly related to 
dishonesty through the ability to be creative in finding justifications 
for this dishonesty; working memory relates positively to creative 
performance (De Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012) and 
creative people have been found to cheat more (Gino & Ariely, 2012).  
Contrary to our findings however, a recent experiment 
utilizing a variation of the paradigm used in the current chapter 
observed more dishonesty under time pressure (Shalvi et al., 2012). 
This contradiction is surprising, because time pressure and cognitive 
load have often been used interchangeably, namely to lay bare an 
automatic process. One possible reason for these deviating findings 
could be that our procedure was adjusted such that participants’ 
opportunity to justify any lies beforehand was kept to a minimum. 
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Namely, only after rolling the die three times were participants in the 
current study informed about which of their die rolls would earn them 
money. In the procedure utilized by Shalvi and colleagues (2012) 
participants knew that the one roll they were going to report was for 
money even before being under time pressure. Similar to the argument 
made by Shalvi and colleagues (2012), others have found that being 
forced to contemplate for 3 minutes about the decision to lie decreased 
deception, as compared to an immediate choice that had to be made 
within 30 seconds (Gunia et al., 2012). What remains unclear 
however, is whether in these cases the immediacy with which the 
decision had to be made was pressing enough to stop any justification 
or rationalization, which arguably could have already taken place 
while apprehending the nature of the task.  
Another difference between our cognitive load manipulation 
and the aforementioned time pressure manipulation is that our 
participants had two concurrent demands on cognitive capacity 
instead of having one task demanding immediate capacity. This 
difference could have led participants under time pressure—contrary 
to those under cognitive load—to have just enough cognitive capacity 
to generate an untruthful response. In that case, even though time 
pressure will make observing the product of automatic processing 
more likely because further processing (i.e., deliberation) is not 
possible, some processes like self-serving biases or relying on 
heuristics might still occur under time pressure. These processes may 
happen extraordinary fast and mostly outside of conscious awareness 
and can therefore arguably be considered part of the automatic 
response. As Balcetis and Dunning (2006) showed, people readily see 
what they are motivated to see. People may be unaware of self-serving 
biases because these biases operate outside of conscious awareness. 
The possibility that under time-pressure self-serving biases are present 
but under cognitive load they are not is currently insufficiently 
founded. It does, however, open up an opportunity for further research 
to explore what processes make up the automatic part of the dual 
system. As has been argued before, both systems involve cognition in 
the sense of information processing (Cushman, 2013). The question, 
then, is not what the automatic tendency is during (dis-)honesty 
junctures, as both lying and being honest can be automatic, but what 
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processes contribute to the automaticity of the given tendencies.  
Although a body of research presumes lying is a deliberate 
act, an indication that a process takes up cognitive capacity—such as 
found here—does not necessarily entail that this process is not also 
somewhat automatic. The process of reporting the truth might just be 
one that is relatively less prone to interference by simultaneous 
demand on cognitive capacity than the self-serving bias that so often 
comes on top of it. The current chapter therefore calls for further 
empirical clarification on the different effects of manipulations such 
as time pressure and cognitive load, and also on their differences with, 
for example, depletion of self-control resources. This manipulation is 
known to increase cheating (e.g., Mead, Baumeister, Gino, 
Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009), a result possibly due to not having 
enough executive resources to identify an act as moral or immoral 
(Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011). However, studies that did 
not focus on cheating but instead focused on lying found lying was 
not affected by depletion (Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012). In 
light of the abovementioned findings, it thus seems that although 





To understand unethical behavior, we need to study the 
prerequisites for such dishonest behavior to take place. Findings of the 
current chapter suggest that one of those prerequisites is having ample 
cognitive capacity. On the societal level, a moral basis that pulls 
people’s behavior away from pure self-interest is indispensible. 
Although individuals are often found to act in their own interest, and 
lying is often done out of self-interest, solely on the basis of this it 
would be unwise to conclude that being deceptive is the default: The 
current chapter shows that telling the truth is the most effortless option 
in terms of cognitive processing and that telling a lie takes at least 









Effortless impressions of honesty 
 
It is advantageous to correctly assess the honesty of stories others tell. 
In this chapter we argue that it is important to consider whether these 
stories are spontaneous or rehearsed and whether veracity judgments 
are assessed directly or indirectly. We examined both anticipated 
veracity detection (Study 3.1, N = 236) and actual veracity detection 
(Study 3.2, N = 147). Results revealed that participants anticipated 
being better at distinguishing spontaneous truths and lies than at 
distinguishing repeated truths and lies. This resonated with actual 
detection ability when it was measured by direct veracity judgments: 
Whereas during initial statements liars came across more deceptive 
than truth-tellers, during repeated statements this distinction 
disappeared. Affective indirect judgments, however, distinguished 
between truth-tellers and liars irrespective of whether statements were 
repeated. This suggests that while direct veracity judgments no longer 
discriminate between liars and truth-tellers when accounts are 
repeated, inherently more affective indirect judgments remain 




This chapter is based on: van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. 
(2015). Detecting deception from repeated statements: Indirect 





Chapter 3: Effortless impressions of honesty 
 
People are passionate narrators. Regardless of whether their 
stories are true or untrue, people who tell the truth and people who lie 
have the same goal: To come across as an honest person. When people 
want to be believed, a common solution and often given advice is to 
rehearse a statement. Indeed, in many domains it has been argued that 
practice makes perfect (e.g., Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 
1993). Similarly, irrespective of whether the aim is to convince 
another person with the truth or with a lie, one could argue that 
practice benefits the way a story comes across. However, as we argue 
here, telling a story repeatedly may have its pitfalls, especially for 
truth-tellers. When truth-tellers’ repeated stories are assessed in a 
direct way (i.e., with the question whether the story is true or false), 
repeated truths may be mistaken for lies.  
Affective character assessments of the story teller, in contrast, 
may prove a more robust guide to trustworthiness if, in the case of 
deception detection, they serve their suggested role of picking up on 
the moral intentions of others (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). If 
this is indeed the case it can be expected that—irrespective of whether 
an account is given repeatedly—observers’ affective judgments of 
truth-tellers remain more positive than their judgments of liars. In the 
current chapter we investigate this by examining whether 
statements—both true and false—appear less deceptive when they are 
told for the second time compared to the first, and whether their 
narrators leave a different impression when giving these two accounts 
of the same story. This impression is assessed with different indirect 
veracity judgments, including the above-mentioned affective 
judgment (i.e., how much the observer likes the story teller). In doing 
so, we challenge the notion that a practiced story is always a 
convincing one.  
 
 
Distinguishing truths from lies 
 
Telling lies is commonplace. Therefore, being on the 
receiving end of deception is, inevitably, common as well. Despite 
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this, people barely perform above chance when trying to detect 
deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Although the quest for what 
differentiates a liar from a truth-teller has been present in the literature 
for a long time, cues to deception appear to be weak, if not lacking in 
existence (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003). What seems to be left is the 
impression a liar makes on the target of her deception: Liars’ stories 
come across more tense and less forthcoming (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Additionally, observers’ affective and indirect judgments of liars do 
seem to discriminate between liars and truth-tellers. For instance, the 
same targets are liked and trusted less when they lie compared to 
when they tell the truth. However, when people are asked to judge 
these same targets’ veracity directly, the ability to correctly detect a 
liar is around chance level (e.g., van ’t Veer, Stel, van Beest, & 
Gallucci, 2014). This speaks to the idea that it is useful to distinguish 
direct and indirect veracity judgments. 
The amount of cognitive load associated with telling a lie 
could also play an important role when it comes to differentiating liars 
from truth-tellers (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008). The lie itself has 
to be thought up, whereas the truth is something that merely has to be 
recalled. The assumption that lying requires more cognitive capacity 
than being honest is supported by research showing individuals lie 
less when their working memory is taxed (van ’t Veer, Stel, & van 
Beest, 2014). In similar vein, spontaneous lies compared to truths are 
found to be more cognitively demanding as measured by saccadic eye 
movement rate (Vrij, Oliveira, Hammond, & Ehrlichman, 2015)—a 
measure that indicates searching long-term memory (Ehrlichman & 
Micic, 2012). Liars might also be more aware of themselves and their 
performance, leading to a higher level of monitoring and controlling 
verbal and nonverbal behavior (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & 
O’Brien, 1988; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). As a 
consequence, liars may leave an impression of having to think hard. 
This impression raises suspicion in the perceiver and has been found 
to distinguish truth-tellers from liars (Ulatowska, 2010, 2014; Vrij, 





Observers’ impression of repeated stories 
 
The cognitive load that liars experience may thus make them 
easier to detect. This raises the question of whether rehearsing or 
repeating a lie could relieve some of these cognitive burdens. In a 
study by DePaulo, Lanier, and Davis (1983) it was found that answers 
to known (vs. unknown) questions came across more deceptive, more 
tense, and less spontaneous. This occurred regardless of whether these 
planned answers were true or false. Notably, the planned lies were not 
more or less readily detectable. However, merely planning an answer 
may not decrease the necessary effort as much as actual rehearsing. 
For instance, reaction times when lying become faster after training, 
more so than after debriefing and instruction to speed up (Hu, Chen, 
& Fu, 2012). Moreover, lies that are rehearsed and memorized appear 
to be associated with less cognitive conflict compared to spontaneous 
lies, as evidenced by decreased activities in brain regions involved in 
cognitive control, such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Ganis, 
Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). Additionally, 
response times of practiced lies decrease and thereby closer resemble 
the response time of truths (Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & 
Griffith-Ross, 2009). However, it remains unclear whether rehearsing 
a lie does indeed leave a more positive impression on observers. We 
propose that a repeated lie may become more polished. This makes 
the liar appear to have more ease of expression, which in turn could 
impair the actual detection of deception. Indeed, as considered by 
DePaulo et al. (2003), the idea that lying is more difficult than telling 
the truth may only apply when liars are making up new stories, instead 
of referring to stories from others or replacing one event with another. 
It seems then, that when a liar is repeating a lie told earlier, the hard 
part is over, as the story is already made up. This, in turn, would 
suggest that detecting deception becomes more difficult for a repeated 
lie than for an initial lie.  
And what about truth-tellers? Do they benefit from repeating 
their story just like liars might? One could argue that repeating an 
account could also be beneficial for truth-tellers. After all, a rehearsed 
truth may become more polished and therefore leave a more positive 
impression. However, prior research indicates that truth-tellers’ stories 
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are often full of mistakes and self-corrections, and this is true even 
though an account is given multiple times. Specifically, Granhag and 
Strömwall (2002) found that liars and truth-tellers have equally 
consistent statements during the course of multiple interrogations. 
Liars’ statements are stable because liars adapt their strategy to 
remember their statements. Truth-tellers’ statements are also stable, 
but often undermined by the likely weaknesses associated with normal 
memory performance. Because for truth-tellers a story that was told 
initially may not have been intended for future use, recalling the 
account as it was told the first time may require additional cognitive 
effort in instances where the aim is to keep consistent. Recalling 
information stored in memory is cognitively taxing, and as cognitive 
resources are limited, having a concurrent task that requires cognitive 
capacity leaves fewer resources available for recall (van den Hout et 
al., 2010). A retold truth may therefore seem more deliberated upon. 
Another possibility is that truth-tellers may be less preoccupied with 
coming across honest; after all, they have the truth on their side. For 
truth-tellers, it thus seems unclear whether the retold story comes 
across with more or less ease of expression, whether it feels deceptive 
to the observer, and whether the truth-tellers’ innocence still reflects a 
moral character that can be differentiated from that of a liar when the 
truth is retold.  
Taken together, it seems that observers’ subjective, indirect 
impressions of liars can differentiate liars from truth-tellers, but it is 
unclear whether this is still the case when a story is retold. Repeating 
a lie could relieve the liar of some of the cognitive load associated 
with, for instance, coming up with the lie itself. As a consequence, 
compared to a first-time lie, a repeated lie could be more difficult to 
detect due to the liar coming across, for instance, more confident and 
less nervous. For truth-tellers, the prediction is less clear. On the one 
hand, a truthful story may benefit from repetition. On the other hand, 
it might even be impaired by it. If it is the case that retelling a truthful 
story impairs the truth-teller’s impression, an honest person could be 
mistaken for a liar.  
In addition, it may be argued that repeated stories, both true 
and false, may bare such a resemblance that both direct and indirect 
assessments will fail to differentiate a truth-teller from a liar. 
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However, it has been previously argued that on an intuitive level, 
people may have a better sense of whether another person is lying to 
them (Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009). Provided that affective 
judgments tap into a ‘gut feeling’ that can intuit whether someone is 
lying, it may also be expected that this intuition will hold even for 
instances where truths and lies are being repeated. If this is the case, 
than both direct and indirect judgments will differentiate liars from 
truth-tellers when their stories are told for the first time, whereas only 
affective indirect veracity judgments will be able to differentiate liars 
from truth-tellers when stories are repeated.  
Building on the premise that people place high value on 
narratives and accounts of events told by others, and that accounts are 
often given on multiple occasions, we tested two facets of retelling 
true and untrue stories. In Study 3.1, we investigated people’s 
intuitions pertaining to what the best chance of coming across honest 
would be: an initial or a repeated account of the same event. In Study 
3.2, we subsequently tested our main expectation, namely that 
people’s actual ability to differentiate truths from lies is better for 
initial accounts than for repeated accounts. Furthermore, we test 
different indirect judgments pertaining both to how a target person 
comes across and to the observers’ own feelings towards the target 
person, in order to assess whether these indirect measures endure as 





In Study 3.1 we investigated three aspects of how people 
anticipate themselves and others to react to initial and repeated 
accounts of a story. First, we assessed whether people anticipate 
repeated accounts to come across better than initial accounts. 
Specifically, we asked participants to indicate to what extent they 
thought listening to an initial or a repeated account would make them 
feel lied to, a judgment we refer to as the anticipated direct veracity 
judgment. Second, we also asked them to choose which account, 
initial or repeated, would come across more deceptively. Third, we 
asked participants whether they would rehearse a story or tell a story 
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right away. We asked separate groups of participants to indicate this 
for either truthful or deceitful stories. Assuming that people have more 
feedback and experience with whether their own deception is detected 
and whether it is retold than with whether others are dishonest and 
whether their account is retold, we explored the effect of perspective 
and asked separate groups of participants to take the perspective of the 
listener or the perspective of the teller of the story.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and thirty six 
psychology students—166 females, 47 males, 23 unknown, Mage = 
19.93, SDage = 5.86 (age of 24 unknown)—took part in this study. 
Sample size was determined by the number of first year students that 
participated in the yearly testweek of the psychology department at 
Tilburg University. This resulted in a big enough sample size to have 
over 80% power to find a small effect. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one condition of a 2 (perspective: self or other) × 2 
(veracity: truth or lie) between-subjects design (each n = 59). We 
report all data exclusions (there were none), all manipulations, and all 
measures in the study.  
Procedure. Veracity was manipulated by instructing 
participants to either imagine that an untruthful or a truthful account 
was going to be given about activities on the previous day. 
Perspective was manipulated by instructing participants to imagine 
that they would tell the account to another person or that they were 
listening to another person who gave the account. Next, we assessed 
the anticipated direct veracity judgment with two separate questions. 
Participants were asked to indicate to what extent the person who was 
listening to the account (which, depending on condition, was the 
participant him/herself or another person) would feel lied to (a) when 
the account was given initially and (b) when the account was given 
repeatedly (both scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much). 
These two questions thus constitute a repeated measure of anticipated 
feelings of being deceived, namely during both the initial and the 
repeated account. This was followed by a forced choice on which 
participants had to indicate whether the initial or the repeated account 
would come across more deceptive. Lastly, another forced choice 
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followed between what they or the other person (depending on 
perspective) would do: 1) rehearse the same story on a different 
person first, or 2) tell it right away without rehearsing. 
 
Results 
Anticipated direct veracity judgment. A 2 (perspective: self 
vs. other) × 2 (veracity: truth vs. lie) × 2 (account: initial or repeated) 
mixed design ANOVA on the anticipated feelings of being deceived 
resulted in a main effect of perspective, F(1, 232) = 23.60, p < .0001, 
η!!  = .09, a main effect of veracity, F(1, 232) = 23.60, p < .0001, η!!  = 
.09, a main effect of account, F(1, 232) = 11.56, p < .001, η!!  = .05, no 
interaction between perspective and veracity, F(1, 232) = 1.43, p = 
.23, η!!  = .01, an interaction of perspective and account, F(1, 232) = 
14.60, p < .0001, η!!  = .06, and an interaction of veracity and account, 
F(1, 232) = 4.28, p = .04, η!!  = .02. The three-way interaction did not 
reach significance, F(1, 232) = 1.68, p = .20, η!!  = .01. 
The perspective × account interaction (see Figure 3.1) showed 
that whereas participants anticipated their own first accounts not to 
come across more deceptive (M = 3.08, SE = .14) than their repeated 
accounts (M = 3.03, SE = .13), F(1, 232) = .09, p = .766, η!!  < .001, 
95% CI [-.29, .39], for others’ accounts participants anticipated the 
repeated account to come across more deceptive (M = 4.23, SE = .13) 
than the first (M = 3.36, SE = .14), F(1,232) = 26.07, p < .0001, η!!  = 
.10, 95% CI [.54, 1.12]. Initial accounts were not anticipated to come 
across differently when told by another person than when told by the 
participants themselves, F(1, 232) = 1.92, p = .167, η!!  < .01, 95% CI 
[-.12, .68]. Repeated accounts were anticipated to come across more 
deceptively when told by another person compared to when told by 
participants themselves, F(1, 232) = 41.26, p < .0001, η!!  = .15, 95% 
CI [.83, 1.57].  
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Figure 3.1. Anticipations of feeling deceived for both initial and 
repeated accounts by perspective. Error bars represent standard errors 
of the mean, calculated for data of within-subjects variables based on 
a procedure by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
 
The veracity × account interaction (see Figure 3.2) showed 
that while for initial lies participants did not anticipate to feel lied to 
more or less (M = 3.71, SE = .14) than for repeated lies (M = 3.87, SE 
= .13; F(1.232) = .89, p = .347, η!!  < .01, 95% CI [-.50, .18]), for 
initial truths participants anticipated to feel lied to less (M = 2.72, SE 
= .14) than for repeated truths (M = 3.38, SE = .13; F(1, 232) = 14.95, 
p < .001, η!!  = .06, 95% CI [-.10, -.32]). Additionally, initial accounts 
were anticipated to come across less deceptively when truthful 
compared to when untruthful, F(1, 232) = 24.15, p < .0001, η!!  = .09, 
95% CI [-1.39, -.59]. Repeated accounts were also anticipated to come 
across less deceptively when truthful compared to when untruthful, 


































Figure 3.2. Anticipations of feeling deceived for both initial and 
repeated accounts by veracity. Error bars represent within-subjects 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
Choice between which account is more deceptive. With a 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model we investigated the effects of 
perspective (self vs. other) and veracity (truth vs. lie) on the choice 
between whether an initial or a repeated account would feel more 
deceptive. Results indicated there was a main effect of perspective on 
choice, F(1, 232) = 10.51, p = .001, such that when selecting which 
account was more deceptive, participants who rated their own account 
selected their initial account more often (56.8%) compared to 
participants who rated the accounts of others (35.6%). There was also 
a main effect of veracity on choice, F(1, 232) = 8.94, p = .003, such 
that when selecting which account was more deceptive, participants 
rating truths chose the initial account less often (36.4%) than 


































and veracity on choice was not significant, F(1, 131) = 1.90 p = 
.168. See Figure 3.3. 
 
 
Choice between telling the story right away and 
rehearsing it. With a Generalized Linear Mixed Model we 
investigated the effects of perspective (self vs. other) and veracity 
(truth vs. lie) on the choice between telling the story right away and 
rehearsing it. Results indicated there was no effect of perspective on 
choice, F(1, 232) = 1.20, p = .27, there was an effect of veracity on 
choice, F(1, 232) = 10.97, p = .001, and a marginally significant 
interaction between perspective and veracity, F(1, 232) = 3.34, p = 
.069. Participants rating others’ accounts chose others would tell the 
story right away (55.9 %) about equally as often as participants rating 
whether they themselves would tell the story (61.9%). The effect of 
veracity showed that participants rating truths thought that stories 
would be told right away more often (59.5 %) than participants rating 





Figure 3.3. Distribution of forced choice between which account 
(initial vs. repeated) feels more deceptive, by condition. 
Figure 3.4. Distribution of forced choice between telling the story 






























































In Study 3.1 we explored participants’ anticipations pertaining 
to whether an initial or a repeated account of the same story would 
come across more deceptive. Results showed that participants 
anticipated repeated truths to come across more deceptively than 
initial truths, whereas participants did not anticipate repeated lies to 
come across more deceptively than initial lies. This suggests that 
participants believe that trustworthiness is impaired for a rehearsed 
truth-teller compared to a spontaneous truth-teller, but that rehearsing 
does not impair the trustworthiness of a liar. In line with this, results 
of the choice between whether an account would be given right away 
or rehearsed indicate that truths were chosen to be told right away 
more often than lies. Furthermore, participants were either asked to 
imagine that they told the story or that another person told the story. 
Results indicated that participants believe that their own account 
would not be affected by rehearsing whereas the stories of others 
would be affected by rehearsing. Specifically, regardless of the 
veracity of the account, rehearsed accounts of others were believed to 
come across more deceptive than spontaneous accounts of others. In 





In Study 3.2, we continued to examine veracity judgments by 
looking at participants’ actual deception detection abilities for initial 
and repeated accounts. We tested whether—corresponding to the 
results of Study 3.1—a truth told initially compared to a truth told 
repeatedly comes across more honest, and whether a lie told initially 
compared to repeatedly comes across less honest. Moreover, we 
assessed veracity judgments in both a direct and an indirect way. For 
the direct veracity judgments, next to asking participants to choose 
between whether they believed a target to be lying or telling the truth, 
we asked participants to indicate how much they felt lied to. This may 
aid detection because research has shown intuitive judgments to 
outperform deliberated judgments (e.g., Albrechtsen et al., 2009). 
Importantly, because there is now some evidence that indirect 
53 
judgments distinguish liars from truth-tellers better than direct 
judgments (cf. Ulatowska, 2014; van ’t Veer et al., 2014; Vrij et al., 
2001), we aimed to test whether indirect measures still differentiate 
between truths and lies even if statements are repeated. Therefore, 
next to direct veracity judgments, we assessed several indirect 
veracity judgments. First of all, we assessed participants’ confidence 
in their direct judgments (cf. DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & 
Muhlenbruck, 1997). Secondly, following prior research indicating 
that people believe liars show nervous behaviors and increase their 
movements (Vrij & Semin, 1996; Vrij & Mann, 2001), we assessed 
participants’ impression of the targets’ confidence, movement and 
nervousness as a measure of the ease of expression of the targets. And 
thirdly, because people readily differentiate others by their affinity for 
them (e.g., trustworthiness, warmth; Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, & De 
Neys, 2013; Fiske et al., 2007), we assessed an affective judgment, 
namely participants’ liking of the targets. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and forty seven 
Tilburg University students participated—94 females, Mage = 21.74, 
SDage = 2.53—in return for course credit or money (€8 for the entire 
experimental hour). The study was run for the two weeks it was 
scheduled for, resulting in a big enough sample size to have over 80% 
power to find a small effect. We report all data exclusions (there were 
none), all manipulations, and all measures in the study. Participants 
were presented with four videos in which we randomly varied whether 
an account was given spontaneously or whether it was repeated, and 
whether a target person told the truth or lied, resulting in a 2 (account: 
initial or repeated) × 2 (veracity: truth or lie) within-subjects design.  
Video material. Participants watched four videos that were 
sampled from sixteen videos of four targets (2 females, Mage = 22.08, 
SDage = 0.27). Sampling was done in such a way that a given 
participant saw four different targets. Separate videos depicted the 
first or second recording of a truthful or deceitful answer by the target 
person to the question “Can you tell me what you day looked like 
yesterday?”. Before each time a target person went into the video 
recording room—for the lie and truth separately—a first research 
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assistant randomly told the target person to either lie or tell the truth. 
The second research assistant who was in the recording room was 
unaware of truth/lie condition, and posed the same question twice in a 
row in order to first get a spontaneous answer and then a repeated 
answer from the same target person. Targets directed their answer to 
the second research assistant (who was sitting next to the camera) and 
went through their entire day, taking their time and freely correcting 
themselves if mistakes were made. The target person’s full body was 
visible on the videos. The average duration of the videos was 1 minute 
and 9 seconds (SD = 34.29 seconds), which included the voice of the 
second research assistant posing the question. Truth and lie videos did 
not differ significantly in duration, and neither did recordings of initial 
and repeated accounts (all ts <1).  
Procedure. Participants were first presented with all the 
questions they were going to answer about the target person in each 
video. This was done to keep knowledge of the questions comparable 
between the first and subsequent videos. Participants watched a total 
of four videos, however, this number was unknown to participants in 
order to avoid strategic answering. After each video we first asked 
participants to assess their own feelings of being deceived on a 
continuous direct veracity judgment: “Do you have the feeling that 
this was a lie?” (slider from 0 = not a lie, to 100 = a lie), followed by 
a binary direct veracity judgment: “If you had to choose, would you 
say this was mainly a lie or mainly the truth?” (binary judgment 
between “truth” or “lie”). Next, participants’ indirect veracity 
judgments were assessed. First, participants indicated their confidence 
in the direct judgments: “How sure are you about this?” (slider from 0 
= not at all sure, to 100 = very sure). Second, we assessed the 
impression of ease of expression a target person made. We asked 
about the target person’s confidence: “To what extent did the person 
on the video come across confident?” (slider from 0 = not at all 
confident, to 100 = very confident), about the target person’s 
nervousness: “To what extent was the person on the video nervous?” 
(slider from 0 = not at all nervous, to 100 = very nervous), and about 
the target person’s movement: “How much movement did the person 
show?” (slider from 0 = no movement at all, to 100 = a lot of 
movement), α = .71. Third, as the last indirect veracity judgment we 
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assessed whether participants liked the target person: “To what extent 
do you like the person on the video?” (Slider from 0 = not at all, to 
100 = very much). Demographics were ascertained (age, gender) and 
participants were asked whether they knew any of the targets5.  
 
Results 
Direct veracity judgment: Feelings of being lied to. A 
2(account: initial vs. repeated) × 2(veracity: truth vs. lie) repeated 
measures ANOVA on participants’ feelings of being deceived 
revealed there was no main effect of account, F(1, 146) = 1.48, p = 
.23, η!!  = .01. There was a main effect of veracity, F(1,146) = 6.95, p 
= .009, η!!  = .05, which was qualified by an interaction between 
account and veracity, F(1, 146) = 9.13, p = .003, η!!  = .06. Subsequent 
pairwise comparisons indicated that when looking at initial accounts, 
participants felt lied to less by truth-tellers (M = 27.49, SD = 24.55) 
than by liars (M = 39.85, SD = 30.63), F(1, 146) = 15.54, p < .001, η!!  
= .10, 95% CI [-18.56, -6.16]. For repeated accounts, there was no 
difference between truth-tellers (M = 36.31, SD = 28.30) and liars (M 
= 35.62, SD = 26.01), F(1, 146) = .05, p = .82, η!!  < .001, 95% CI [-
5.33, 6.72]. Truth-tellers’ initial accounts made participants feel lied 
to less than their repeated truth, F(1,146) =  9.90, p = .002, η!!  = .06, 
95% CI [-14.37, -3.28]. For liars, the initial and repeated lie did not 
differ significantly, F(1,146) = 2.08, p = .15, η!!  = .01, 95% CI [-1.56, 










5 15% of participants knew one or more of the targets. In- or excluding these 
participants in the analyses did not change the interpretation of the analyses. 
We report the analyses including all participants. 
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Figure 3.5. Participants’ feeling of being deceived by account (initial 
or repeated) for both truthful and untruthful accounts. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean calculated for within-subjects.  
 
 
Direct veracity judgment: Truth or lie. To examine the 
forced veracity choice, we performed a Generalized Linear Mixed 
Model with this direct veracity judgment as the dependent variable 
and both account and veracity as fixed factors. Results revealed no 
main effect of account, F(1, 584) < .01, p = .97, a main effect of 
veracity, F(2, 584) = 6.54, p = .011, and an interaction between 
account and veracity, F(1, 584) = 6.54, p = .011, confirming the above 
mentioned results that while initial accounts of lies were judged to be 
lies more often (34.7%) than initial accounts of truths (16.3%), lies 
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and 24.5%). Overall, participants were correct 54.6% of the time, 
which was significantly different from chance, t(146) = 2.44, p = .016, 
d = .20, 95% CI [.87, 8.32].  
Indirect veracity judgment: Confidence in veracity 
judgment. A 2(account: initial vs. repeated) × 2(veracity: truth vs. lie) 
repeated measures ANOVA on participants’ confidence in their own 
veracity judgment revealed no main effects of account, veracity, nor 
their interaction (F(1,146) = 1.94, p = .17, η!!  = .01, F(1,146) = 2.06, 
p = .15, η!!  = .01, and F(1,146) = .49, p = .48, η!!  < .01, respectively). 
This suggests participants did not differ in their confidence when 
judging initial truths (M = 65.08, SD = 24.27), repeated truths (M = 
64.35, SD = 24.86), initial lies (M = 63.78, SD = 24.94), and repeated 
lies (M = 60.40, SD = 24.62). 
Indirect veracity judgment: Ease of target’s expression. A 
2(account: initial vs. repeated) × 2(veracity: truth vs. lie) repeated 
measures ANOVA on participants’ impression of the targets’ ease of 
expression revealed only a main effect of account, F(1,146) = 10.17, p 
= .002, η!!  = .07, and no main effect of veracity, F(1,146) = .17, p = 
.677, η!!  < .01, nor an interaction, F(1,146) = 1.82, p = .180, η!!  = .01. 
This suggests initial accounts come across with more difficulty (M = 
45.99, SE = .98) than repeated accounts (M = 42.17, SE = 1.01; 95% 
CI [1.45, 6.20]). 
Indirect veracity judgment: Liking the target person. A 
2(account: initial vs. repeated) × 2(veracity: truth vs. lie) repeated 
measures ANOVA on participants’ liking of the target person revealed 
a main effect of veracity, F(1,146) = 13.31, p < .001, η!!  = .08, and no 
main effect of account, F(1,146) = .45, p = .51, η!!  < .01, nor an 
interaction, F(1,146) = .41, p = .52, η!!  < .01, respectively), showing 
truth-tellers were liked more (M = 61.85, SE = 1.13) than liars (M = 




In Study 3.2, we found that truth-tellers came across more 
deceptively during their repeated account compared to their initial 
account. The way that truth-tellers came across on their repeated 
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account was no longer distinct from the way liars came across. 
Irrespective of whether a truth or a lie was told, however, repeated 
accounts were judged to have more ease of expression than initial 
accounts. Irrespective of whether an account was given repeatedly or 
not, when targets lied they were liked less than when they told the 
truth. Taken together, Study 3.2 seems to suggest that for liars it is 






Narratives are an important aspect of people’s lives and on 
many occasions, accounts of events are given repeatedly. Even so, the 
influence of retelling (un)true stories on the believability of the 
account has received little empirical attention thus far. Across two 
studies we found that detection of deception was anticipated to be and 
actually was more difficult for repeated stories than for initial 
accounts of the same stories. Moreover, we showed that it is essential 
to distinguish between direct and indirect veracity judgments. 
Specifically, a direct judgment that asked participants to indicate 
whether they thought the target was lying no longer distinguished 
between liars and truth-tellers when their stories were repeated. This 
suggests that knowing whom to trust is best assessed from initial 
unrehearsed stories, because, for these instances, the feeling of being 
deceived is still on the right course to set apart liars from truth-tellers. 
The indirect, affective judgment of liking the target person, in 
contrast, distinguished between liars and truth-tellers for both the 
initial and the repeated accounts of their stories. This finding suggests 
that affective judgments, such as liking another person, seem to 
endure as appropriate guides to sincerity even though stories are 
repeated and the storyteller comes across with more ease of 
expression during this repetition. 
The results of actual feelings of being lied to while attempting 
to detect deception were not entirely in line with the anticipations of 
this feeling that we found in Study 3.1. Repeated accounts of others—
but not of the participants themselves—were anticipated to feel more 
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deceptive then initial accounts, irrespective of whether the account 
was true or false. In Study 3.2, results indicated that repeating a lie 
turned out to be beneficial for the liar, as repeated lies no longer came 
across more or less deceptive than repeated truths. In Study 3.1, 
irrespective of whether they themselves or another person told the 
story, participants anticipated the listener to feel deceived especially 
during repeated truths compared to during initial truths. Repeated lies, 
in contrast to this, were not anticipated to come across more or less 
deceptively than initial lies. These anticipations do resonate with 
actual ratings of feeling deceived in Study 3.2. Furthermore, 
participants in Study 3.1 chose their own initial lies to come across 
more deceptively than their repeated lies, and their own repeated 
truths to come across more deceptive than their initial truths. 
Additionally, the majority of participants in Study 3.1 indicated they 
would not rehearse their own true stories—both these anticipations 
seems to be good practice according to the findings in Study 3.2. 
Connecting both studies, the findings suggest that intuitions about 
coming across honestly suit actual detection performance best when 
these intuitions are provided about one’s own feelings and behavior. 
We think it is likely that this is the case because people have more 




Our results have implications for situations where stories or 
statements are told repeatedly. When direct veracity judgments are 
made, for instance when people are actively trying to tell whether they 
are being deceived, truth-tellers who repeat their story may be 
mistaken for a liar. We did find some benefits to telling a true story, 
and even to telling it repeatedly. Truth-tellers were liked more than 
liars, and on top of this, during their repeated account they left a more 
positive impression in terms of their ease of expression—as measured 
by their confidence, nervousness and amount of movement—than 
during their initial account. Even so, repeated accounts of the truth 
came across more deceptively than initial accounts of the truth. 
Because for liars this pattern was reversed, together this resulted in 
repeated truths no longer making the listener feel any more or less 
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deceived then repeated lies did. A possible explanation could be that 
truth-tellers devote resources to both recalling the actual events and 
recalling the first time they told their story. Additionally, attention 
may be devoted to, for instance, controlled impression management. 
Repeated truths may reflect more deliberated processes, whereas 
spontaneous truths are fairly automatic. The unrehearsed truth may 
therefore come across more sincere than a rehearsed truth. 
For liars, on the other hand, it seems beneficial to repeatedly 
tell a story. Repeated stories have more ease of expression than stories 
that are told for the first time, and repeated lies may no longer be 
distinguishable from repeated truths. It seems likely that once a lie is 
thought-up, merely reiterating what was said before is fairly effortless. 
The current research has focused on relatively small and 
inconsequential lies. Once lies become more elaborate and lie-catchers 
start to ask difficult questions, liars will likely have to expand more 
and more effort to keep consistent (e.g., Vrij & Granhag, 2012). It is 
especially noteworthy that even with the small lies that were studied 
here, liars did pay a price for their deception: They were liked less 
than truth-tellers. Outside of the lab, depending on the purpose of a 
lie, being liked less may be a small price to pay. However, it is unclear 
whether this brings along long-term consequences for liars. People 
who follow their gut may, for instance, be less inclined to trust or 
engage with those who are deceiving them.  
 
Indirect veracity judgments 
Our findings have important implications for researchers who 
study lie detection. This is often studied by trying to find cues that 
liars display (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Ekman, 2003; Levine et al., 
2011), looking at manipulations aimed at eliciting cues from the liar 
(e.g., Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012; Vrij & Granhag, 2012), 
and individual difference measures within observers (e.g., Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008; Reinhard, 2010). As the current research suggests, it 
is likewise valuable to study the conditions under which targets tell 
their story (i.e., whether it is rehearsed) and the conditions under 
which veracity judgments are made (i.e., whether the observer is 
asked to judge veracity directly or indirectly). The different types of 
indirect measures that were assessed here aimed to add to the 
61 
literature by disentangling participants’ impressions of the ease of 
expression of a target person and participants’ affective reactions 
towards the target person. Indeed, these indirect measures showed 
different patterns. 
Our results did not reveal a difference between liars and truth-
tellers on how fluent the stories came across, suggesting that it is not 
the fact that liars come across more disfluent that causes them to be 
liked less than truth-tellers. The question is what it is exactly that 
causes individuals to be liked more when they are telling the truth 
compared to when they were lying. This result seems to be a robust 
finding, as it is in line with research showing that likeability is 
negatively related to the amount of lies people tell in a 10 minute get-
acquainted conversation (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006). 
Furthermore, this finding replicates previous studies (van ’t Veer et 
al., 2014; van ’t Veer, Gallucci, Stel, & van Beest, 2015). Future 
research could further investigate this. We think it is conceivable that 
the different patterns of indirect measures point at separate processes 
underlying reliance on appearance (i.e., deliberate assessments of 
cues; targets repeating their account always came across with more 
ease of expression) and reliance on character assessments (i.e., 
intuitive assessments of warmth; targets who lied were always liked 
less). 
When our participants were asked to detect deception directly, 
they no longer distinguished truth-tellers from liars when stories were 
rehearsed. These findings resonate with established findings in the 
literature suggesting that with direct veracity judgments liars and 
truth-tellers are not readily distinguishable (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
The fact that for the initial stories we did find that liars made 
participants feel more deceived than truth-tellers may be due to a 
combination of several factors. The question we asked to assess 
participants’ direct veracity judgment was framed in terms of ‘feeling 
deceived’ and this framing in terms of feelings may have induced 
participants to answer more in line with their gut feeling towards the 
targets. Next to this, targets displayed on the videos were not told the 
question they would be asked beforehand. The initial stories were 
therefore not thought-out beforehand, and contained the targets’ 
spontaneous reactions. It is important for future research to keep this 
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in mind when developing video material. At the very least, it seems 
good practice to report the procedure leading up to the video material 
in enough detail for others to evaluate the spontaneity—or lack 
thereof—of the statements. 
When investigating the detection of deception, it is important 
to resemble real life situations in which both liars and truth-tellers are 
sufficiently motivated to come across honest. For the purposes of the 
current chapter, we used a situation in which we expected minimal 
interference of complicating factors: Giving an account of what one 
did yesterday. Most people can remember their activities of the day 
before with a moderate amount of effort, and this gives a baseline on 
top of which anything that draws upon additional cognitive resources 
would have a fair chance of coming to light. The magnitude of these 
lies resemble real life, as most lies are small and of little consequence 
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). However, this 
does not permit generalization to applied settings or advice on how to 
interview suspects, which we suggest could be a valuable avenue for 
future research. For example, suspects are often asked to repeat their 
statements several times. It therefore seems important to fully 
understand the impact of this repetition on how a suspect is perceived 
by law enforcement officers as well as judges. 
Although far removed from any interrogation setting, the 
current research borrows from research agenda’s set by others who 
argue that deception detection research should move towards 
paradigms that build on basic cognitive research approaches (Bond, 
2012; Lane & Vieira, 2012). Investigating the circumstances under 
which potential liars’ working memory and processing speed is 
hampered could ultimately lead to knowledge that is useful in 
practice: it is in these situations that cues to deception are argued to be 
elicited and enhanced (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Combining 
assumptions about the cognitive processing of the target person with 
indirect and intuitive judgments of the observer—as was done in the 








Conclusions that can be drawn from the current chapter have 
implications for narrators as well as for listeners. As it was found that 
truth-tellers’ repeated account of their story left an impression 
comparable to that of a liar, rehearsing the truth can be 
disadvantageous. This may be due to truth-tellers needing more 
cognitive effort and concentration when they repeat their story, which 
in turn makes truth-tellers more likely to be mistakenly taken for a 
liar. In contrast, when retelling a lie that was—almost as per 
definition—supposed to be remembered well, the impression one 
gives off seems to benefit from repetition. To get a feeling of whether 
someone is lying, it is best to catch the spontaneous account of his or 
her statement. Yet even though it may be favorable to listen to a 
spontaneous story, one cannot always be sure whether a story is 
indeed told for the first time. For this reason, and as can be inferred 
from the current research, it seems that judging whether someone is 










Reliance on effortless modes of 
processing when detecting honesty 
 
Correctly deciding whom to trust on the basis of other people’s 
(dis)honesty is a valuable skill in life. In the current chapter we 
hypothesized that detection of dishonesty may be enhanced under 
stress. In a pre-registered experiment, participants (N = 169) detected 
deception from videos with both a direct veracity judgment (i.e., is the 
target lying?) and an indirect veracity judgment (i.e., is the target 
trustworthy?). During this task, participants in the stress condition 
anticipated giving a public speech, while participants in the control 
condition did not. Results indicated that stress did not facilitate the 
ability to detect deception on direct measures. However, indirect 
detection did seem to be facilitated by stress. Under stress, 
participants judged truth-tellers to be more trustworthy than liars. 
Results are discussed in terms of the automaticity of trustworthiness 






This chapter is based on: van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. 
(2015). Detecting dishonesty and trustworthiness under stress. 




Chapter 4: Reliance on effortless modes of processing  
when detecting honesty 
 
People make decisions about whether to trust others on a daily 
basis. Being able to tell apart a lie from the truth is therefore a 
valuable skill. In the evolutionary race between the deceiver and the 
deceived, the deceiver is thought to be one step ahead: once a new 
way to detect deception has been established, the deceiver comes up 
with a new method to hide the truth (Trivers, 2011). Correspondingly, 
when people are consciously attempting to detect a liar, they are led 
astray most of the time (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Intriguingly, 
theoretical accounts do assume people have an inborn module to 
identify cheaters (Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010)—a mental 
faculty that is less reliant on cognitive processing. Analogous to this, 
indications that humans possess an unconscious, automatic ability to 
detect deception are emerging in the literature (Albrechtsen, Meissner, 
& Susa, 2009; ten Brinke, Stimson, & Carney, 2014). In some 
situations—for instance when meeting a stranger who may be friend 
or foe—it is more important to form an accurate impression of others’ 
intentions than in other situations. If these situations also call for a 
greater reliance on automatic responding, this in turn may increase 
relevant intuitions about whom to trust. It can be suspected that the 
ability to detect deception is particularly important under 
circumstances that involve novelty, lack of control, or 
unpredictability—in short, circumstances that induce stress (Mason, 
1968). Accordingly, in the current chapter we aim to test the influence 
of stress on people’s ability to detect deception directly (i.e., with a 




Deception detection under stress 
 
Stress triggers neural responses that permit an adaptive and 
fast response to the situation—often referred to as a ‘fight-or-flight’ 
response (Cannon, 1914). Situations involving stress are often 
uncertain and usually offer a trade-off between a first intuitive 
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reaction and a deliberate revision of that reaction. This means that 
brain regions that are associated with emotional-intuitive and rational-
analytical decision-making are divergently impacted by stress. 
Decision-making strategies that are controlled and take up more 
processing capacity are thought to be hindered, while automatic 
responses are left relatively unaltered. Stress can thus lead to less 
deliberative processing (Starcke & Brand, 2012). For example, stress 
is associated with more premature closure and non-systematic 
scanning (Keinan, 1987), meaning that during a decision there is little 
consideration of alternative options. This is corroborated by studies 
finding that stress impairs prefrontal cortex (PFC) function (Qin, 
Hermans, van Marle, Luo, & Fernández, 2009) and decreases working 
memory performance (Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 2008). Indeed, stress 
has often been found to undermine performance on laboratory tasks 
where analytical thinking would lead to better outcomes (Keinan, 
1987; Starcke & Brand, 2012). 
There are, however, numerous situations in which automatic 
processing may lead to better outcomes. One such situation is when 
people judge other people’s character (e.g., Ambady, 2010). For 
instance, judging the trustworthiness of economic partners is not 
impaired by concurrent cognitive load, and is independent of 
intelligence (Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, & De Neys, 2013). Additionally, 
having concurrent cognitive load seems to aid deception detection, 
suggesting that an automatic processing style may lead to more 
accurate deception detection than a deliberate processing style 
(Albrechtsen, et al., 2009; Feeley & Young, 2000). Furthermore, 
various findings suggest that subjective, unconscious, and indirect 
veracity judgments result in more accurate discrimination between 
liars and truth-tellers than their more deliberated and direct 
counterparts (DePaulo et al., 2003; Reinhard, Greifeneder, & 
Charmach, 2013; van ’t Veer, Gallucci, Stel, & van Beest, 2015; Vrij, 
Edward, & Bull, 2001). In short, provided that stress leads to 
relatively more automatic processing, it is likely that stress should 
have comparable beneficial effects on deception detection 
performance to other factors that hinder deliberation.  
Next to the enhancing reliance on automatic processing, stress 
might also enhance the ability to tell whether someone’s intentions are 
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genuine through a more sensitized detection of social cues. In a 
stressful environment, it could be adaptive to direct attention to 
relevant signals. When experiencing stress, it seems to be the case that 
priority is given to the processing of emotional stimuli. For instance, 
stress increases neural activity and reaction times for emotional 
stimuli (Li, Weerda, Milde, Wolf, & Thiel, 2014) and directs attention 
to these stimuli at the cost of working memory performance (Oei et 
al., 2012). Sensitivity to social cues is also heightened during other 
kinds of stressful negative experiences, such as social exclusion. After 
recalling the stressful experience of being rejected, people seem to be 
better able to discriminate true smiles from deceptive smiles 
(Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & Claypool, 2008). As it can be 
costly for rejected individuals to affiliate with dishonest others, it 
seems they are better able to detect this dishonestly. Similarly, when 
under stress, it would be most advantageous to direct affiliation and 
cooperation efforts towards individuals who have genuine intentions. 
Truth-tellers, compared with liars, may leave a more positive 
impression because their emotional expressions are genuine. Although 
meta-analyses indicate that there are few reliable cues that liars 
portray, if anything, they come across more tense and less 
forthcoming than truth-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003). Liars may also 
‘leak’ the emotional states they are attempting to suppress (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1969). In short, a person who experiences stress could more 
readily perceive the emotions—however fleeting—that differentiate a 
truth-teller from a liar.  
 
 
Indirect veracity judgments 
 
As mentioned above, there is no single distinct cue that 
informs observers that they are being lied to. Nevertheless, a 
combination of factors seems to leave an overall impression that 
‘something about this person is off’. One possible explanation for this 
is that this impression is based on signals of the genuineness with 
which a message is portrayed. Frank, Ekman, and Friesen (1993) 
showed participants videos of targets who displayed genuine 
Duchenne smiles as well as targets who displayed faked non-
70 
Duchenne smiles. Results of a composite measure of trait ratings that 
together formed a general positivity scale revealed that participants’ 
impression of the person they saw was more positive if this person 
displayed Duchenne smiles rather than non-Duchenne smiles. 
Moreover, research by Tyler, Feldman, and Reichert (2006) showed 
that the number of lies that were told during a short interaction was 
negatively related to liking. Importantly, direct comparisons between 
impressions of a target person who lies and a target person who tells 
the truth also reveal that liars are liked and trusted less (van ’t Veer et 
al., 2015; van ’t Veer, Stel, van Beest, & Gallucci, 2014). These kind 
of positive and negative impressions that are born out of honest and 
dishonest interactions may be the very reason why indirect veracity 
judgments—the kind of judgments that do not require an assessment 






Of the many ways that deception detection could be assessed 
indirectly, trustworthiness judgments seem to be the most promising. 
Impressions of the warmth and trustworthiness of another person have 
been argued to be fundamental and important for survival (Fiske, 
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) and a growing body of research suggests that 
people automatically perceive trustworthiness from faces (Bonnefon, 
et al., 2013; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009; Todorov, 2008; 
Willis & Todorov, 2006; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 
2002; Yang, Qi, Ding, & Song, 2011). This research in the area of 
trustworthiness detection has focused mostly on showing participants 
still pictures in which, for instance, facial features related to perceived 
trustworthiness are manipulated (e.g., Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; 
Todorov, Baron, Oosterhof, 2008). However, this does not take into 
account the fundamental aspect of social behavior that actions are 
influenced by the situation. The same person may be dishonest in one 
situation, and entirely honest in another. From the literature on 
behavioral economics it is known that dishonest behavior is not just 
present in a few immoral people, but that most people can be tempted 
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to display dishonest behavior given certain circumstances (Mazar, 
Amir, Ariely, 2008). Accordingly, if people were to trust others 
around them sensibly, they would not just rely on their ability to 
detect cheater personalities or stable facial features, but on an 
impression formed when observing a person who, in a given situation, 
has decided to betray trust.  
There are several indications that information from situation-
related expressions may be informative to the detector. For instance, 
people can distinguish cooperators from non-cooperators when 
viewing a picture that was taken at the moment the target was thinking 
about the decision to cooperate or not (Verplaetse, Vanneste, & 
Braeckman, 2007). Additionally, this ability seems to be stronger than 
the ability to detect trustworthiness from faces that were not taken 
during the decision (Bonnefon, et al., 2013). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the ability to detect trustworthiness from a neutral face is 
an extension of the ability to have a functional reaction towards 
emotional expressions (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009; Todorov, 2008). 
A study by Frank and Ekman (2004) showed that for any given 
individual, the skill to appear honest during a videotaped interrogation 
is likely consistent over different deception situations. This perceived 
truthfulness was found to be driven by dynamic facial actions, and 
was not related to truthfulness judgments from pictures of the targets' 
neutral expression (Frank & Ekman, 2004). Emotional expressions 
and other non-verbal behavior, evidently, are likely to be present more 
in videos or real life interactions rather than in static pictures. This is 
further demonstrated by findings suggesting that people predict 
cooperation of others better after a face-to-face interaction than after a 
computer mediated chat interaction, and that a combination of non-
verbal behaviors displayed by the interaction partner predicts 
trustworthiness (DeSteno et al., 2012).  
Because we believe that judgments made on the basis of more 
information than just facial features could provide additional insights 
into trust behavior, we focused on trustworthiness judgments as an 
indirect measure of deception detection from videos taken of liars and 
truth-tellers. Trustworthiness judgments are suggested to be fairly 
automatic, yet it is unclear whether the additional information 
presented in a video could help or hinder this automatic response. On 
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the one hand, it has been found that adding more information to the 
picture of the face (i.e., pictures that reveal hairstyle and clothing) 
impairs trustworthiness detection (Bonnefon et al., 2013). On the 
other hand, while watching videos that by definition convey more 
information, the ability to detect deception directly is enhanced under 
cognitive load (Albrechtsen et al., 2009). Additional reliance on 
automatic processing may therefore be beneficial when watching 
videos with a rich variety of information. Here, we test whether 
people’s ability to detect dishonesty and untrustworthiness from 
videos is enhanced under stress due to its presumed effect of increased 
reliance on automatic processing. 
 
 
The current research 
 
Taken together, different pieces of evidence lead to the same 
prediction: the ability to detect deception could be enhanced under 
conditions of psychological stress. A pre-registration of this 
hypothesis can be found online (see: https://goo.gl/7LSruw). We 
aimed to test whether stress would positively impact the ability to 
discriminate between liars and truth-tellers when the veracity 
judgment is assessed in a direct as well as an indirect way. 
Importantly, each measure could show an independent effect of stress 
because these measures can operate separately (Ulatowska, 2014). 
Therefore, participants were asked to judge whether they think a target 
person is lying (a direct veracity judgment) as well as how trustworthy 
they believe the target person to be (an indirect veracity judgment). 
We explored whether either of these measures would be enhanced 
under stress. On the one hand, direct deception detection is typically 
not very accurate and therefore stands a lot to gain, as evidenced by a 
higher accuracies found under cognitive load (Albrechtsen et al., 
2009). The direct measure could also outperform indirect measures 
due to the fact that indirect measures already rely on an automatically 
formed judgment and therefore may not allow for much improvement 
in a situation where the tendency to rely on automatic processing is 
high. On the other hand, as mentioned above, it may be argued that 
indirect measures perform better than direct measures, and that is 
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especially so in a stressful situation where knowing whom to trust is 






A total of 190 Tilburg University students participated in 
return for course credit. We applied the planned stopping rule of 
running the study for a full week, which resulted in the sample size 
exceeding our planned minimal sample size of 150. Twenty-one 
participants (11%) were excluded on the basis of our pre-defined 
exclusion criteria: Three participants did not take part in the stress 
manipulation (i.e., giving a presentation), an additional 10 participants 
did not believe the manipulation, and an additional eight participants 
knew one of the targets (analyses including these participants did not 
change the interpretation of the results, see analyses provided on the 
Open Science Framework). The final sample consisted of 169 
participants (134 females, 2 unknown), Mage = 19.59, SDage = 2.10. 
 
Procedure  
Before watching videos with the goal of detecting deception, 
participants were randomly assigned to either a stress or a no stress 
condition. Participants in the stress condition were asked to prepare a 
public speech; participants in the no stress condition were asked to 
think of positive and negative aspects of their previous holiday. This 
standardized paradigm for laboratory settings reliably induces 
moderate psychosocial stress in the stress condition (e.g., Preston, 
Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007; Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, 
& Brand, 2008; Steele & Josephs, 1988). All participants were then 
presented with eight videos of around 20 to 30 seconds. The videos 
displayed a target person talking about their identity. The videos were 
selected out of a total set of 16 videos. The total set of 16 videos 
contained two video recordings of eight targets: One truthful and one 
deceitful message per target. We ensured that participants never rated 
the same target twice and that all participants rated four truthful and 
four deceitful messages (for details on the video material, see van ’t 
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Veer, et al., 2014). Participants were told beforehand that for each of 
the videos they would see during this task they would have to form an 
impression of the target person on the video by rating their 
trustworthiness and veracity. Participants were not informed about the 
number of videos in order to reduce the tendency to judge half as a lie. 
Indirect deception detection was measured with the question: “How 
trustworthy do you judge this person to be?” (slider-scale from not at 
all trustworthy [0] to very trustworthy [100], numbers not visible to 
participants). Following this, direct deception detection was measured 
with the question: “Do you think this person lied?” (forced choice; yes 
or no).  
After participants judged eight targets, we assessed both mood 
and anxiety as a check of our stress manipulation. Mood was assessed 
with one item: “At this moment I feel: very negative – very positive” 
(slider-scale from 0 to 100, numbers not visible). Next, the state part 
(20 items) of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1977) was assessed. The state 
part of the STAI is typically used as a manipulation check for stress 
manipulations (see Starcke & Brand, 2012), and includes items like “I 
am tense” and “I feel pleasant” (reversed coded) using a 4 point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (very much so). 
Next, participants were asked whether they recognized any of the 
targets and subsequently demographics were ascertained.  
We decided to have participants give an actual speech at the 
end of the experiment. This ensured that we did not have to deceive 
our participants and also prevented participants from spreading 
possible disbelief about our stress manipulation. Therefore, after 
providing demographic information and after completing an unrelated 
experiment that also relied on our stress induction, participants 
performed the speech. After the speech, participants again filled out 
the mood item as well as the STAI, allowing us to test whether their 
anxiety levels were back to normal. Note that we only assessed mood 
and the STAI a second time in the stress condition because 
participants in the control condition did not have to give a speech and 
therefore their stress levels were assumed to stay relatively stable over 





Below we first report the analyses that we planned to do to (1) 
check our manipulation and (2) to test whether stress affects deception 
detection abilities. After this, we report additional analyses on (3) 
stress levels after the experiment that we did not register upfront. 
 
Manipulation checks 
To check the stress manipulation, we compared the mean 
STAI scores with an independent samples t-test. Results confirmed 
that stress was higher in the stress condition (M = 44.73, SD = 11.08) 
than in the control condition (M = 36.88, SD = 8.08), t(141.32) = 5.18, 
p < .0001, d = .82, CI [4.85; 10.84]. We also explored the difference 
in mood with an independent samples t-test. This revealed that 
participants in the stress condition felt less positive (M = 53.52, SD = 
19.67) than participants in the control condition (M = 64.10, SD = 
16.69), t(164) = -3.75, p < .0001, d = .59, CI [-16.16; -5.01]. 
 
The influence of stress 
 Indirect veracity judgment. Trustworthiness judgments in 
both conditions for truth-tellers and for liars are displayed in Figure 
4.1. As planned, we ran a mixed design ANOVA with trustworthiness 
as the dependent variable, condition as a between-subjects predictor 
and veracity of the target person as a within-subjects predictor. 
Results of the mixed design ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
veracity of the target person, F(1, 165) = 4.74, p = .031, η!!  = .028, 
indicating that liars were rated lower on trustworthiness (M = 56.30, 
SE = 1.07) than truth-tellers (M = 58.73, SE = 1.00). There was no 
main effect of condition, F(1, 165) = .76, p = .39, η!!  = .005, and no 
interaction between veracity and condition, F(1, 165) = 1.73, p = .190, 
η!!  = .010.  
The interaction effect in the Mixed Design ANOVA on 
trustworthiness indicated that the difference between differences for 
liars and truth-tellers per condition was not significant. Because we 
predicted trustworthiness detections to be present under stress (i.e., a 
difference between trustworthiness judgments for liars and truth-
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tellers under stress), we ran pairwise comparisons to examine 
trustworthiness detection within each condition. Pairwise comparisons 
indicate that in the stress condition liars were rated lower on 
trustworthiness (M = 56.33, SE = 1.55) than truth-tellers (M = 60.22, 
SE = 1.46), F(1, 165) = 5.79, p = .017, η!!  = .034, whereas in the 
control condition liars were not rated differently on trustworthiness (M 
= 56.27, SE = 1.47) than truth-tellers (M = 57.23, SE = 1.38), F(1, 
165) = .39, p = .533, η!!  = .002. This observed pattern is in line with 
an ability to distinguish truth-tellers from liars under stress. See Figure 
4.1. 
Direct veracity judgment. In table 4.1 we present the 
frequency of the direct veracity judgments (i.e., judging a target to be 
truthful or deceitful) as a function of the veracity of the target (liars 
vs. truth-tellers) and condition (stress vs. control). The overall 
detection accuracy was 54.49%. A one sample t-test indicated that this 
overall accuracy was higher than chance, t(166) = 3.321, p = .001, dz 
= .26, CI [.0182; .0716]. This accuracy rate is comparable to the 
accuracy rate of 53.98% found in a meta-analysis (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006). 
As planned, we ran a Generalized Mixed model to test the 
effect of the target’s veracity and condition on whether a message was 
rated as a truth. Results revealed a significant effect of veracity of the 
target person, F(1, 1332) = 11.58, p < .001, indicating that truth-tellers 
were more likely to be judged to be truth-tellers (69.76%) than liars 
were (60.78%). There was no effect of condition, F(1, 1332) < .01, p 
= .984, and no interaction between veracity and condition, F(1, 1332) 




Figure 4.1. Trustworthiness judgments for liars and truth-tellers by 
condition. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE. 
 
Table 4.1 
Frequency (and percentage) of participants’ direct veracity judgments 
by target’s veracity and condition 
  Target’s veracity 










































For the direct veracity judgment, we also tested the difference 
in the frequency of truth judgments for liars compared with the 
frequency of truth judgments for truth-tellers per condition. Pairwise 
comparisons indicate that in the stress condition liars were judged to 
be a truth-teller less often (61.70%) than truth-tellers (69%), F(1, 630) 
= 3.69, p = .055. In the control condition liars were also judged to be a 
truth-teller less often (59.90%) than truth-tellers (70.50%), F(1, 165) = 
8.52, p = .004. This observed pattern is markedly different from the 
pattern we found for the indirect measures. These tests show that for 
both the stress condition (although marginally significant) as well as 
the control condition, liars were judged to be truth-tellers less often 
than truth-tellers, indicating that participants did have a slight 
tendency to give the right veracity judgments (as is also evidenced by 
the above-mentioned overall accuracy).  
Stress levels after the presentation. We conducted 
additional analyses to verify that participants’ anxiety level and mood 
in the stress condition would return back to baseline after the 
presentation. A paired samples t-test indicated that stress levels were 
indeed higher before the presentation (M = 44.64, SD = 11.13) 
compared with after the presentation (M = 38.58, SD = 9.54), t(77) = 
4.86, p < .0001, dz = .55, CI [3.58;8.55]. Similarly, a paired samples t-
test indicated that mood was more negative before the presentation (M 
= 53.99, SD = 19.35) compared with after (M = 60.49, SD = 20.88), 
t(77) = -2.78, p = .007, dz = .31, CI [-11.15; -1.85].  
 An additional independent samples t-test indicated that after 
the presentation both the anxiety level and mood of the participants in 
the stress condition was no longer significantly different from the 
anxiety level and mood of participants in the control condition, t(164) 
= 1.24, p = .218, d = .19, CI [-1.01;4.39] and t(163) = -1.23, p = .219, 
d = .19, CI [-9.40;2.17], respectively. This suggests that participants in 





The aim of the current research was to examine whether stress 
affects the ability to detect dishonesty of another person. Furthermore, 
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we explored whether it mattered how veracity is assessed. 
Specifically, participants were asked to detect veracity indirectly (i.e., 
is the target trustworthy?) as well as directly (i.e., is the target lying?). 
Overall, when participants gave their impression of the 
trustworthiness of the targets, they judged truth-tellers to be more 
trustworthy than liars. This ability to distinguish between liars and 
truth-tellers on indirect measures is in line with previous findings 
where the indirect question assessed the target’s appearance (e.g., 
whether they have to think hard; Ulatowska, 2010, 2014; Vrij et al., 
2001) and with previous findings where the indirect question assessed 
an intuitive response of the observer (van ’t Veer et al., 2015; van ’t 
Veer et al., 2014). Additionally, on direct measures, participants 
performed slightly above chance when they explicitly had to indicate 
whether the target was lying. This confirms previous findings that 
people are not very accurate in discriminating between liars and truth-
tellers (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  
We found mixed evidence for an effect of stress. First, direct 
deception detection was not enhanced under stress. Second, we found 
partial evidence that indirect judgments were affected by stress. The 
overall analysis of indirect deception detection did not yield an 
interaction. However, specified comparisons did reveal that the ability 
to distinguish between liars and truth-tellers was aided under stress: In 
the stress condition, truth-tellers were judged to be more trustworthy 
than liars, whereas in the control condition trustworthiness judgments 
did not differentiate between truth-tellers and liars. These results 
provide tentative support for the idea that people are able to intuit that 
trust may be betrayed and that stressful circumstances may enhance 
this intuition about the trustworthiness of others. Taken together, 
when evaluating dishonesty under stressful circumstances, it seems 
best to rely on indirect judgments that are inherently more automatic 
rather than on directly assessed veracity judgments. 
We tested the ability to detect trustworthiness from dynamic 
video material because of the assumption that the ability to judge 
others both on the basis of their stable features indicative of moral 
character and their demeanor is likely to be a product of natural 
selection. Humans have a strong tendency to cooperate with those 
who do also, and to punish those who violate moral norms (Fehr & 
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Gachter, 2002; Gintis, Henrich, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2008). During 
primate and human evolution, individuals who were able to assess the 
verbal and non-verbal behavior of those around them would have been 
better able to form reliable social relationships with trustworthy 
individuals. Accordingly, people readily judge good and bad 
intentions in others (Fikse, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn, & 
Bloom, 2008; Winter & Uleman, 1984) and people are able to 
sensibly evaluate others while these others are making their decision 
or after a face-to-face interaction (DeSteno et al., 2012; Verplaetse et 
al., 2007). Combining these findings with findings in the deception 
detection literature, we found that indeed, trustworthiness judgments 
made on the basis of dynamic information were different when a 
target was lying compared with when he or she was telling the truth.  
When a target lied, he or she was deemed less trustworthy 
compared with when he or she was honest. This is in line with 
previous findings that show that this ability to distinguish between 
liars and truth-tellers is present when judgments of liking are made but 
not when more deliberated explicit judgments of whether someone is 
lying are made, even in cases where these latter judgments are made 
on a continuous scale (van ’t Veer et al., 2014). The current results 
further suggest that this trustworthiness detection is automatically 
present: Inducing stress did not improve trustworthiness detection by a 
great margin even though the current manipulation is suggested to 
shift processing to a bottom up fashion. Together with other studies 
that likewise show distinguishability between honest and dishonest 
messages of the same target when affective evaluations are made (van 
’t Veer et al., 2014, 2015), this suggests that indeed people have some 
sort of ‘gut feeling’ about the deceptiveness of their interaction 
partners.   
 
Directions for future research 
The current findings parallel other evidence that likewise 
points in the direction of automatic responses to untrustworthiness. 
For instance, specific neural responses to untrustworthy faces are 
present both when judging trustworthiness explicitly and when 
judging whether the target was a high school or university student 
(Winston et al., 2002). This suggests that neural activity indicative of 
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a ‘gut feeling’ is present irrespective of whether participants are 
explicitly asked to judge trustworthiness. In similar vein, Bonnefon et 
al. (2013) showed that people are able detect trustworthiness from a 
picture of a face, and that this ability was not affected by concurrent 
cognitive load. Interestingly, this ability was present when participants 
responded by making a trust decision in a trust game, yet there was no 
difference in explicit ratings of trustworthiness from the same faces. 
In other words, participants’ behavior towards the targets, not their 
judgments, reflected the ability to detect trustworthiness. This 
suggests that once explicit judgments have to be made from only the 
face, people do not have conscious access to the gut-level processes 
that produce a trust decision. Likewise, direct veracity judgments that 
ask participants to call someone a liar on the basis of dynamic 
information may be too explicit. However, automatically formed 
global impressions of the trustworthiness of a person who may very 
well be lying could tap into the underlying ability to detect 
trustworthiness. It is for future research to examine whether 
trustworthiness judgments made from dynamic information will 
likewise be robust to actual concurrent load and whether people’s 
behavioral choices towards dishonest individuals are advantageous.  
The current data suggest that, especially given our sufficient 
sample size to detect a medium effect size with 98% power, it is likely 
that we are dealing with a smaller effect than expected. Therefore 
caution is warranted when drawing the conclusion that people are or 
are not able to detect liars, especially when taking into account that in 
real life situations there are an infinite number of other factors at play 
that may distract or overwrite relevant intuitions. The current results 
suggest that being under stress—a state that has been argued to hinder 
cognition—is not a factor that distracts from these intuitions. It is for 
future research to examine whether the small effects of first 
impressions can have long-term consequences that are of graver 
importance for the less trusted. Additionally, effects may be bigger in 
instances where participants are not explicitly asked for a judgment 
but are instead, for instance, asked to act towards the target (e.g., to 
cooperate with them or to trust them; cf. Bonnefon et al., 2013). An 
especially fruitful avenue for future research seems to be the 
consideration of moderators indicative of threat and challenge (e.g., 
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Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2012) when participants 





The present experiment provided tentative evidence for an 
enhanced ability to detect deception under stressful circumstances. 
With a direct veracity judgment, the ability to detect deception was 
not enhanced under stress. With an indirect veracity judgment, when 
under stress, trustworthiness judgments of targets that were telling the 
truth were higher than trustworthiness judgments of targets that were 
lying. Importantly, these findings not only suggests that people are 
able to detect trustworthiness from dynamic information about the 
target, they also highlight that the ability to indirectly detect deception 







Effortless warmth responses to honesty 
 
This chapter describes a pilot study, a pre-registration, and a pre-
registered experiment that were conducted to examine psycho-
physiological responses to being lied to. Bridging research on social 
cognition and deception detection, we hypothesized that observing a 
liar compared to a truth-teller would decrease finger skin temperature 
of observers. Participants first watched targets while not forewarned 
that they would later be asked to judge (direct and indirect) veracity, 
and then watched other targets while forewarned about this. During 
both these phases finger skin temperature was measured. Findings 
pertaining to temperature partly confirmed our main hypothesis that 
temperature would decrease when participants observed dishonesty. 
Results confirmed that participants judge liars as less likeable and less 
trustworthy than truth-tellers—an indication of indirect deception 
detection. Effect sizes for trustworthiness and liking judgments were 
similar. Additionally, participants performed around chance level 
when directly judging whether the target person was lying. 
Limitations and directions for future work related to the existence of 
psychophysiological indicators of deception detection are discussed. 
 
 
This chapter is based on: van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., van Beest, I., & 
Gallucci, M. (2014). Registered report: Measuring unconscious deception 
detection by skin temperature. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 442.  
And: van ’t Veer, A. E., Gallucci, M., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015). 
Unconscious deception detection measured by finger skin temperature and 
indirect veracity judgments—results of a registered report. Frontiers in 




Chapter 5: Effortless warmth responses to honesty 
 
Being able to detect deception of others—or at the very least 
knowing whom to trust—was most likely an indispensible advantage 
during human evolution. Indeed, there are many indications that 
judging (moral) character and forming impressions of the intentions of 
others is an elementary, innate ability (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick 
2007; Miller, 2007; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Nevertheless, a robust 
finding in the deception detection literature indicates that people are 
no better than chance at detecting a liar (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This 
is the case, at least, when deception detection ability is assessed with 
veracity judgments that directly ask about the untruthfulness of a 
statement. At the same time, an increasing amount of evidence is 
emerging from the deception detection literature that suggests that 
people’s judgments of liars and truth-tellers do sometimes 
differentiate between the two—especially when these judgments are 
assessed in an indirect way. 
Building on evidence suggesting that people are able to 
differentiate between liars and truth-tellers when asked indirectly, we 
aim to add to this previous work by not only measuring direct and 
affective indirect veracity judgments, but also by exploring the 
possibility of a physiological marker (i.e., an unconscious indicator) 
of this indirect deception detection. In the current chapter we propose 
to measure skin temperature, as we believe that this physiological 
proxy of social interaction could be an important indicator of people’s 
correct intuition towards liars.  
 
 
Intuitive deception detection 
 
As noted above, people are not very good at verbalizing 
whether another individual is lying or not. Indeed, people’s direct 
veracity judgments rarely exceed what could be expected on the basis 
of chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Yet when people’s judgment of a 
liar is assessed in an indirect way, they do seem to be able to 
distinguish the liar from the truth-teller. Although this does not mean 
that people are aware that they are being lied to, it does mean that 
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compared to truth-tellers, people’s impressions of, or feelings toward, 
liars are different. One telling piece of evidence for people’s ability to 
indirectly detect deception is a study comparing direct (‘Is the person 
lying?’) to indirect (‘Does the person have to think hard’) judgments 
made by police officers (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). Results of this 
study indicate that the indirect judgments distinguished between liars 
and truth-tellers (i.e., the liars were judged to be thinking harder), 
whereas the direct judgments did not. A meta-analysis touching upon 
indirect deception detection also found that people report more 
confidence in their judgment after perceiving a truthful compared to a 
dishonest message (DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & 
Muhlenbruck, 1997), leading authors to conclude that this supported 
the idea that feelings of confidence—as indirect measures of 
deception detection—might differentiate truths from lies. 
Additionally, subjective impressions seem to distinguish liars from 
truth-tellers better than objective measures. In their meta-analysis, 
DePaulo et al. (2003) found that subjective measures of verbal 
immediacy (e.g., active vs. passive voice), eye contact, and facial 
pleasantness all discriminated between a liar and a truth teller, 
whereas the objective measurements of these features (e.g., the coding 
of their occurrences by independent researchers) did not. The most 
compelling evidence for people’s ability to sense someone is lying 
comes from research comparing an intuitive to a more deliberative 
processing style. Albrechtsen, Meissner, and Susa (2009) found that 
intuitive judgments of deception were more accurate than deliberative 
judgments. On top of this, these authors found that automatic 
judgments made when conscious attention was directed at a 
concurrent task were more accurate than judgments made after 
conscious reasoning about one’s deception judgment. These findings 
suggest that, on some level, people intuit that they are being lied to 
while they are forming an impression of a liar.  
The fact that directly judging someone to be a liar is difficult 
is understandable considering that there is a lack of cues that people 
can use to reliably detect a liar (DePaulo et al., 2003). Yet even 
though cues might be weak, some evidence of their presence does 
exist. Liars are perceived as more tense and less forthcoming, they 
have less compelling stories, speak in a higher pitch, and make a more 
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negative impression—truth tellers, on the other hand, come across 
more direct, certain, and more personal (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Although not always consciously aware of it, people are very good at 
picking up subtle cues from their social environment (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999). This is, for instance, supported by both research on 
mimicking suggesting that nonverbal behavior is regulated mostly 
outside of conscious awareness and that it has consequences at the 
behavioral level (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel, van Baaren, & 
Vonk, 2008), and research on emotional face-to-face communication 
(Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). Similarly, as we suggest 
here, people might thus unconsciously pick up on some of the less 
apparent cues given away by a liar.  
Our reasoning is based on indications that forming 
impressions of the intentions of other people seems to be an automatic 
process, one that has been argued to be evolved in order to enhance 
chances of survival (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). More specifically, 
to the extent that forming alliances with trustworthy others benefits 
survival and reproduction, being able to detect trustworthiness in 
others has adaptive value. One major marker for trustworthiness is 
emotional expressivity, where emotional expressiveness is positively 
related to being judged as trustworthy (Boone & Buck, 2003). As liars 
may try to control their expressive behaviors (DePaulo et al., 2003), 
liars could generally be perceived as less trustworthy. People judge 
trustworthiness of others very rapidly (Willis & Todorov, 2006), and 
base their social decision-making on it (van ’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). 
People are also especially good at judging someone’s warmth—an 
indication of the favorability of another person’s intentions toward 
us—as compared to their competence (Fiske et al., 2007). In similar 
vein, people judge liars less likable and less trustworthy than truth-
tellers, and tend to increase their own deceptive behavior towards a 
liar (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006). It appears that people are 
wired to detect friendly intent or potential threats in others, and adjust 
their behavior towards them accordingly.  
Seminal work has demonstrated that from early on in life, 
being able to know who to trust and forming emotional attachments is 
essential for development (Bowlby, 1969), and that physical contact is 
essential for survival and psychological wellbeing (Harlow, 1958). 
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Accordingly, it has been argued that the association between warmth 
and trust is strengthened during early development, as physical 
warmth usually co-occurs with care from trusted others (IJzerman & 
Koole, 2011). Recent research also suggests there is a relationship 
between perceiving a person as trustworthy and temperature 
perceptions. Szymkow, Chandler, IJzerman, Parzuchowski, and 
Wojciszke (2013) found focusing on traits unrelated to trustworthiness 
did not affect perceptions of ambient temperature, whereas focusing 
on traits relevant to trustworthiness (i.e., communion, warmth) did. 
This also led the authors to argue that perceptions of temperature—
which could arguably be stemming from bodily temperature 
changes—can inform on the trustworthiness of others. The question 
we are concerned with here is whether forming an impression of an 




Physical and interpersonal warmth 
 
There have been a number of studies linking skin temperature 
to interpersonal relations. For instance, social exclusion not only 
makes people feel bad but it also makes them feel colder (Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008) and this is reflected in actual skin temperature 
(IJzerman et al., 2012). Correspondingly, temporarily holding a warm 
object—such as a tea cup—can mend this negative affect (IJzerman et 
al., 2012) and positively influences judgments of interpersonal 
warmth (trust) and enhances positive behavior towards others 
(Williams & Bargh, 2008). Physical temperature has also been found 
to influence trust behavior in an economic trust game (Kang, 
Williams, Clark, Gray, & Bargh, 2011), and as mentioned above, 
focusing on a target person’s psychological warmth increases 
estimates of ambient room temperature (Szymkow et al., 2013). These 
findings suggest a process of bodily temperature regulation during 
social interaction, wherein elements of the interaction influence the 
body and vice versa. Building on these ideas of the embodiment of 
social relationships, the question arises, then, whether unconsciously 
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picking up on untrustworthiness (i.e., another person lying) is also 
accompanied by temperature changes.  
Finger skin temperature is an excellent way of assessing 
psychophysiological change and reflects sympathetic 
vasoconstriction—a known reaction to pain or mental and emotional 
stressors—with an average delay of about 17 seconds (Kistler, 
Mariauzouls, & von Berlepsch, 1998). Although in the case of 
thermoregulation a lot is still to be revealed about its causes and 
consequences, there are some notable findings. For instance, a 
decrease in skin temperature is usually associated with negative or 
stressful events, such as being asked threatening personal questions 
(Rimm-Kaufman & Kagan, 1996), anticipating and receiving electric 
shocks (Boudewyns, 1976), watching the shower murder scene of 
Alfred Hitchcock's movie 'Psycho', hearing the noise of a ruler 
slapping on a table without seeing it (Kistler et al., 1998) or being 
excluded (IJzerman et al., 2012). It is also found that the decrease in 
finger skin temperature that is observed during relatively stressful 
events can be alleviated by a subsequent relaxation phase 
(Boudewyns, 1976). Obviously, stressful experiences are not the only 
elicitor of changes in physiology, and with this work we aim to 
expand knowledge on the aforementioned relationship between the 
social environment and thermoregulation.   
We suggest that to capture the full range of people’s reactions 
to liars, the physiological reaction of the observer of a liar should also 
be taken into account. Whereas we propose to focus on the observer of 
a liar, to date, more is known about the physiology of liars themselves 
(cf. Podlesny & Raskin, 1977; Wang, Spezio, & Camerer, 2010). For 
instance, in interrogation settings, the polygraph is a well-studied 
instrument, but it is also far from perfect (see Lykken, 1998, for 
a critical review). More specific to thermoregulation, the stress in a 
sender of a deceptive message is found to manifests itself in blood 
flow to the face (specifically, the orbital muscle area) resulting in 
elevated temperature in this area (Tsiamyrtzis et al., 2006). However, 
to our knowledge, we are the first to put forth the argument that the 
physiology—and in particular the thermoregulation—of the receiver 
of a deceptive message should be investigated to acquire knowledge 
of the underlying mechanisms of social interactions. 
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The proposed research 
 
In the proposed research, we aim to explore whether skin 
temperature is influenced by observing liars and truth-tellers and 
whether temperature relates to self-reported judgments of these liars 
and truth-tellers. Previous work has provided two notions that are of 
interest to the current thesis: Physiological markers can precede 
explicit knowledge (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997), 
and, these markers influence decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005, but see Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006, for a critical 
evaluation). In the case of deception detection, a physiological marker 
may precede explicit judgment of a liar. To our knowledge, no attempt 
to find such a physiological marker of deception detection exists to 
date. Yet if this process by which physiological markers influence 
people’s deception judgment could somehow aid people’s conscious 
assessment of a liar, it does not seem to do so unless they are induced 
to rely on their intuition (Albrechtsen et al., 2009). For this reason, we 
will ask participants to rate both their liking and trustworthiness of 
liars and truth-tellers, as indirect measures, and their direct veracity 
judgment. We will measure this together with finger skin temperature 
in two distinct situations: First when participants are not aware they 
might be lied to (i.e., they are not forewarned), and subsequently, 
when they are aware of this possibility (i.e., they are forewarned). We 
thereby examine whether forming an impression of a liar compared to 
a truth-teller, even not having a conscious goal of detecting deception, 
is accompanied by physiological states that can be differentiated by 
measuring finger temperature.  
Below we first describe an exploratory pilot study (Study 5.16) 
that was conducted to familiarize ourselves with methods of 
investigating the proposed association between finger skin 
temperature and deception detection. We then describe how and why 
this pilot study can be improved, and then describe the pre-registered 
experiment we conducted while incorporating these improvements. 
This pre-registered experiment was awarded In Principle Acceptance 
																																																								
6 Data and accompanying syntax can be found via the link: 
http://openscienceframework.org/project/bgrVB/node/YZjUB/files 
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after having gone through peer review. In the appendix to this chapter 
we provide further details of the pre-registration itself. This 
description can also be found in a methods paper holding the pre-
registration, and includes the hypotheses, analysis plan, and proposed 
sample (see van ’t Veer et al., 2014). 
 
 
Study 5.1 (pilot study) 
 
In this study there were 132 participants of which 18.2 % was 
excluded according to the same exclusion criteria that are described 
for the pre-registered experiment below (1 for failure to save the data, 
21 for recognizing a target person, 2 for participating before), leaving 
108 participants (Mage = 20.62, SDage = 2.49, 64.8 % female).  
In this pilot study, participants first saw a five-minute long 
neutral nature movie and then saw a total of four videos of three 
minutes each, in which a target person either gave a truthful or an 
untruthful impression of themselves (below we refer to this as the 
target person’s veracity). While participants were watching these 
videos, we measured their finger temperature. The four videos were 
structured in two blocks of two videos each; in the first block 
participants randomly saw one truth-teller and one liar, and in the 
second block they again randomly saw one truth-teller and one liar. 
After the first block of videos participants answered two veracity 
questions for both videos in the first block, and they again answered 
these same questions after the second block. This allowed us to ensure 
that for the first two videos the participants were not aware of the fact 
they might be lied to, but for the last two videos they were (in the pilot 
study we refer to this factor as awareness). For each target person, the 
participants were asked to indicate how much they liked this person, 
and whether they thought the target person was telling the truth (both 
on 7-point scales).7  
																																																								
7 Because the procedure of Study 5.1 and Study 5.2 are similar (with the 
exceptions that we did not measure trustworthiness in Study 5.1, that the 
‘warm up’ time was shorter in Study 5.1, and that awareness was 
manipulated less strongly in Study 5.1), we refer to the description of the pre-
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Results  
Linear mixed models were performed on the temperature data. 
In our full model, regarding the fixed effects, there was a three-way 
interaction between veracity, awareness and time, b = .0002, 
F(1,73218.7) = 6.69, p = .010. We also found an average (across time) 
interaction between veracity and time, b = .0007, F(1,73218.7) = 
387.14, p < .001, an average (across time) interaction between 
awareness and time b = -.001, F(1,73218.7) = 993.88, p < .001, and a 
quadratic effect of time, b = .000008, F(1, 107.430) = 14.04. 
Additionally, there was a significant main effect of awareness, b = -
.107, F(1, 108.105) = 6.78, p = .011. There were no significant main 
effects of veracity, order, and time. Order did not interact with the 
other experimental factors, and there was no interaction between 
veracity and awareness, all ps > .175.  
These results suggest that veracity predicted temperature 
differently in the unaware vs. the aware phase, and that this effect was 
changing over time. To understand the interactions, we plotted the 
average temperature over time as a function of veracity, broken down 
by awareness levels (see Figure 5.1).  
From Figure 5.1 it becomes apparent that in the first phase 
(i.e., in the first block of videos) participants were warming up over 
time while watching both a video of a liar or a truth-teller. 
Interestingly and surprisingly, in the aware phase (i.e., the second 
block of videos) finger temperature dropped when watching a video of 






registered study (Study 5.2) for a detailed account of the procedure and 
materials used.   
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A) Observed temperature 
 
 




Figure 5.1. Average observed (A) and estimated (B) temperature 
change over time in Study 5.1 as a function of type of video, broken 




In this pilot study, participants’ liking of the target person on 
the video was assessed (the indirect judgment), and whether they felt 
that the target person was telling the truth (the direct judgment). 
Liking for liars was lower (M = 4.57, SD = 1.00) than liking for truth-
tellers (M = 5.15, SD = .80), t(107) = -4.873, p < .001, 95% CI [-.81, -
.34], Hedges's gav = 0.64. The CL effect size indicates that after 
controlling for individual differences, the likelihood that a participant 
scores a truth-teller higher on liking than a liar is 68%. The direct 
deception judgment, however, was not significantly different for liars 
(M = 5.10, SD = 1.14) than for truth-tellers (M = 5.10, SD = 1.14), 
t(107) <1, p = 1. This indicates that even though participants disliked 
liars more than truth-tellers, they did not explicitly judge them as 
being more deceptive than the truth-tellers. We conclude from this 
that people are indeed able to intuit that something about a liar is “off” 
and sense a subtle difference between liars and truth-tellers when their 
judgment is assessed in an indirect way.  
Correlations were run between temperature and liking and 
temperature and veracity judgment for liars and truth-tellers. Out of 
eight correlations run (temperature during a first block-truth with both 
the direct and indirect judgment of the truthful person, temperature 
during a first block-lie with both the direct and indirect judgment of 
the liar, and the same four correlations for the second block) there 
were two significant correlations, both in the second block: the higher 
a participant’s temperature while watching a truth-teller, the more this 
participant thought the target person was telling the truth, r(106) = 
.26, p < .01, and the more this participant thought the target person 
was likable, r(106)  = .19, p < .05.   
To summarize, in the pilot study we found that participants’ 
finger temperature increased while watching a liar or a truth-teller in 
the first block of videos (i.e., when participants were not aware of the 
possibility of being lied to), but in the second block of videos (i.e., 
when participants were aware of the possibility of being lied to), we 
found participants’ finger temperature dropped while watching a liar 
or a truth-teller, but more so for the truth-tellers. This interaction of 
veracity with the different experimental phases is interesting in itself, 
as it shows that our design and stimuli do indeed elicit temperature 
changes in our participants.  
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Improvements to Study 5.1 
Findings of Study 5.1 were not entirely consistent with the 
reasoning outlined in the introduction, and therefore we proposed and 
pre-registered an additional study to confirm or disconfirm our 
hypothesis that participants’ finger temperature will lower when 
perceiving a liar. In Study 5.1, participants’ temperature was still 
increasing with time during the first videos a participant encountered 
(irrespective of whether they were watching a truth or a lie). The 
neutral movie in the pilot study might thus have been too short for 
participants to reach a stable temperature. We feel we can improve on 
the study’s procedure by allowing a longer ‘warm up time’. In other 
words, for the proposed study, we will present the participant with a 
longer neutral movie before the targets are presented. Results of Study 
5.1 also indicate that participants could differentiate between liars and 
truth-tellers on the indirect veracity judgment (i.e., liking), but not on 
the direct veracity judgment. In the pre-registered study, we aimed to 
replicate this finding to assess the robustness of this effect of indirect 
deception detection, and we add to it by now also incorporating a 
measure of trustworthiness of the target person. These direct and 
indirect veracity judgments also allow an attempt to replicate the 
finding in Study 5.1 that higher finger skin temperatures correlate with 
the judgment that someone is telling the truth and with liking that 
person. In our opinion, these initial results provide a tentative 
indication of a physiological marker intertwined with a mechanism 






There were several hypotheses put forward during the pre-
registration of Study 5.2. To facilitate and clarify the distinction 
between our confirmatory and exploratory analyses, we restate the 
hypotheses here. Our main hypothesis was that finger skin 
temperature would decrease during the watching of a 3-min video clip 
of a liar (H1). We further hypothesized that participants would judge 
truth-tellers more trustworthy and likeable than liars (the indirect 
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veracity judgments; H2a), with the additional hypothesis that this 
effect would be bigger for the trustworthiness judgment than for the 
liking judgment, because trustworthiness judgments are suggested to 
be more automatic and intuitive and would therefore tap into the 
covert differences between liars and truth-tellers better (H2b). Next to 
this, we hypothesized that when asked to judge whether a target 
person is lying, participants’ judgment would not differentiate 
between liars and truth-tellers better than chance (the direct veracity 
judgment; H3). Finally, we hypothesized that the indirect veracity 
judgments, namely the liking and trustworthiness for the target person, 
would be positively related to finger skin temperature, whereas the 
direct veracity judgment would not be (H4).  
We also again included two distinct phases in our experiment. 
As in Study 5.1, first participants were not forewarned they might be 
lied to, and subsequently, they were forewarned of this possibility. 
This allowed us to explore whether the hypothesized effects interact 
with the level of suspicion participants may have. People have their 
own ideas about what a liar could look like, yet these beliefs about 
cues are often incorrect (Vrij & Semin, 1996). Having a goal to detect 
deception could therefore arguably make participants look for these 
cues more. Additionally, looking for specific cues (e.g., cues that 
indicate untrustworthiness) may prompt participants to process 
information more systematically. On the one hand, it could be 
expected that increased suspicion in the forewarned phase may result 
in an overall tendency to trust less, without making veracity 
judgments more accurate (De Neys, Hopfensitz, & Bonnefon, 2013). 
On the other hand, being forewarned could benefit the impressions 
that are formed of targets. Signs of untrustworthiness may more 
readily be perceived as such due to high accessibility. We therefore 
tested whether skin temperature, as well as both the direct and the 
indirect veracity judgment, were differently affected in these two 
phases.  
 
Exploratory Research Questions 
In addition to the pre-registered hypotheses and exploratory 
examination mentioned above, we explored our data on the basis of 
two considerations that occurred after the results were in. First of all, 
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we tested whether on the direct veracity judgment participants were 
better than chance at detecting deception while controlling for the 
indirect judgments. We did this to understand the interdependence of 
the direct and indirect veracity judgments: Although trustworthiness 
and likeability judgments were counterbalanced, the direct veracity 
judgment always came after these two indirect judgments. Secondly, 
we also explored whether participants’ tendency to judge a target as a 
truth-teller (truth-bias) was lower in the forewarned phase than in the 
not forewarned phase. Truth-bias has been argued to be especially 
prominent during automatic compared to systematic processing 
(Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2009). Therefore, if truth bias were 
lessened in the forewarned phase this could be an indication, although 
not conclusively so, of more systematic processing.  
 
Method8 
Participants. In accordance with the Registered Report, data 
was collected over a period of three weeks. Participants received 
either course credit or €8. This resulted in a total N of 191, exceeding 
our minimal planned sample size of 120 due to running full weeks. 
We excluded 36 (18.85%) of the participants on the basis of one or 
more of our predefined exclusion criteria; 2 participants for knowing 
that the experiment was about measuring temperature, 28 for being 
acquainted with one or more of the target people on the videos, 10 for 
technical failure of the temperature measurement, and 1 person for 
smoking more than 20 cigarettes a day. We did not disregard any data 
points on the basis of our predefined temperature cut-off: participants’ 
finger skin temperature did not fall below 18 °C or above 37 °C. Our 
final sample therefore consisted of 155 participants, 60.65 % female, 
Mage = 21.35, SDage = 3.78, age range: 18-53 years. Participants 
completed an hour of experiments of which this study was the last half 
hour, allowing skin temperature to reach a stable level before the 
experiment began. We did not deviate from the registered minimum 
sample size, data exclusions, manipulations, or measures in the study 
except for one instance that we outline in footnote 11. 
																																																								
8 For a description of adequate detail to allow close replication is provided in 
the pre-registration of this experiment (see Appendix for Chapter 5).  
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Design and Procedure. Participants’ finger skin temperature 
was measured with an iButton (see Pouw, Flore, & IJzerman, 2012 for 
software instructions) during the entire experiment. The first 
experimental factor, veracity of the target person, was manipulated by 
showing participants a total of four videos containing either a truth-
teller or a liar. The second experimental factor, being forewarned or 
not, was manipulated by not informing participants that the goal of 
watching the videos was to detect deception for the first two videos 
(not forewarned phase). For the last two videos, participants were 
informed of this (forewarned phase)9.    
All participants first watched a nature documentary of 8 
minutes, which allowed the iButton to reach a stable finger 
temperature. Participants then watched two videos of 3 minutes that 
randomly contained a target person being truthful or untruthful about 
their identity (not forewarned phase). Next, participants completed our 
three main dependent variables: For the first and second target person 
separately, participants were asked to indicate how much they liked 
this person and how trustworthy they thought this person was (the 
indirect veracity judgments; both on 7-point scales, order 
counterbalanced between participants), followed by whether they 
thought the target person was telling the truth (the direct veracity 
judgment; forced choice between yes or no).  
We refer to the next phase as the forewarned phase. Due to 
completing the three main dependent variables participants were now 
warned about the type of questions they would be asked. From these 
questions, in turn, they could infer that there was a possibility that the 
target person would lie. We further stressed the purpose of watching 
the next videos by telling participants they would get the same 
questions for these videos. Additionally, all three questions were 
repeated to help remind them. Participants then proceeded to watch 
the last two videos that randomly contained a truth-teller or a liar, and 
completed the three main dependent variables for this third and fourth 
target person. At the end of the experiment, participants indicated 
their age, gender, smoking behavior, acquaintance with any of the 
																																																								
9 In Study 5.1 these two phases were termed ‘unaware’ and ‘aware’. 
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people presented in the videos, dominant hand, and their thoughts on 
what the experiment was about. 
 
Results 
All data pre-processing steps (as described in the pre-
registration) are available from the first author on request. De-
identified data, syntax, R scripts and supplemental material are  




Temperature trajectories. The first hypothesis stated that 
finger skin temperature would decrease while observing a liar (H1). 
Figure 5.2 shows the average temperature trajectories over time for 
both the not forewarned and forewarned phase. To test the first 
hypothesis, a model was run in which all factors were modeled as both 
fixed and random effects in order to estimate the main effect of 
veracity, the main effect of gender, the main effect of being 
forewarned, the main effect of order, their interactions, and the 
interaction of the experimental factors with time. As described in the 
pre-registration, the interaction of the experimental factors veracity, 
being forewarned and time informs on whether temperature 
trajectories change depending on the target person’s veracity and on 
whether participants were forewarned of the fact that this is a situation 
in which they have to detect deception. Therefore, the most important 
effect of the complete model is the interaction effect of the 
experimental factors and their interaction with time, because the 
expected change in temperature due to the experimental factors should 
unfold over time10. 
																																																								
10  As planned, we computed participants’ temperature minus their 
temperature at the beginning of the video, and because we should allow some 
time for any influence of our manipulations to take effect, we centered time 
on the last second of the video. This deviates from our original plan to center 
time on 85 seconds, however it does not influence the interactions between 
time, veracity, and being forewarned that are of interest. This will produce an 
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Figure 5.2. Average observed temperature change (with confidence 
interval) over time as a function of veracity of the target person (truth 
or lie), broken down by phase: While not forewarned of the possibility 
of deception (left) and while forewarned of the possibility of 
deception (right).  
 
There was a main effect of time (b = .0006, F[1, 153.026] = 
5.251, p = .023) and a quadratic effect of time (b = .000007, F[1, 
154.432] = 46.779, p < .001), indicating that participants’ finger skin 
temperature dropped during a video and climbed a little towards the 
end of the video. To grasp the meaning of the size of these effects of 
time, one could consider that on average our participants’ finger skin 
temperature was getting one tenth of a degree colder in 3 minutes. 
There was also a main effect of gender (b = -.146, F[1, 154.140] = 
6.829, p = .010) indicating females were relatively colder than males, 
but there was no interaction of gender with the other experimental 
factors (all ps > .341). Neither veracity nor being forewarned had a 
main effect (ps .866 and .509, respectively), and time did not interact 
																																																																																																																							
estimate (b) of the influence of observing a truth-teller or a liar for 

































significantly with veracity or being forewarned (p = .598 and .122, 
respectively). The order of seeing a truth-teller or a liar first did not 
have an effect on participants’ temperature, nor did the order of 
judging trustworthiness or liking first (p = .800 and p = .848, 
respectively). Neither of these orders interacted with veracity or being 
forewarned (p = .626 and p = .494, respectively).11,12,13 
Importantly, there was a marginally significant three-way 
interaction between veracity, being forewarned, and time, b = -.001, 
F(1, 154.001) = 3.598, p = .060, and, also a marginally significant 
interaction between veracity and being forewarned, b = -.165, F(1, 
153.534) = 3.461, p = .065 (see Figure 5.2). Together, these 
interactions suggests that when participants were not forewarned, their 
finger skin temperature lowered more when they were watching a 
																																																								
11  In the pre-registration we stated that participants who had “prior 
experience with the temperature measure (and its debriefing) will be offered 
participation in another study and will be refused participation in the current 
study on theoretical grounds, as people may be able to consciously control 
their own finger temperature (Keefe, 1978)”. Two participants did participate 
but stated in their comments they were aware that temperature was measured, 
and thus we saw fit to exclude them. Not excluding these two participants 
does not change the overall results: The interaction between veracity and 
being forewarned is still marginally significant, b = -.173, F(1, 155.599) = 
3.758, p = .054 and so is the interaction between veracity, being forewarned, 
and time, b = -.001, F(1, 156.000) = 3.780, p = .054. 
12 We excluded one participant who indicated to smoke more than 20 
cigarettes a day (as our pre-defined exclusion criteria required). Including 
this participant did not change any of the interpretations of the results, both 
the interaction between veracity and being forewarned and the interaction 
between veracity, being forewarned, and time were marginally significant (b 
= -.166, F(1,154.453) = 3.552, p =.061, and b < .001, F(1, 155.000) = 3.655, 
p = .058, respectively). 
13 As was specified in the pre-registration, we also ran our full model while 
excluding participants who did not reach 30 °C during the neutral nature 
movie. This left a total of 108 participants (about two thirds of our total 
sample; Mage = 21.49, SDage = 4.25, 53.70 % female). Excluding these 
participants did not change the estimate of the veracity × being forewarned 
interaction, however, the effect did become non significant: b = -.168, 
F(1,107.780) = 2.259, p = .136. 
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truth-teller compared to when they were watching a liar. Yet when 
participants were forewarned, their finger skin temperature lowered 
more when they were watching a liar compared to when they were 
watching a truth-teller. At the end of the videos, for not forewarned 
participants, watching a truth-teller meant a finger temperature .101 
degrees colder than when watching a liar, whereas when participants 
were forewarned, watching a truth-teller meant a finger temperature 
.077 degrees warmer than when watching a liar. In other words, when 
watching truth-tellers, without consciously knowing what they were 
looking for, our participants’ temperature lowered more than when 
participants did know what they were looking for. When watching 
liars, however, temperature lowered no matter whether participants 
were forewarned or not. 
From the marginally significant three-way interaction, we can 
tentatively conclude that our prediction that finger skin temperature 
would decrease while participants watch a liar (H1) is supported by 
the data. However, only for the phase in which participants were 
forewarned that they could be lied to was this decrease more 
pronounced than the decrease we observed when participants were 
watching truth-tellers. Moreover, there was significant variation at the 
participant level, meaning that the effect of observing a liar or a truth-
teller on skin temperature varied from one participant to another. We 
should therefore not exclude the possibility that there is an unknown 
individual difference characteristic that moderates the relationship 
between veracity and skin temperature (e.g., Whitsett & Shoda, 
2014).  
Indirect veracity judgments. Figure 5.3 depicts the means 
and standard errors of the indirect veracity judgments (trustworthiness 
and liking). We ran two separate models to test Hypothesis 2a; the 
first to assess whether liars were liked less than truth-tellers, the 
second to assess whether liars were rated lower on trustworthiness 
than truth-tellers.  
The first linear mixed model with liking as the dependent 
variable and veracity, being forewarned, and order as predictors 
revealed a main effect of veracity, b = -.364, F(1, 461.532) = 13.735, 
p < .001, meaning that on average liars were liked less (M = 4.706, SE 
= 0.79) than truth-tellers (M = 5.071, SE = 0.79). There was also a 
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main effect of being forewarned, b = -.247, F(1, 462.203) = 6.287, p = 
.013, meaning that when participants were forewarned, they judged 
the target person less likeable. There was no interaction between 
veracity and being forewarned (p = .109), and no effect of order of 
seeing a truth-teller or a liar first (p = .717). The order of first judging 
liking of the target person and then judging the trustworthiness of the 
target person, or vice versa, did have an effect, b = -.307, F(1, 
153.792) = 6.012, p = .015, such that if a participant first judged 
liking, their liking judgment was higher than if a participant first 
judged trustworthiness and then liking. Regarding the random 
intercepts, we found a non-zero variance (σ = .226, Wald Z = 3.102, p 
= .002), implying that participants have different average liking 
ratings.  
The second linear mixed model with trustworthiness as the 
dependent variable and veracity, being forewarned, and order as 
predictors revealed an average effect of veracity, b = -.348, F(1, 
461.656) = 11.843, p < .001, meaning that on average liars were 
deemed less trustworthy (M = 4.616, SE = 0.079) than truth-tellers (M 
= 4.965, SE = 0.079). There was also a main effect of being 
forewarned, b = -.347, F(1, 462.340) = 11.742, p < .001, meaning that 
when participants were forewarned, they judged the target person less 
trustworthy. There was a marginally significant interaction between 
veracity and being forewarned, b = -.335, F(1, 461.656) = 2.746, p = 
.098, suggesting that the difference on the trustworthiness judgment 
between liars and truth-tellers became bigger in the forewarned phase. 
Both the order of seeing a truth-teller or a liar first and the order of the 
indirect veracity judgments were not significant predictors in this 
model (p = .783 and .217, respectively). Regarding the random 
intercepts, we found a non-zero variance (σ = .180, Wald Z = 2.546, p 










Figure 5.3. Means and standard errors of the indirect veracity 
judgments (trustworthiness and liking) for truth-tellers and liars, by 
phase (not forewarned and forewarned). 
 
Taken together, the results of the indirect veracity judgments 
suggest that liars were liked and trusted less than truth-tellers. It also 
seems to be the case that being forewarned of the possibility of deceit 
made participants more distrusting overall, and especially so for liars. 
This indicates that if participants are alerted to the fact that they can 
be deceived, this helps them form better impressions of the target 
person’s sincerity. 
Hypothesis H2b stated that the effect of rating truth-tellers 
more positive than liars on the indirect veracity measures would be 
bigger for trustworthiness, as trustworthiness judgments are suggested 
to be automatic and intuitive and could therefore better distinguish the 
subtle differences between truth-tellers and liars. We tested whether 
the effect size of veracity on the trustworthiness judgment was higher 
than the effect size of veracity on the liking judgment. To obtain this 















Being forewarned: Forewarned Not forewarned
105 
combined as a single dependent variable, veracity as independent 
variable, and with appropriate dummies indicating whether the scores 
refer to trustworthiness or liking. The interaction between the veracity 
term and the dummy provides the required test. This technique, one of 
the different ways to estimate a seemingly unrelated equation model, 
is largely inspired by random coefficients mediational models (Bauer, 
Preacher, & Gil, 2006; MacCallum, Kim, Malarkey, & Kiecolt-
Glaser, 1997). We found no difference between effect sizes, 
coefficients difference = 0.019, t(1073.8) = 0.130, p = .89614.  
Direct veracity judgment. We estimated a mixed logistic 
model with participants’ accuracy on the direct veracity judgment (“Is 
this person telling the truth, yes or no?”), with veracity, being 
forewarned, and order as predictors. Because the mixed model did not 
converge, the logistic regression parameters and the associated 
inferential tests were obtained with GEE methodology (Zeger, Liang, 
& Albert, 1988). An exchangeable working correlation matrix was 
used to model the dependency of observations. Results showed a main 
effect of veracity, χ2(1) = 99.375, p < .001, such that the probability of 
a correct response was higher when participants had been watching a 
truth-teller compared to a liar. There was no main effect of being 
forewarned χ2(1) = 1.211, p = .270, and being forewarned and veracity 
did not interact, χ2(1) = 0.40, p = .841. There was no effect of order (p 
= .998). 
These results indicate that although participants were more 
accurate in detecting truth-tellers—a finding probably due to truth-
bias (see also under exploratory analyses)—being forewarned or not 
did not significantly affect the ability to correctly detect liars and 
truth-tellers. Despite of this, there is value in examining whether for 
the different phases the probability of correctly detecting deception is 
higher than chance (H3). To test the accuracy of participants direct 
veracity judgments against chance in the two phases, we ran the same 
model as described above, with now only being forewarned as the 
																																																								
14 We also explored the relationship between liking and trustworthiness 
judgments by using a mixed model with random intercepts after 
standardizing these variables, and found that liking and trustworthiness 
judgments were highly correlated (.670). 
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independent variable. In the not forewarned phase, participants were 
correct 52.92 % of the time, which did not differ from chance, χ2(1) = 
.725, p = .395, Wald 95% CI [.47, .58]. In the forewarned phase, 
participants were correct 57.42% of the time, which was significantly 
different from chance, χ2(1) = 9.704, p = .002, Wald 95% CI [.53, 
.63]. We further examined whether this higher accuracy rate in the 
forewarned phase could be explained by the indirect veracity 
judgments that were assessed right before it. We did this because the 
results also indicated that the indirect veracity judgments were 
affected by being forewarned. We report on this analysis under 
exploratory analyses. 
Relationship between temperature and the veracity 
judgments. To assess whether participants’ temperature at the end of 
the videos is predictive of their indirect and direct veracity judgments 
we ran separate models with temperature as the independent and 
liking, trustworthiness, accuracy of participants answer on the direct 
veracity judgment, and the answer of the direct veracity judgment as 
dependent variables. We did not find a relationship between 
temperature and any of these self-report measures. Temperature was 
not predictive of liking, F(1,610.689) = 1.661, p = .198, and it did not 
interact with the experimental factors to predict liking, all ps > .137. 
Temperature was also not predictive of the trustworthiness judgment, 
F(1, 609.964) = 2.358, p = .125. The interaction of being forewarned 
and temperature on trustworthiness was marginally significant (p = 
.085), however, interactions of veracity with temperature as well as 
the interaction of veracity with being forewarned and temperature 
were not significant (all ps >.633). For the direct veracity judgment, 
temperature did not predict whether the direct veracity judgment was 
correct, χ2(1) = .009, p = .923, nor did it predict whether participants 
said yes or no to the question whether the target person was telling the 
truth, χ2(1) = .757, p = .384. 
 
Exploratory Analyses 
Detection accuracy when controlling for indirect 
judgments. As is described above, we found participants’ accuracy in 
detecting deception in the forewarned phase to be significantly higher 
than can be expected by chance. We also found an effect of being 
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forewarned on the trustworthiness judgment, such that in the 
forewarned phase, participants were more likely to judge a liar as less 
trustworthy. It could be the case, therefore, that because the indirect 
veracity judgments (i.e., liking and trustworthiness) were judged 
before the direct veracity judgment, participants accuracy on the direct 
veracity judgments was enhanced due to an enhanced performance on 
the indirect measures. To examine this possibility, we ran the model 
assessing whether accuracy at detecting deception was better than 
chance again, this time controlling for the indirect veracity judgments. 
Comparable as to when not controlling for these judgments, 
participants’ deception detection accuracy was not significantly 
different from chance in the not forewarned phase χ2(1) = .576, p = 
.448, Wald 95% CI [.34, .71]. However, as a result of controlling for 
these judgments, in the forewarned phase, participants’ accuracy was 
no longer significantly different from chance either, χ2(1) = 1.982, p = 
.159, Wald 95% CI [.39, .75]. This could imply a reliance of the direct 
veracity judgment on the indirect measures, although we are hesitant 
to make any firm conclusions on the basis of these results.  
Truth bias. The finding that in the forewarned phase 
participants seemed to be better able to distinguish between liars and 
truth-tellers on both the indirect as well as the direct veracity 
judgment could be a side effect of an overall change in the tendency to 
judge messages as true. Our manipulation of being forewarned could 
have made participants more suspicious overall, leading them to judge 
a lower proportion of messages as truths. To test whether this was the 
case, we ran a GEE with the tendency to judge a message as the truth 
as the dependent variable and being forewarned and veracity as the 
independent variables. Although the tendency to make truth 
judgments was higher when actually watching a truth-teller compared 
to a liar, χ2(1) = 7.962, p < .01, the tendency to make truth judgments 
did not differ between the different phases, χ2(1) = .612, p = .434. 
Participants thus did not differ in their amount of truth judgments 
when watching truths in the not forewarned phase (proportion = .733) 
and the forewarned phase (proportion = .781), and they did not differ 
in their amount of truth judgments when watching lies in the not 
forewarned phase (proportion = .675) and the forewarned phase 




In the current chapter we explored people’s automatic 
evaluative and physiological responses to observing a deceiver, as 
well as their more conscious direct evaluation of a target person’s 
veracity. We did so in two distinct phases: First while participants 
were not forewarned of what the goal of observing another person 
was, and second while participants were forewarned that the goal was 
to form an impression of this other person’s likeability, 
trustworthiness, and their veracity. We chose to measure participants’ 
finger skin temperature because of the suggested embodied function 
of warmth in interpersonal relationships. The observed patterns of 
temperature change over time only partly confirmed our main 
hypothesis (H1), and the current findings pertaining to this hypothesis 
are therefore inconclusive. We found that finger skin temperature 
consistently decreased while observing a liar. When participants were 
observing a truth-teller, however, their finger skin temperature 
decreased more than it did for liars in the phase where participants did 
not have the goal to detect deception. In contrast, participant’s finger 
skin temperature stayed higher when observing a truth-teller 
compared to a liar when participants did have the goal to detect 
deception. This latter pattern is consistent with the direction of our 
predictions based on the relationship between warmth and positive 
person impressions; however, it failed to achieve significance by 
conventional standards.  
As for the judgments of trustworthiness and likeability—the 
so-called indirect veracity judgments—we found that across both 
phases, liars were consistently judged less trustworthy and less 
likeable than truth-tellers. This is in accordance with our hypothesis 
(H2a) which was based on earlier findings in the literature indicating 
that subjective, indirect, and intuitive judgments can contrast liars 
from truth-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2001; Albrechtsen 
et al., 2009) and this finding replicates the findings of Study 5.1. In 
addition, results indicated that in the forewarned phase participants 
were more inhibited in their liking and trusting overall. Irrespective of 
this, trustworthiness and liking judgments were lower for liars than for 
truth-tellers in both phases. It thus seems that intuitive judgments are 
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reliable guides when forming impressions of the intentions of others 
no matter whether people are forewarned or not.  
We did not observe a difference between the magnitude of the 
effect of the likeability judgment and the trustworthiness judgment. 
This fails to support our hypothesis that trustworthiness judgments 
would differentiate between liars and truth-tellers better than 
likeability judgments because of the relative automaticity that has 
been argued to underlie trustworthiness impression formation (H2b). 
In the current research the order of these two indirect veracity 
judgments was counterbalanced. For the likeability judgment we 
found the order of the questions to influence the judgments 
themselves: The target person was judged less likeable if 
trustworthiness was assessed first. These judgments were also highly 
correlated, suggesting that we cannot draw far-reaching conclusions 
from the fact that we found similar magnitudes of effects. Future 
research may test the difference in strength of these judgments in a 
between participants design rather than a within design.  
For people’s ability to accurately indicate whether someone 
was lying, we predicted that this direct veracity judgment would not 
detect deception much better than chance (H3), as the meta-analysis 
by Bond and DePaulo (2006) would suggest. We indeed found 
participants to be accurate about 53% of the time in the not 
forewarned phase, a performance that was not different from chance. 
However, when participants were alerted to the possibility of deceit 
and had the goal to detect deception, their accuracy rose to 57%. This 
percentage was significantly different from chance, although not as 
substantial as to suggest our participants were able to catch liars with 
a high success rate. It seems that, at least in the case where 
participants are searching for indications of ill intend, they had a 
slightly higher chance of correctly detecting a liar. This can be the 
case, for instance, because of a reduced truth-bias under conditions 
where people are more suspicious, or, as our exploratory analyses 
suggest, because intuitive impressions of others are aided by being a 
bit more on guard. A combination of these two processes could also 
be at play: Adjustment of the automatic tendency to judge most people 
to be evidently honest for the perception of ill-intent could require 
motivational resources (i.e., the goal to detect deception) as well as 
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indications from indirectly formed impressions. Future research could 
examine whether it best to be on guard while relying on intuition at 
the same time. We suggest that it is likely that this is what happens 
when affective judgments are made in a context in which deception is 
more salient. 
Taken together, our participants’ accuracy in correctly 
indicating whether they were being lied to was around chance level, 
and their impressions of liars’ likeability and trustworthiness were 
likely to be more negative than their impressions of truth-tellers. 
Although comparing participants’ accuracy on the direct judgment to 
the indirect judgments is not a fair comparison in this case, in Study 
5.1 we assessed both types of judgments on a continuous scale, 
allowing for a better comparison. Results of Study 5.1 indicated very 
clearly that participants did not explicitly judge liars to be more 
deceptive than truth-tellers. In contrast to this, the indirect judgment 
that assessed to what extent a target person was likeable was 
significantly lower for liars compared to truth-tellers. Similar evidence 
for the superior accuracy of indirect questions has been found by 
others, for instance when using the question how hard a target person 
was thinking compared to the question whether the target person was 
lying (Ulatowska, 2014). Our results further imply that one and the 
same person is judged more negatively when he or she is lying 
compared to when telling the truth, even though this person has a 
good chance of ostensibly getting away with giving off a false 
impression.  
With regard to the relationship between our self-report 
measures and skin temperature (H4), we found no meaningful 
correlations in Study 5.2. This can be contrasted with the results of 
Study 5.1, where we did observe a positive correlation between (a) 
temperature and liking the target person and (b) temperature and 
judging the target person to be telling the truth. This discrepancy calls 
for further exploration of the functioning of thermoregulation in 
response to real life social interactions and the possible interplay of 
physiological and psychological processes during deception detection.  
As our main findings pertaining to the temperature measure 
reached marginal significance, we are hesitant to draw firm 
conclusions, and suggest future explorations in this area to consider an 
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even bigger sample size. Currently, we found an initial tentative trace 
of the supposition that observing a deceiver can influence the 
physiology of the observer. More specifically, our findings hint at a 
thermoregulatory mechanism that responds to the veracity of an 
impression another person is trying to convey.  
 
Being Forewarned of The Possibility of Deceit 
There are several possible explanations for why being 
forewarned or not would lead to different processes and outcomes. 
Below we discuss these explanations and relate them to our findings 
for the direct and indirect veracity judgments and the physiological 
changes. Our data suggest liars have more chance of getting caught 
when their observer is alerted to the possibility of deceit. This 
indicates that detection—and possibly the ability to process the rich 
variety of information that is sent by the target person—is aided by 
having a detection goal while decoding a message. It has been 
previously argued that having correct beliefs about what cues give a 
liar away benefits the observer only when such beliefs are activated 
while making the judgment: People have been found to be better at 
detecting a liar when they are both told a target is ‘usually untruthful’ 
(thus creating suspicion) and rely on accurate nonverbal cues to 
deception (Forrest, Feldman, & Tyler, 2004). A possible explanation 
thus seems to be that some level of active engagement in detection is 
beneficial because distinct processes are switched on.  
Our indirect measures seemed to be slightly more powerful in 
differentiating liars from truth-tellers when participants were 
forewarned. One possible explanation that has been provided for the 
finding that indirect questions are more accurate than direct questions 
is that the indirect questions shift participants’ attention to the 
appropriate cues to deception (Vrij et al.,  2001). However, this 
explanation does not seem to account for sharpened differentiation 
when the aim to detect deception is salient; indirect questions have 
been found to discriminate between liars and truth-tellers even though 
participants were not informed about the reason for why they were 
being assessed (Ulatowska, 2010, 2014). In the current experiments, 
we chose to measure person impressions related to warmth because 
these judgments are more intuitive compared to other indirect 
112 
measures (e.g., whether the target person had to think hard). In 
contrast to these other indirect measures, the liking and 
trustworthiness judgments seem unlikely to shift attention to specific 
cues that indicate deception. Instead, they elicit a more holistic and 
affective evaluation. Relying on specific cues could be costly when 
beliefs about the characteristics of deceptive behavior are not correct 
(Forrest et al., 2004). Holistic judgments, in comparison, have more 
chance of getting it right if intuition based on the rich information 
send by liars indeed aids deception detection. This is further suggested 
by studies showing that task-relevant unconscious thought improves 
lie detection (Reinhard, Scharmach, & Müller, 2013). Indeed, the 
affective indirect judgments proved appropriate guides to 
trustworthiness even when participants were arguably not searching 
for cues of deception (i.e., in the not forewarned phase). We 
encourage future research to further test whether these holistic indirect 
judgments perform better when the goal to detect deception is present. 
Most research on deception detection has explicitly given 
participants the instructions to watch a video with the goal of 
detecting deception (Reinhard et al., 2013). It seems, however, that 
this does not mimic real life situations in which people are usually not 
out to spot liars—notwithstanding the notable exception of law 
enforcement professionals. Even so, under these explicit instructions 
to detect deception, intuitive judgments seem to outperform 
deliberative ones (cf. Albrechtsen et al., 2009). Our experiments, in 
contrast to other experiments, were characterized by two distinct 
phases: One where participants watched videos while the reason for 
this was unbeknownst to them, and one where the goal of watching 
videos was apparent. This allowed us to explore differences our 
physiological measure for these two phases. While we had suggested 
that observing a liar would result in a lower skin temperature than 
observing a truth-teller, this was only the case when participants had a 
clear goal: To detect deception.  
One possible explanation for this could be that while people 
generally go through life unsuspicious of others, when they have the 
goal to detect ‘threats’ in the environment their conscious as well as 
their unconscious reactions are conducted to respond to this threat 
more adaptively. One could imagine, for instance, that being more 
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vigilant heightens conscious processing of information while at the 
same time it increases the reflexive, automatic responses. It has been 
argued that some automatic processes are goal-dependent and require 
awareness of the triggering stimulus to occur (Bargh, 1994), and that 
external stimuli and internal determinants of behavior are mutually 
dependent on each other in producing adaptive responses (Fiedler, 
Bluemke, & Unkelbach, 2009). For instance, unintentional, 
spontaneous trait inferences happen with little awareness, yet they are 
goal-dependent in the sense that they arise when prompted by a 
relevant goal (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). It could be the case that similar 
processes were unintentionally elicited in our experiments due to 
giving participants the explicit instruction to form impressions of 
possible deceivers. Future research could examine this possibility by 
exploring the relationship between physiological responses and 
having, versus not having, a conscious goal.   
When comparing the results of both studies in this chapter, the 
temperature pattern observed in the second phase of Study 5.1 seems 
to resemble the pattern observed in the not forewarned phase of Study 
5.2. Although speculative, a perceivable cause of this could be that in 
the pilot study the forewarning was not manipulated as strong as in the 
current study, leaving participants still in a relatively ignorant state 
about what was to come and whether the experimental context was 
one of deception detection. Being able to expect and prepare for what 
is to come arguably has some advantages, although it should be noted 
that not anticipating threats is comparable to an everyday life situation 
in which people assume they will not be lied to. 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
In the pre-registered experiment detection accuracy in the 
forewarned phase was slightly higher than can be expected by chance, 
even though truth-bias was unaltered. This means that participants’ 
judgments in the forewarned phase were less often false alarms and 
more often hits. This could be due to a learning effect, although this 
seems unlikely. Our design was set up to minimize the possibility of 
participants getting better over time; participants did not get feedback 
on their performance, videos were randomized, and the procedure of 
seeing a video and answering questions about it was “rehearsed” with 
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the nature documentary. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility 
that the differences between the two phases stems from the time 
participants were on the task, as this feature is inherent to our within-
design. Similarly, we cannot exclude the possibility that the accuracy 
of the direct veracity judgment was assisted by the mere presence of 
both the indirect veracity judgments that came before it.  
Next to these design characteristics, another possible 
explanation for the differences between our experimental phases could 
be that simply having thought and read about lying could make this 
concept more accessible, unintentionally influencing inferences and 
impressions of the target person to come. An intuition about a person 
that is based on experiential, associative knowledge might be 
triggered by deliberate thought (e.g., Epstein, 2003). A relevant 
question for future research is whether activating knowledge 
structures concerning distrust would lead to similar enhancement of 
(indirect) deception detection as we found here.  
In our experiments we found liars to be liked and trusted less. 
A possible explanation for this effect of indirect deception detection is 
that liars come across more tense and may exhibit afflicting emotions 
related to lying, which could lead to emotional contagion. We did not 
ask our participants whether they themselves felt tense after seeing a 
liar; however, it could be argued that the temperature measurement is 
a proxy for this. Future research will have to identify the exact 
relationship between so-called indirect veracity judgments and other 
measures indicative of the affective state of the observer. Although 
emotional contagion from the liar to the observer seems plausible, on 
the basis of what is currently known, it is too soon to draw any 
conclusions. Studies where participants were asked how comfortable 
they felt after a deceptive message reveal contradicting patterns 
(DePaulo & Morris, 2004; Ulatowska, 2014), possibly due to features 
of the sender such as whether their task of lying was cognitively 
demanding or the extent to which they themselves feel comfortable 
lying. If contagion is indeed present, a possible prediction could be 
that the negative feelings elicited in the observer would aid affective 
judgments. However, when it comes to consciously catching the liar 
these feelings may induce more systematic processing and therefore 
hinder direct detection of veracity.  
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The fact that our experimental design was able to elicit 
changes in temperature is promising, especially in light of the fact that 
the use of videos to manipulate truths and lies is a minimal, albeit 
controlled, version of real interactions. In general, deception detection 
performance is equally poor when observers detect deception in a live 
situation compared to observing a video (for an overview, see: 
Landström, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2005). It is likely, however, that a 
target person’s deceptive intent is registered as a threat to a lesser 
extend when presented on a video than in a real life interaction. It is 
also conceivable that this low level of threat might need some higher 
alertness or vigilance to be detected, as could be the case when being 
forewarned. Manipulations that aim to make the environment more 
unpredictable would in that case enhance the ability to detect 
untrustworthiness. Additionally, people who are constantly more on 
guard and distrusting (e.g., insecurely attached individuals) may see 
more deception around them. Whether they are more often accurate in 
these assessments remains an unanswered question. Furthermore, it 
may well be the case that interacting with a liar in real life is costly 
and aversive because the observer needs to be more on the alert. To 
explore this possibility and to make a broad generalization possible, 
more data from accumulating accounts based on different sets of 
videos and real life interactions is needed.  
To examine the impact of deceptive messages on the observer 
further, more time-sensitive methods would shed light on the dynamic 
interplay between interaction partners and its assumingly adaptive 
nature. For instance, neural activity associated with observing a 
deceptive message could be considered, as well as mental activity as 
assessed by pupillary responses. Other areas of investigation involve 
the long-term consequences of insincere interactions on, for instance, 





The current research is a first endeavor to explore 
psychophysiological underpinnings of deception detection with a 
special focus on thermoregulation within the observer of truthful and 
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deceptive messages. We found marginal significant results revealing 
skin temperature decreased when liars were observed, whereas 
temperature trajectories for observing truth-tellers were dependent on 
being forewarned of the possibility of deceit. Indirect judgments of 
liars and truth-tellers revealed that lying typically caused a person to 
be liked and trusted less, while accuracy on a direct judgment of 
whether this person was lying was barely above chance level. 
 
Pre-registration   
The aim of our pre-registered experiment was to investigate a 
previously unexplored part of deceptive social interactions and the 
role of psychophysiology (i.e., the embodiment) of these interactions 
on the part of the receiving end of a deceptive message. This research, 
fundamental in its nature, is but an example of the multitude of 
opportunities for further investigation—some of which we have 
suggested above. The fact that this research was pre-registered played 
a positive role in the development of our experiment and it did not 
constrain our curiosity for exploring the data. Working together with 
reviewers in an early stage maximizes chances of making a valuable 
contribution to current debates. In addition, this process and its open 
access character carry on the momentum, enabling researchers to 
continuously build on ongoing work. We hope to have inspired future 
investigations of the interaction between physiology and cognition, 










Appendix for Chapter 5: Pre-registration15 
 
Proposed experiment: Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of this study is to assess whether finger skin 
temperature differs when watching a liar as opposed to a truth-teller. 
Our main hypothesis is that temperature will lower during the 
watching of a 3-minute video clip of a liar (H1). We further 
hypothesize that participants will judge truth-tellers more trustworthy 
and likeable than liars (the indirect veracity judgments; H2a), with the 
additional hypothesis that this effect will be bigger for the 
trustworthiness judgment than for the liking judgment, because 
trustworthiness judgments are suggested to be more automatic and 
intuitive and would therefore tap into the covert differences between 
liars and truth-tellers better (H2b). Next to this, we hypothesize that 
when asked to judge whether a target person is lying, participants’ 
judgment will not differentiate between liars and truth-tellers better 
than chance (the direct veracity judgment; H3). Finally, we 
hypothesize that the indirect veracity judgments, namely the liking 
and trustworthiness for the target person, are positively related to 
finger temperature, whereas the direct veracity judgment is not (H4). 
Additionally, our proposed design allows us to infer whether these 
effects interact with the level of awareness participants have of the 
fact that this is a setting in which deception has to be detected.  
We regard this registered report as a unique opportunity to 
shed light on findings that were obtained in our pilot study. We aim to 
improve on the methods used in the pilot study by now also including 
a measure of trustworthiness, and by measuring the direct veracity 
judgment with a binary choice option, in order to be able to compare 
our participants’ performance in detecting deception to performance 
																																																								
15  From the experience of this pre-registration as well as other pre-
registrations, a pre-registration template was made and perfected in order to 
facilitate and standardize the process of pre-registration. The latest version 
can be downloaded online (https://osf.io/k5wns/), filled out, uploaded to 
one’s own account on a platform such as the Open Science Framework 
(http://osf.io), and time-stamped as a (reviewed or unreviewed) pre-
registration (see van ’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2015).   
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on the basis of chance (see H3). We aim to replicate the findings of 
the pilot study that truth-tellers get more positive judgments on liking 
(and for the proposed study, also on trustworthiness, see H2a) and that 
finger skin temperature was positively correlated with this (see H4). 
Most importantly, we aim to better test our prediction that we make on 
the basis of thermoregulation in (dis) trusting interactions that we will 
observe a lowering in finger temperature when watching a person who 
is dishonest compared to honest (see H1), by now allowing more time 
for participants to reach stable temperature. 
 
Description of proposed sample characteristics 
The proposed sample will consist of the Tilburg University 
lab participants, a sample that on average consists of about 65% 
females, 95% University students who are mainly Psychology 
undergraduates around the age of 21, who participate for course credit 
or an hourly pay of €8. We propose to run at least 120 participants 
(see below). We will apply several exclusion criteria. First, 
participants who have prior experience with the temperature measure 
(and its debriefing) will be offered participation in another study and 
will be refused participation in the current study on theoretical 
grounds, as people may be able to consciously control their own 
finger temperature (Keefe, 1978). Second, participants will be 
excluded from analyses if they are acquainted with one or more of the 
people depicted in the video material (assessed after all dependent 
measures). This is done because knowing the target person in this case 
will almost always result in being able to tell whether what the person 
is saying is true (e.g., recognizing someone from a psychology class 
while this person faints an education in another area). Third, 
participants will be excluded in the following instances: technical 
failure of temperature measurement, defined as either a software error, 
crashing of the computer program or a failure on the experimenter’s 
part to correctly start measurement or save it (in which case no 
temperature recording is present for this participant, yet other 
dependent measures may be present).  
Contrary to what was done in previous research (IJzerman et 
al., 2012), we will also run exploratory analyses without participants 
who fail to reach 30 °C during watching of the neutral movie, as some 
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authors have argued that fingertip temperature should be high enough 
to observe vasoconstriction (i.e., it should be physiologically possible; 
Kistler et al., 1998). The analyses including these participants are the 
main analyses. Analyses will also be run both with and without heavy 
smokers (more than 20 cigarettes a day) as smokers can have trouble 
warming up after cooling down (Cleophas, Fennis, & van’t Laar, 
1982), the analyses without them being conclusive. Outliers are 
defined as having an unlikely to be correct bodily temperature, cut 
offs set at below 18 °C and above 37 °C. If outliers are present in the 
data, we will employ a jackknife methodology to confirm the 




Possible participants will enter a draftless lab room with a 
maximum of 12 at a time. They will be led to an individual table with 
a computer separated by screens, where they sign for informed 
consent. A maximum of six participants will be participating in the 
current study at a given time. After completing half an hour of 
unrelated tasks (to allow for acclimatization to the room temperature), 
the experimenter will set up the current experiment run in both 
Authorware and, for the temperature measure, OneWireViewer. 
Participants’ finger skin temperature will be measured with a so-called 
iButton (see Pouw, Flore, & IJzerman, 2012, for software and 
instructions), introduced to the participant as ‘a battery measuring a 
physiological response’. The iButton will record temperature every 
second. The iButton clock will be synchronized to system seconds, 
and the start and end time of all videos shown will be saved in 
Authorware (which also relies on system seconds to retrieve the 
current time). During the time the experimenter starts the temperature 
log, the participant will be asked to clean their fingers with an 
antibacterial wipe and to indicate which is their dominant hand. After 
this the experimenter will attach the iButton to the palmar surface of 
the distal phalange of the non-dominant index finger with a double-
sided EEG sticker. The participant will then be instructed to 
comfortably lay their forearm on the table with the iButton facing up, 
and to start working through the experiment in Authorware.  
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All participants will first see part of a nature documentary for 
a minimum of 8 minutes allowing for the iButton to reach finger 
temperature, and for the participant to reach a stable starting 
temperature. Two filler questions about this documentary will be 
asked to seemingly give the documentary a purpose and to acquaint 
the participant with the overall procedure of watching a video and 
subsequently answering questions about it. Next, the participants will 
be told they will now watch a series of different videos. They are 
explicitly informed that these videos will be presented in blocks and 
that questions will follow after each block. Each block contains two 
videos and thus after two videos questions will be asked about the 
person in both videos. The participant is not told the total number of 
videos that will follow, to minimize their possible tendency to expect 
50% of the videos to be untruths. In reality, four videos will be shown 
in total (see Video material), divided in two blocks of two videos. 
Each block consists of one liar and one truth-teller, randomly 
presented. The gender of the person on the video will also be varied to 
make sure lies are not confounded with gender.  
After each block of two videos, the participant will answer 
three questions about each video. Firstly the indirect deception 
judgments are assessed with two counterbalanced questions: “How 
much do you like the person in the first [second] video?” and “How 
trustworthy did you think the person in the first [second] video was?”, 
responses will be given on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 7 (very much). Thirdly, the direct deception judgment is assessed 
with the question: “Did you think the person in the first [second] 
video was telling the truth?” (yes vs. no). Note that the nature of the 
questions about the target person is thus revealed after block 1, and 
that the participant now knows that the possibility exists that the 
person in the video is insincere. To strengthen this manipulation of the 
level of this awareness, participants are told that for the next block of 
videos, they will receive the same three questions about the target 
person. The three questions will also be presented to the participants 
again in order to make sure they realize what they will be asked after 
the next videos. This allows us to compare our dependent measures in 
both blocks to examine the effect of this awareness of possible 
deception. Lastly, the participants will provide information on their 
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gender, age, smoking behavior, acquaintance with any of the people 
depicted in the videos, dominant hand, and their thoughts on what the 
study was about. The iButton will then be detached and the participant 
will be thanked and debriefed.  
 
Video material 
Videos used in this study will display two men and two 
women who have each been recorded separately while they introduce 
themselves for three minutes, once truthfully and once deceptively, 
making eight videos in total16. These targets were instructed to give an 
impression of themselves, talking about topics like their personality, 
interests, family situation, childhood, education, and work situation. 
As people frequently lie to make a good impression, for instance in 
job interviews (Weiss & Feldman, 2006), impression management is a 
topic particularly relevant to the current study. Additionally, it has 
been found that both men and women who have a self-presentation 
goal (i.e. to appear likable or competent), compared to those who 
don’t have this goal, lie significantly more in real-life interactions 
(Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002). In our opinion, this makes having 
to form an impression of a person in a video who is trying to leave a 
good impression an appropriate setting in which to examine the 
participants’ physiological responses to deceit. Targets in the videos 
read instructions that told them they were randomly assigned to tell 
the truth first, and then lie, to another participant (who, in fact, was a 
confederate). They were instructed to talk about themselves for three 
minutes truthfully, and were told that three minutes would feel like a 
long time, so they should try to give a complete picture of different 
aspects of themselves. They directed their speech to the confederate, 
who sat next to the camera. After giving this true impression the 
confederate briefly left the room, supposedly to fill out a 
questionnaire. During this time, the target person was instructed to 
give an impression of themselves for a second time when the 
confederate returned, while this time being untruthful. The 
confederate then came in again for this second recording, and was 
																																																								
16 Notice that of the eight videos, a given participant is only shown four. This 
ensures that participants do not see a lie and a truth of the same target person.  
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supposedly going to guess which one of the two times an impression 
was given would be the truth. 
 
Proposed analysis pipeline 
The following pre-processing steps will be taken. First all 
individual temperature data files will be jointly imported to SPSS with 
‘TempToSPSS’, a piece of software custom programmed by SpITs, 
the Tilburg University IT department. Authorware data will also be 
joined and subsequently these two datasets will be combined. As the 
Authorware dataset will contain a variable indicating the time of a 
given video and the order in which the program randomly displayed 
the videos, new variables can be made indicating at what point in time 
(thus belonging to which temperature data) which of the nine videos 
was displayed to the participant (neutral nature video clip or one of 
the eight videos of 4 targets lying or telling the truth), and whether a 
liar or a truth-teller was in it. Next, a new time variable will be made 
that starts at 0 for each new video encountered by the participant, 
allowing the temperature data to be displayed and analyzed over time, 
collapsing over videos (all SPSS syntax steps openly available 
online).  For each video that a participant is watching, we will 
compute the participants’ temperature minus their temperature at the 
beginning of this video, in order to ensure that any differences 
between participants’ temperature at the beginning of the video will 
not influence the outcomes. This way, we make sure that individual 
carry-over effects from the last video that was watched are kept to a 
minimum. 
In the statistical models described below we refer to the 
experimental factors in the following way: The factor veracity, 
representing whether the person on the video was lying or not, the 
factor awareness, representing whether the participant was aware of 
the possibility of being lied to or not, and the factor order, 
representing whether a liar was shown first and then a truth-teller, or 
vice versa. 
To analyze the indirect veracity judgments, to test whether 
truth-tellers compared to liars get higher judgments (see H2a) we will 
estimate separate linear mixed models, one with liking and one with 
trustworthiness as the dependent variable, and with the experimental 
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factors veracity, awareness and order as independent variables. To 
analyze the direct veracity judgment (“Is this person lying, yes or 
no?”) to test whether truth-tellers compared to liars get different 
judgments we will estimate a mixed logistic model with this binary 
variable as the dependent variable and veracity, awareness and order 
as independent variables. The same model will allow us to test 
whether the judgments in each experimental phase deviate from 
chance (i.e., equal probability), thus providing a test of accuracy (see 
H3). Furthermore, we will compute a variable indicating whether the 
participant made a correct direct veracity judgment for each video. A 
mixed logistic model will be used to assess the relationship between 
this indication of accuracy and the participants’ mean temperature per 
video across different experimental phases (unaware vs. aware). Using 
a random coefficients regression we will also assess the relationship 
between temperature and both liking and trustworthiness (see H4). 
The main statistical analyses’ aim is to estimate the effects of 
veracity of the person on the video (lie vs. truth; see H1) and 
deception-possibility-awareness of the participants (aware vs. not 
aware) on participants' temperature. In order to ease interpretation, we 
will center time as was done for the pilot study. Using linear mixed 
models (SPSS mixed), a model will be built to define the trajectory of 
temperature over time (with linear and polynomial effects of time), as 
a function of veracity and awareness. Order of both the independent 
variable (veracity) and the dependent variables (liking and 
trustworthiness) will be considered in the analysis with its main effect 
and interactions with the experimental factors. All repeated measures 
effects—intercept, polynomial time, awareness, and veracity—will be 
allowed to vary randomly, removing those effects that show no 
variability across participants. Variances and covariances will be 
tested with Wald tests against the null hypothesis of no variance, but 
any parameter greater than zero will be left as random (Littell, 
Pendergast, & Natarajan, 2000). When the random components are 
ascertained, we will estimate the complete model using restricted 
maximum likelihood. Sattherwaite approximation of the degrees of 
freedom will be used (West, 2009). Specifically, this full model has 
ID (participants) as subjects variable, includes temperature as the 
dependent variable, and time as the continuous (polynomial) 
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independent variable, veracity, awareness and order as predictors to 
the model. This model estimates the main effect of type of video, the 
main effect of deception-possibility-awareness, the main effect of 
order, their interactions and the interaction of the experimental factors 
with time. This last effect informs on whether the temperature 
trajectories change depending on the veracity and awareness. Order of 
the videos is added to the model to account for any order and carry 
over effects; if order interacts with the experimental factors we will 
discuss implications of this for the validity of the results, if order has a 
main effect, taking this variable into account strengthens the models’ 
statistical power.  
The most important effects these models allow us to estimate 
are the interaction effects of our experimental factors and time, 
because the expected change in temperature due to the experimental 
factors should unfold over time. For exploratory purposes, we will run 
our full model with gender as a fixed predictor to see whether it 
interacts with any of the experimental factors (if this reveals an 
interaction with the experimental factors, we will leave Gender in the 
model that we report in our results section). 
In short, we will regard H1 as confirmed if the average skin 
temperature of participants while watching a liar is lower than when 
watching a truth-teller. This should translate into an interaction 
between veracity and time, and possibly a main effect of veracity. We 
will regard H2a as confirmed if liking and trustworthiness are 
significantly higher for the truth-tellers compared to the liars, and H2b 
as confirmed if the effect size of this effect is larger for 
trustworthiness than for liking. We will regard H3 as confirmed if the 
overall proportion of correct veracity judgments made by the 
participants is not significantly different from equal probability or if it 
is significantly different from equal but lower (due to truth-bias). We 
will regard H4 as confirmed if liking and trustworthiness are 
significantly positively related to temperature and partly confirmed if 
either one of these indirect measures is, whereas accuracy (on the 





Statistical power analysis 
For temperature measurements in experiments about social 
relations, effect sizes in the literature are scarce, although some do 
exist. For instance, IJzerman et al. (2012) found a B of  -0.011 for the 
effect of being excluded during an experiment that employed a ball-
tossing game. As our proposed stimuli are hypothesized to elicit an 
unconscious reaction, we argue the change in fingertip temperature 
could be even smaller than this, and therefore we aim to have as many 
participants as possible. For our design and our specific needs we 
were not confident in proposing an appropriate way of determining 
sample size. For this reason we propose to go beyond the sample size 
suggested for a between-subjects design, namely the suggestion for 
the rule of thumb to have a minimum of 50 participants in each 
condition (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013). With our 
exclusion criteria in mind, we set out to run a minimum of 120 
participants. Note that the above-mentioned rule of thumb is based on 
a between-subjects design, and our design repeatedly measures 
participants’ temperature for both lies and truths, thus is a within-
subjects design. This means we will collect a minimum of 160 
temperature observations (measured each second of video material) 
four times per participant (during the first and second lie and first and 
second truth). Thereby, this design increases the probability of finding 
a finger temperature difference between perceiving truths and 








Effortless physiological responses in  
the eyes of the beholder of honesty 
 
Previous research suggests that people can have correct intuitions 
about whether they are being deceived, and that this detection of 
deception may take place below the threshold of consciousness. In the 
current chapter we examine this suggested intuition by monitoring 
pupil diameter while participants viewed targets who, unbeknownst to 
the participants, were either lying or telling the truth. Differential 
pupillary changes were found in response to the targets’ veracity. 
When participants watched a dishonest compared to an honest target, 
an initial pupillary increase and a subsequent decrease was found. 
Results of participants’ self-reported veracity judgments indicated that 
a correct intuition about the target’s veracity was reflected in affective 
evaluations (i.e., truth-tellers were liked more) but not in direct 
veracity judgments (i.e., truth-tellers were not judged to be less 
deceptive). Findings of this chapter highlight the possibility of 




This chapter is based on: van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. 
(2015). In the eye of the beholder: Observers’ pupillary responses and 





Chapter 6: Effortless physiological responses in  
the eyes of the beholder of honesty 
 
Theoretical as well as empirical accounts suggest that people 
may possess an ability to detect dishonest intentions in others (i.e., 
cheater detection; Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010; Verplaetse, 
Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007). Although work on deception 
detection suggests that judgments of veracity are not very accurate 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006), on an intuitive level there may be some 
form of detection present. For instance, detection of deception seems 
to fare well under cognitive load (Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 
2009), after unconscious thought which is presumed to diminish top-
down influences (Reinhard, Greifeneder, & Scharmach, 2013), and 
when measured on a more implicit level (ten Brinke, Stimson, & 
Carney, 2014). Together with other research showing the 
effectiveness of fast and automatic judgments of moral character (e.g., 
Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, & De Neys, 2013; Willis & Todorov, 2006), 
this makes an appealing case for intuitive deception detection. 
Correct intuitive judgments about whether another person is 
lying may stem from unconscious deception detection, however, this 
detection may occur at such an early stage that it often does not 
permeate consciousness. This may explain why people’s accuracy in 
detecting deception by explicitly judging veracity is—although in the 
statistical sense significantly higher than chance—not very high (i.e., 
54%; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Judgments that do not explicitly ask 
about the veracity of another person, often called indirect veracity 
judgments, in contrast, have been found to distinguish liars from truth-
tellers (DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997; 
Ulatowska, 2014; van ’t Veer, Stel, van Beest, & Gallucci, 2014; Vrij, 
Edward, & Bull, 2001). For instance, when asked how trustworthy a 
target person is, participants rate liars lower than truth-tellers even 
though they are not aware of the fact that they are being lied to (van ’t 
Veer, Gallucci, Stel, & van Beest, 2014). In an attempt to find a 
marker of unconscious deception detection, van ’t Veer et al. (2015) 
measured finger skin temperature, and suggested that observing a liar 
could influence the physiology of the observer. Given these findings, 
one may expect that a much more time-sensitive physiological 
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marker, namely the observers’ pupillary response, could reveal an 
unconscious reaction towards dishonesty.  
Pupillary responses signal changes in mental states that occur 
outside of awareness (Laeng, Sirois, & Gredeback, 2012). Pupil 
dilation occurs together with, among other things, increased cognitive 
load (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000), emotional arousal for both 
positive and negative stimuli (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 
2008), the detection of perceptual anomalies (Sleegers, Proulx, & van 
Beest, 2015), and error detection (Critchley, Tang, Glaser, 
Butterworth, & Dolan, 2005). Even thought presented stimuli often 
remain unconscious, they affect pupillary responses and their presence 
can still influence judgments and behavior (Laeng, et al., 2012). 
Recent theorizing suggests that aversive stimuli elicit an initial 
response of vigilance, arousal and avoidance (Jonas et al., 2014; 
Sleegers & Proulx, 2015), which can be measured with pupillary 
responses (Sleegers et al., 2015). The pupil thus seems a relevant 
indicator of the brain’s ability to detect certain abnormal events in the 
environment. Dishonesty—especially when contrasted with honesty—
could be such an abnormality. If so, it can be predicted that a pupil 
arousal response (i.e., dilation) occurs when dishonesty is observed.  
With the current chapter we examine whether pupillary 
responses are differently affected when observers are watching targets 
that—unbeknownst to the observer—are either lying or telling the 
truth. Specifically, an increase in pupil size is expected when 
dishonesty is observed. These kind of physiological underpinnings of 
observers’ intuitions towards (dis)honesty have been hitherto 
underexplored. Furthermore, we assess deception detection ability 
with both a direct veracity judgment (i.e., is the target person honest 
about whether they cheated?) as well as an indirect veracity judgment 
(i.e., how much do you like this target person?). We predict that—as 
previous research suggests—the direct veracity judgment does not 
distinguish between liars and truth-tellers, whereas the indirect 
veracity judgment is able to do so. We thus expect to find that the 
detection of (dis)honesty is reflected in an unconscious physiological 
response and in an affectively based judgment, rather than in a cold 





Participants and design 
Forty-four Tilburg University students—31 females, 2 
unknown, Mage = 20.12, SDage = 1.65 (age of 2 unknown) —took part 
in this study in return for money (€6) or course credit. Sample size 
came about by running the study for the two weeks it was planned for. 
The experiment was programmed in Tobii Studio. We report all data 
exclusions (there were none), all manipulations, and all measures in 
the study.  
 
Material and procedure  
Participants watched six videos (Levine, 2007) that lasted a 
little over two minutes (M = 2.29, SD = .19) in random order in which 
a target person was displayed answering questions posed by an 
interviewer. The target, but not the interviewer, was visible sitting on 
a chair. The interview included several questions about a trivia game 
the target participated in earlier. During this trivia game the 
experimenter had left the room for a short while, and via the use of a 
confederate who ostensibly participated in the game it was known 
whether targets had cheated in this game. Towards the end of the 
video of the interview the question of interest was asked: “Did you 
cheat on the trivia game when the experimenter left the room?” All 
targets (three males, three females) spontaneously negated this, 
although half was known to be lying. In keeping with the exploratory 
nature of this experiment, we chose to measure pupillary responses in 
a time window of ten seconds starting from the moment the 
interviewer’s question ended. This ensured we captured the targets 
answer to the question (i.e., their denial of having cheated) and their 
subsequent demeanor. Participants’ eye movements were recorded 
with a Tobii T60 eye tracker (17 inch TFT monitor) with a sampling 
rate of 60 Hz. A Modified Repeated Median filter (Bernholt, Fried, 
Gather, & Wegener, 2006; Fried, Schettlinger, & Borowski, 2012) 
was applied to the pupil size data in order to reduce measurement 
noise (e.g., spikes) and linear interpolation was applied to missing 
data (e.g., blinks). 
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After watching each video participants first made an indirect 
and then a direct veracity judgment about the target. The indirect 
veracity judgment was measured by asking: “How much do you like 
this person?”. The direct veracity judgment was measured by asking: 
“To what extend do you think this person was lying about having 






 Figure 6.1 displays participants’ pupil diameter over a 10 
second period when watching a dishonest or an honest target answer 
the ‘did you cheat’-question. Irrespective of the veracity of the target, 
there is an overall wave-like pattern that may likely reflect pupil 
response for the common procedure of hearing the answer of the 
target. To test whether this pattern was different when observing a 
dishonest compared to an honest answer we ran a Mixed Model 
analyses predicting pupil diameter. There was no average effect of the 
target’s veracity, b = -.003, F(1, 8802) = .07, p = .79, however, there 
was an interaction between time and veracity, b = -.008, F(2, 8802) = 
20.13,  p < .001. This indicates that, over time, when watching a 
dishonest compared with an honest target the pupil diameter first 
increased more and then decreased more. As can be seen in Figure 
6.1, dishonest answers resulted in the greatest pupil arousal response 
measured at around 4-5 seconds from the onset of the targets’ 




Figure 6.1. Pupil diameter over time by target’s veracity (honest vs. 
dishonest answer to the question ‘Did you cheat?’). Error bars display 
95% confidence interval. 
 
Gaze direction check 
To check whether the results were impacted by other factors 
we also examined areas of interest (AOI) as an indication of whether 
similar information was attended to for dishonest and honest targets. 
These areas were defined with an eclipse drawn over the face of the 
target. This allowed calculation of the amount of time (percentage) the 
participants’ gaze was directed at the face or somewhere else during 
the 10 seconds that followed the interviewers question to the target. 
Although a paired samples t-test indicated that participants were 
looking towards the face of dishonest targets less (54.53%) than that 
of honest targets (59.20%), t(43) = -2.24, p = .03, 95% CI [-8.88, -
.46], dZ = .34, this difference was already present at the beginning of 




differences found in pupil dilation are not due to gaze direction. In 
other words, closer inspection revealed that participants’ tendency to 
look at the face of the target was not the cause of the observed spikes 
in pupil size. 
 
Veracity judgments 
 Figure 6.2 displays participants’ indirect (i.e., liking) and 
direct veracity judgments. A 2 (veracity: dishonest vs. honest) × 2 
(method: direct vs. indirect) within subjects ANOVA was run on 
participants’ self-reported judgments. This revealed no main effect of 
veracity, F( 1, 43) = .69, p = .41, η!!  = .02, and a main effect of 
method, F(1, 43) = 4.06, p = .05, η!!  = .09, which was qualified by an 
interaction, F(1, 43) = 16.48, p < .001, η!!  = .28. This interaction 
indicated that whereas dishonest targets were liked less (M = 4.77, SE 
= .11) than honest targets (M = 5.20, SE = .10), F(1, 43) = 11.85, p = 
.001, η!!  = .22, 95% CI [ -.67;-.18], dishonest targets were not judged 
significantly more or less dishonest (M = 5.34, SE = .14) than honest 
targets (M = 5.11, SE = .16), F(1, 43) = 2.28, p = .14, , η!!  = .05, CI [-
.08; .55]. Similarly, whereas participants tended to like dishonest 
targets less than they tended to think the targets were lying, F(1, 43) = 
15.48, p < .001, η!!  = .27, CI [ -.86; -.28], for honest targets, there was 
no difference between how much they were liked and how deceptive 
they came across, F(1, 43) = .41, p = .53, η!!  = .01, CI [ -.20; .38]. 
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Figure 6.2. Indirect (left panel) and direct (right panel) veracity 






Can people discern whether they receive an honest or a 
dishonest answer to the question “did you cheat in that trivial game?”, 
and does this ability reach the conscious assessment of others? The 
present research demonstrated that while a direct judgment of whether 
another person is lying did not distinguish honesty from dishonesty, 
an affective indirect judgment did; truth-tellers were not judged to be 
more or less deceptive, however, they did receive more positive 















































unconsciously perceived. That is, dishonest answers evoked greater 
pupillary responses. Pupil size first increased more and then decreased 
more when watching a dishonest compared to when watching an 
honest answer. This initial increase seems an especially promising 
lead in the investigation of unconscious deception detection, as it was 
exactly this period where the targets first negated having cheated. 
Together these findings suggest that even though conscious judgments 
are often led astray, the ability to detect deception may be present on a 
nonconscious level. 
Our results are consistent with previous findings advocating 
the merit of unconscious deception detection (Reinhard et al., 2013; 
ten Brinke et al., 2014). Detection of an unexpected or aversive signal 
emanating from the deceiver and the following lowered affect could 
be analogous to vigilance and subsequent avoidance of untrustworthy 
others (Todorov, 2008; Tolin, Lohr, Lee, & Sawchuk, 1999). The 
initial increase in pupil dilation that was found when participants were 
watching a dishonest target might reflect an increase in sympathetic 
activity associated with preparedness to respond adaptively. Pupil 
dilation occurs with cognitive processing and attention as well as 
emotional arousal (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000; Bradley et al., 
2008; Hermans, Henckens, Roelofs, & Fernández, 2013; Partala & 
Surakka, 2003). This reaction thereby reflects the importance of the 
allocated resources and affective preferences relevant to what is 
observed. A visceral response of this kind may thereby facilitate the 
process of forming an impression of the trustworthy intentions of 
others.  
With regard to the impression that people form of (dis)honest 
others, it seems that these correct intuitions remain largely 
unconscious. Consistent with earlier findings, the direct veracity 
judgment did not discriminate lies from truths whereas the indirect 
veracity judgment was able to distinguish between truth-tellers and 
liars (van ’t Veer et al., 2015). In the current chapter, instead of 
indirectly assessing a veracity judgment by asking about the targets’ 
demeanor (Vrij et al., 2001) or the observers’ confidence in their 
judgment (DePaulo et al., 1997), the indirect judgment was 
specifically aimed at affective reactions. These judgments may 
indirectly tap into a visceral reaction and thereby reflect felt emotions 
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towards the target. These kind of ‘warmth’ judgments—suggested to 
be fast and automatic (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007)—may be borne 
out of a physiological reaction that marks the (un)friendly intent of 
others. 
The design of the current experiment was based on within 
subject trials that consisted of videos of spontaneously dishonest and 
honest targets. We recognize that it is important for future efforts to 
increase the amount of trials and to examine psychophysiological 
responses for dishonesty recorded with a range of different 
procedures. Notwithstanding this, the findings underline the 
importance of the study of psychophysiological responses within the 
detector of dishonesty. Findings provided further evidence for the 
superior ability of indirect veracity judgments as compared to direct 
veracity judgments, suggesting emphasis on people’s affective 
response when inferring intentions of others is warranted. 
Furthermore, the current eye tracking results extend previous findings 
in the area of deception and cheater detection by virtue of exploring 
the possibility of the existence of physiological markers of deception 
detection. We recommend future research to continue focusing on 
pupillary responses of observers of dishonesty and to disentangle 
responses to various indicators of deceit, such as auditory cues and 
facial expressions. For, as the current results denote, the ability to 





















Chapter 7: General discussion  
and directions for future research 
 
People’s daily lives are filled with moral concerns about their 
own and others’ behavior; people’s moral actions and their ability to 
discern the moral character of others shape interpersonal relationships. 
It has been argued that people make cost-benefit analyses of self-
interest when making moral decisions, and that when they carefully 
consider the right cues this may lead to accurate assessment of 
others. However, as I have highlighted in the current dissertation, 
regulating social relationships in an advantageous way requires 
effortless moral judgments and decisions, often made under 
circumstances that are not equipped for moral deliberation. More 
specifically, my aim was to show that to understand the elements of a 
deceptive interaction, it is important to take into account the degree to 
which processes within the deceiver as well as the deceived require 
cognitive effort. Below I give an overview of the main findings, I 
discuss what these findings tell us about the workings of dishonesty, 
and I provide directions for future research. While touching upon 
these issues I describe several studies that did not make it into the 
main chapters. Instead of clogging up my file drawer, these studies 




The aim of Chapter 2 was to establish direct evidence for the 
prediction that being dishonest takes more cognitive effort than being 
honest. Participants’ capacity to deliberate was hindered with an 
often-used manipulation that limits available processing resources17. 
																																																								
17 Actually, the existing cognitive load manipulation was modified slightly; I 
used a string of letters instead of the typically used string of numbers. 
Participants were asked to either remember a long string of eight letters that 
corresponded to my passport number at the time (NWRBRKPJ; high 
cognitive load), or a short two letter combination that corresponds to 
similarly ordered letters in both the alphabet and the name of a Dutch airline 
(KL; low cognitive load).  
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Furthermore, in contrast to previous research, the procedure of a die-
rolling task was adjusted in order to limit participants’ opportunity to 
decide to be dishonest before this manipulation was introduced. 
Results revealed that for participants who were under low cognitive 
load the reported outcomes of a die roll that was to be paid out, but 
not other rolls, were higher than can be expected by chance. This 
suggests that participants in this condition were reporting higher 
outcomes than they had actually obtained in order to get more money. 
In contrast, participants who were under high cognitive load did not 
report higher numbers than an ‘honest’ distribution expected by 
chance. Together this suggests that although in an anonymous, 
tempting situation people often show dishonest behavior, 
having limited cognitive capacity eliminates this dishonesty. As such, 
results of Chapter 2 suggest that honesty, not dishonesty, is 
the ‘intuitive default’.  
Chapter 3 was designed as a first test of the strength of 
affective judgments in discerning dishonesty. It was suggested that if 
these judgments are indeed an indication of a correct intuition of 
another person’s intent, that then it can also be expected that out of 
several indirect judgments, these affective judgments would be the 
most reliable guides to (dis)honesty. Additionally, it was proposed 
that if impressions of liking are automatically formed, they should 
distinguish between truth-tellers and liars even in a situation where 
other judgments may fail to do so, namely when stories are rehearsed. 
Results indicated that when participants made direct veracity 
judgments these judgments distinguished between dishonest and 
honest stories when these stories were told spontaneously, but not 
when they were rehearsed. Importantly, the judgment that was 
theorized to be the most effortless, namely the indirect affective 
judgment of liking, was able to distinguish liars from truth-tellers 
irrespective of whether stories were rehearsed. Specifically, truth-
tellers were liked more than liars, even when stories were rehearsed, 
suggesting that these affective judgments are valuable guides when 
assessing deceptiveness.    
Chapter 4 focused on the influence of being in a state of stress 
on people’s ability to detect dishonesty. Next to the direct ‘Is this 
person lying?’ question, an indirect veracity judgment was asked 
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which is an affective judgment closely related to the above-mentioned 
liking judgment, namely the judgment of whether the other person is 
trustworthy. Stress was induced in half of the participants with an 
anticipatory stress paradigm: participants were asked to prepare a 
public speech. Before participants actually gave this speech, they were 
asked to detect deception and trustworthiness from videos of targets 
who were being honest or dishonest about their identity. Results 
indicated that with the direct veracity judgment, participants were not 
very accurate when detecting deception. With the trustworthiness 
judgment, however, participants judged truth-tellers to be more 
trustworthy than liars, especially so when they were under stress. This 
suggests that sensing another person’s honesty is best served by 
relying on effortless modes of processing. 
In Chapter 5 the aim was to investigate whether intuitions 
toward (dis)honesty reflect themselves in the physiology of the 
observer. Because previous research established a connection between 
temperature and trust, people’s finger skin temperature was measured 
while they were watching videos of targets who either lied or told the 
truth about topics like their personality and family situation. Results 
indicated that finger skin temperature was differentially affected by 
observing a dishonest compared with an honest target. When 
observing dishonesty, temperature declined over time, irrespective of 
whether participants were forewarned of the fact that a target may 
have been lying. However, when observing honesty, changes in 
temperature depended on whether participants were forewarned or 
not. Specifically, when not forewarned, participants’ average finger 
skin temperature dropped below their temperature for observing liars. 
When participants were forewarned, their temperature was higher 
when observing honest others than when observing dishonest others. 
Changes in temperature over time thus interacted with whether 
observers were forewarned, and it seemed that being given the goal to 
detect deception aided gut feelings toward (dis)honesty. Therewith, 
Chapter 5 is the first in its kind to provide evidence for the possibility 
of unconscious physiological indicators of deception detection. Next 
to this physiological measure, findings pertaining to the direct and 
indirect veracity judgments were replicated and extended. 
Furthermore, because the studies in this chapter used different videos 
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than the studies in the previous chapters, this allowed for a test of 
robustness of the previously described findings pertaining to affective 
indirect veracity judgments. 
Chapter 6 again focused on a physiological response within 
the observer, and builds on the previously found indications for an 
unconscious ability to detect deception. This time, a more time-
sensitive measure than finger skin temperature was taken, namely 
pupillary responses. Next to pupil diameter and gaze direction, again a 
direct as well as an indirect veracity judgment was assessed for honest 
and dishonest targets. Targets on the videos that were used in this 
chapter responded—without being instructed to do so—either 
honestly or dishonestly to the question whether they had cheated on a 
trivia game that preceded the video recording. When participants 
watched a dishonest compared to an honest target, an initial pupillary 
increase was found, even though the face area was monitored 
similarly for honest and dishonest targets. Providing additional 
support for the robustness of the findings described in Chapter 3-5, 
again the indirect veracity judgment distinguished truth-tellers from 
liars. In this chapter, targets that lied when they denied having cheated 
were liked less than targets that were honest when denying this. This 
chapter thereby provides further evidence for the merit of looking at 





The results concerning the cognitive effort involved in being 
dishonest (Chapter 2) provide several important insights for future 
research. I chose to take an approach with a focus on cognitive effort 
because previous findings have provided mixed evidence for the 
question of whether people’s automatic tendency is to be honest or 
dishonest. This mixed evidence is likely the result of the fact that 
research in this area has primarily focused on time as an indication of 
deliberation. For instance, findings suggest that people are more 
dishonest when they are under time-pressure compared to when they 
have no time limits (Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 
2012; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012), yet other findings 
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directly contest this (Foerster, Pfister, Schmidts, Dignath, & Kunde, 
2013). Because there is arguably some time for reflection in many 
studies that use time pressure (for instance when a decision has to be 
made within 8 seconds), these studies do not provide convincing 
evidence to be able to tell whether it is automatic selfishness that 
drives dishonesty, or whether even this selfishness is a consequence of 
balanced reasoning. By examining this question while looking at the 
cognitive effort—rather than the amount of time—that is required to 
be dishonest, Chapter 2 shed light on the apparent contradiction; it 
was found that being dishonest takes more cognitive effort than being 
honest.  
Although economic models of deception have changed their 
assumptions about dishonesty over the years, they always seem to 
presume a primary role of deliberative reasoning. Strict views of 
people being either always self-interested (and thus dishonest) or 
honest if the gain from dishonesty does not maximize outcomes by a 
large enough margin (Koford & Penno, 1992), have moved to more 
nuanced views that incorporate not only personal outcomes but also 
the outcomes of others and the process that leads to these outcomes 
(Gneezy, 2005; Koning, van Dijk, & van Beest, 2010). These models 
assume that a certain kind of balancing of the costs and benefits of 
deception takes place. Although I do not dispute that this kind of 
balancing is often present, as I suggested in Chapter 2, current tests of 
whether the decision to be dishonest happens fast or slow are 
inconclusive in determining what amount of reflection may, or may 
not, have taken place. Chapter 2 thus contributes to our general 
understanding of (dis)honesty by examining the prerequisites of this 
behavior. It was found that when enough cognitive capacity is 
available and people can serve self-interest, dishonesty often takes 
place. This suggests that cognitive effort is needed when deceiving 
others. Whereas other models have presupposed cognitive capacity 
for, for instance, computations of the balance of costs and benefits of 
deception (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & 
Douma, 2004) or the instrumental value of it (Koning et al., 2010), 
this chapter adds depth to the understanding of deception by stressing 
the importance of the availability of cognitive capacity.  
The finding that dishonesty takes more cognitive effort than 
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honesty (Chapter 2) is in line with research in other areas, such as 
evolutionary, developmental, and neuropsychology. In these areas, 
converging evidence reveals that dishonest behavior is more complex 
and effortful than honest behavior. For instance, taking deception as a 
measure of cognitive sophistication in primates, it seems to be the 
case that deceit is a matter of neural computation. Although many 
primates hold deceit as a survival strategy—suggesting natural 
selection does not necessarily favor honesty—not all of them are 
equally capable of deceit. In fact, the bigger the size of the neo-cortex 
in a given species, the higher the frequency of the use of tactical 
deceit (Byrne & Corp, 2004). Furthermore, children’s ability to lie 
develops with age, and it is closely related to other signs of mental 
sophistication (e.g., “Theory of mind”; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007). 
Lies also elicit more activation in the brain than truths (Ganis, 
Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Langleben et al., 
2002; Lee et al., 2009) and typically, when lying, it takes people 
longer to respond to a question than when they tell the truth (Farrow et 
al., 2003, Spence et al., 2001). Next to recent research that revealed 
the liar’s heightened effort by measuring their non-visual saccadic eye 
movement (Vrij, Oliveira, Hammond, & Ehrlichman, 2015), Chapter 
2 provides direct evidence for the idea that lying requires more effort 
than telling the truth.  
Furthermore, as Teper, Zhong and Inzlicht (2015) have also 
noted, the research described in Chapter 2 is one of the few cases in 
the moral psychology literature that includes a measure of actual 
moral behavior. The examination of this behavior further adds to the 
existing literature by virtue of its emphasis on the amount of cognitive 
effort involved. Several related topics can likewise benefit from this 
emphasis. In moral psychology, the question whether in social 
dilemmas people act out of selfish concerns and whether this is driven 
by intuition or deliberation has recently received substantial attention 
(e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 
2001; Rand et al., 2014; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Zaki & 
Mitchell, 2013; Zhong, 2011). A dual-process framework is applied 
where people are believed to rely both on automatic, sometimes called 
intuitive, processes, and more deliberative or controlled processes 
(Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). Because the former processes are 
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presumed to be fast, there is a strong emphasis on correlational studies 
using reaction times (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014; Lotito, 
Migheli, & Ortona, 2013; Piovesan & Wengström, 2009; Rand et al., 
2014, 2012). Findings of these studies yield inconsistent results, with 
some studies concluding fast reactions are prosocial and others 
concluding they are not. However, studies that manipulate the 
cognitive mindset, for instance through evoking intuition or reflection, 
favor the conclusion that intuition brings about prosociality and 
honesty (Rand et al., 2014, 2012; Zhong, 2011). It is therefore 
important that future research that aims to answer questions of 
whether people will automatically act in a selfish way—whether that 
means being dishonest or choosing not to cooperate—addresses these 
questions while examining various amounts of cognitive processing.  
Additional insights on this issue could come from further 
empirical clarification on the different effects of manipulations such 
as time pressure and cognitive load. For instance, questions of 
whether these manipulations differentially affect processes like self-
serving biases and relying on heuristics could be addressed. Time 
pressure may elicit a ‘hot’ affective response that is motivated by 
immediate gain. Likewise, under time pressure heuristics are often 
resorted to (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000), and 
certain situations may make the mental short-cut ‘more money is 
better’ more salient than ‘honesty feels good’. Yet arguably, these 
processes still take up some amount of cognitive effort, and therefore 
a manipulation of cognitive load could interfere with, for instance, a 
self-serving bias. Research by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2008) suggests 
that this may indeed be the case. When their participants were under 
high cognitive load, a self-serving bias that is typically observed in the 
hypocrisy literature disappeared. Where normally people judge moral 
transgressions performed by themselves more fair than transgressions 
performed by others, these participants judged a moral transgression 
performed by themselves equally unfair as when it was performed by 
another individual. This suggests that cognitive load can indeed 





Effort and self-serving biases 
 
The question of whether dishonesty is driven by an automatic 
self-serving bias can likewise be examined with a focus on cognitive 
effort rather than time. Although the die rolling task described in 
Chapter 2 has several important qualities, such as its anonymity, it 
does not lend itself well for this question. What this task does is 
determine whether people are dishonest. What it does not do is 
provide evidence for which cognitive process led to this dishonesty. 
Was it due to self-serving biases that arguably take up some cognitive 
effort, or was this dishonesty a result of more controlled calculations 
and deliberation? In an attempt to test the boundary conditions of self-
serving tendencies I therefore ran two experiments using cognitive 
load and a ‘dot task’. This task can be used to reveal dishonesty 
stemming from self-serving interpretations (Gino & Ariely, 2012). It 
works as follows. Participants are asked to indicate on which side of a 
diagonal line dividing a square on the screen they see more dots. To 
reward them for their effort, they are paid 5 euro cents for each trial 
on which they indicate seeing more dots on the right, and 0.5 euro 
cents for each trail on which they indicate seeing more on the left. The 
dots are displayed for one second, after which the participant chooses 
to indicate “more on the right” with the M key on their keyboard or 
“more on the left” with the Z key (Mazar & Ariely, 2009). This 
difference in payment is meant to present the participants with a 
choice to either be accurate or to increase their payment.  
Figure 7.1 displays two examples of a trial in this task. 
Although participants are presented with trials in which the dots are 
seemingly randomly displayed on either side of the diagonal line, a 
distinction can be made between trials on which the correct answer to 
the question “Are there more dots on the left or more dots on the 
right?” was very easy to detect because there were clearly more dots 
on one side then the other (e.g., 6 vs. 14 dots) and trials where the 
correct answer was more difficult to detect (e.g., 9 vs. 11 dots). 
Participants thus have an opportunity to serve their self-interest by 
lying in a clear situation (see also Mazar & Zhong, 2010) and an 
opportunity to serve their self-interest by lying in a more ambiguous 
situation (see also Gino & Ariely, 2012). Because people are generally 
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averse to lying (Gneezy, 2005), I expected participants to only serve 
their self-interest on trials for which they could make use of the 
ambiguity of the situation (not unlike the situation in which no one but 
yourself knows the outcome of a die role). Furthermore, if being 
selfish takes some cognitive effort, it can be expected that participants 
would display this bias only when they have enough cognitive 
capacity to do so.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. An ‘easy’ trial (left) and an ‘ambiguous’ trial (right) in the 
Dot task. One hundred trials present a seemingly random amount of 
dots for approximately one second after which participants have to 
choose on which side they saw more dots. Choosing the right side 
earns ten times as much money as choosing the left. In the examples 
depicted, the correct answer is to choose the left side.  
 
In a first study to test these expectations (N = 177), it was 
indeed the case that participants were dishonest mostly on the trials 
where the ambiguity of the situation allowed for creative re-
interpretation. In other words, on the ambiguous trials participants 
chose to see more dots on the side that earned them more money. 
More importantly, we observed a drop in this behavior in a condition 
where participants were under high cognitive load. This would 
suggest that even a bias that pushes people to be self-serving in a split 
second decision could take additional cognitive effort. However, in a 
150 
pre-registered attempt to replicate these findings (N = 254), this latter 
effect disappeared: in this study, the tendency to serve self-interest on 
ambiguous trials was not decreased under load (see supplemental 
material, Study 3 and 4). It is therefore too soon to draw far-reaching 
conclusions about whether self-serving biases that lead to dishonesty 
take cognitive effort. Some authors have likewise found indications 
that cognitive load can indeed interfere with self-serving biases 
(Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008), whereas others have even suggested 
that selfishly deceiving oneself is an covert automatic process, namely 
one that has evolved to make deceiving another person less effortful 
(von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). 
 
 
Emotions and honesty 
 
Intuitive processes that influence moral judgments and 
decisions may not always register consciously, yet they often involve 
general feelings that signal whether something is positive or negative. 
For instance, the act of deceiving another person may be accompanied 
by negative feelings of guilt. These feelings in turn are accompanied 
by visceral states associated with negative arousal. This is supported 
by research showing that there is more physiological arousal when 
immoral actions are actually performed, compared to when they are 
merely forecasted or not performed at all (Teper, Inzlicht, & Page-
Gould, 2011). Studies of patients with damage to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex reveal that—despite reasoning abilities being 
intact—a lack of integration of this somatic experience can lead to 
anti-social behavior (Bechera, Damasio, Damasio, Anderson, 1994; 
Damasio, 1994). These patients have to rely on a reasoned cost-
benefit analysis of the available options, and consequently often 
choose disadvantageously. In similar vein, when people misattribute 
their visceral state to something other than the moral decision at hand, 
this seems to make them more inclined to act immorally (Dienstbier, 
1972; Dienstbier & Munter, 1971; Teper, Tullett, Page-Gould, & 
Inzlicht, 2015). In other words, if the function of emotions and 
somatic states to signal the wrongness of certain behavior is 
misaligned, this behavior is not avoided. 
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In keeping with the above, a complementary method to 
manipulating cognitive capacity is to manipulate emotional states. 
Emotions have an important influence on decision-making 
(Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; 
Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). Furthermore, 
being in a positive mood has been found to buffer against negative 
associations with the immoral option (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) 
and to increase cognitive flexibility (Isen, 2000). This flexibility may 
in turn allow for more dishonesty (Gino & Ariely, 2012). Therefore, it 
can be argued that when people feel positive, they would more 
readily ‘deceive themselves’ by categorizing a self-serving dishonest 
response as an honest response. This may require some reasonable 
doubt or ambiguity about what the correct response is; it is in these 
cases that a little flexibility allows for re-interpretation. I tested this 
idea by employing the above-mentioned dot task (See Gino & Ariely, 
2012) after inducing happy, sad, or neutral feelings in participants (N 
= 171) via film clips. Results of this experiment indicated that neither 
in the positive nor the negative or the neutral mood condition there 
was a higher tendency to be self-serving (see supplementary material 
Study 5). In these cases, however, a possible explanation for this 
finding could come from the fact that feelings of the internal reward 
of being honest and the external monetary rewards interact (Mazar & 
Ariely, 2006), and thereby possibly cancel each other out. Together 
with recent work that argues that there is a lack of empirical research 
examining the effects of emotion on actual moral behavior (Teper et 
al., 2015), this stresses the importance for future research to further 
disentangle the role of emotions and their influence on cognition in 
producing dishonest behavior.  
 
 
Effortless enduring guides to honesty 
 
In this dissertation, a further focus was on people’s ability to 
discern dishonest intentions in others. Differences in this ability were 
examined for judgments that are more or less effortful. Research on 
detecting deception has focused mainly on consciously made direct 
veracity judgments (i.e., Is the other person lying?). Yet, as meta-
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analyses have shown, these judgments do not seem to enable people to 
correctly deduce whether another person is lying or telling the truth 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). More recently, several indications have 
emerged that suggest that indirect judgments, such as judgments about 
another person’s demeanor, are better able to distinguish lies from 
truths (Ulatowska, 2014; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). Aside from 
this, theoretical accounts hold that people have a fundamental—
survival promoting—automatic ability to determine whether another 
person is friend or foe (Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010; Fiske, 
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). This ability reflects itself in judgments of the 
likability and trustworthiness (i.e., warmth) of others.  
In Chapter 3 these theoretical notions about affective 
impressions of others were tested in the realm of deception detection. 
The robustness of various veracity judgments was tested by varying 
another aspect of a deceptive interaction, namely whether (dis)honest 
stories are spontaneous or rehearsed. As was shown in Chapter 2, 
being dishonest requires more cognitive effort than being honest. This 
effort, in turn, may make it easier for others to detect that they are 
being deceived (see also Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008; 
Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Rehearsing a dishonest 
story may make telling the story less effortful, whereas rehearsing an 
honest story may not have such benefits. Indeed, it was revealed that 
people expect to be better able to detect deception from spontaneous, 
unrehearsed stories. Importantly, Chapter 3 also provided empirical 
evidence that validated this expectation. Next to this, this chapter 
presented initial evidence for the merit of affective indirect veracity 
judgments by showing that while the direct as well as most of the 
indirect veracity judgments no longer discriminated between liars and 
truth-tellers when stories were rehearsed, participants' affective 
indirect veracity judgment remained a valuable guide in dishonesty 
detection. This underlines the importance of the effortless impressions 









Chapter 3 also adds to the literature on deception detection by 
suggesting that it is important to take into account the spontaneity of 
stories when trying to identify whether another person is lying. The 
indirect veracity judgments examined in this chapter that asked about 
the ease of expression of the target indicated that retelling a story 
makes the storyteller come across with more ease. As mentioned 
above, when a liar experiences more cognitive load this can help 
observers detect deception. Together this suggests that if retelling a 
story indeed takes less cognitive effort, this makes correct detection 
less likely. This can have important implications for more applied 
settings where, for instance, statements are used that may have been 
rehearsed or that are retold on several occasions. Although the 
research in this dissertation was not meant to directly advise 
professionals in applied settings, the results provide an important step 
toward fully understanding the impact of, for instance, how law 
enforcement officers and judges perceive a suspect.  
Additionally, it is valuable to take the spontaneity of stories 
into account when studying people’s ability to detect deception. 
Although in Chapter 3 the direct veracity judgment did discriminate 
between liars and truth-tellers when stories were spontaneous, it did 
not do so when their stories were retold. This latter pattern resembles 
the lack of ability to detect deception revealed by meta-analyses 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Future investigations are therefore advised 
to take into account both the conditions under which veracity 
judgments are made (i.e., whether the observer is asked to judge 
veracity directly or indirectly) as well as the conditions under which 
targets tell their story (i.e., whether it is rehearsed). Furthermore, it is 
important to provide sufficient details about these latter conditions in 
order for others to be able to evaluate them.  
 
 
Reliance on effortless modes of processing 
 
In Chapter 4 a stress manipulation was employed to examine 
people’s ability to detect deception in a situation that calls for reliance 
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on effortless modes of processing. Stress triggers neural responses that 
permit an adaptive and fast response to the situation. This is often 
referred to as a ‘fight-or-flight’ response (Cannon, 1914). It has been 
suggested that under stress people rely more on automatic instead of 
controlled effortful processing (Keinan, 1987; Schoofs, Preuss, & 
Wolf, 2008; Starcke & Brand, 2012). Being stressed thus seems to 
hinder deliberation. In the area of deception detection, research has 
found that people have higher deception detection accuracies when 
their ability to deliberate is impaired due to concurrent cognitive load 
(Albrechtsen et al., 2009). Furthermore, in a stressful situation it may 
be especially important to know whom to trust. It is in these cases that 
it is of vital importance that cooperation and affiliation efforts are 
directed at others who will likely reciprocate. Chapter 4 therefore 
focused on people’s ability to discern (dis)honesty in the kind of 
situation where sharpened senses are vital—under stress.  
In this chapter trustworthiness detection was studied with the 
use of dynamic video material. This is relevant because there are 
several indications that dynamic, rather that static, information about 
another person holds the key to the detection of trustworthiness. For 
instance, it has been argued that the features that make a neutral face 
trustworthy resemble emotional expressions, and that therefore the 
ability to detect trustworthiness from a neutral face is present as an 
extension of the ability to read emotional expressions (Oosterhof & 
Todorov, 2009; Todorov, 2008). Although this suggests that there is 
merit to the study of character from the permanent form of facial 
features—an area called physiognomy—it does not take into account 
that the same person may be dishonest in one situation, and honest in 
another. In these situations, the nonverbal behavior that is expressed 
may be subtly different. Correspondingly, when Darwin studied the 
expressions of man and animals, he was interested in the expressions 
associated with a certain state of the mind, not the physiognomy that 
Lavater had described earlier (Darwin, 1872/1998).  
Even though it seems fundamental to the study of people’s 
ability to infer the trustworthy intentions of others to take into account 
the others’ state of mind, its importance is currently undervalued. In 
studies on trustworthiness detection, the use of still pictures of neutral 
faces is plenteous (Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, & De Neys, 2013; Stirrat & 
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Perrett, 2010; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009; Todorov, 2008; 
Willis & Todorov, 2006; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 
2002). Even so, people seem to perform better at detecting 
trustworthiness from pictures that are taken in the moment a target 
decides to betray trust (Verplaetse, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007) 
compared with neutral pictures of a face (Bonnefon et al., 2013). 
Indeed, it seems a combination of non-verbal behaviors displayed by 
an interaction partner predicts trustworthiness (e.g., DeSteno et al., 
2012). For this reason, in Chapter 4 the use of dynamic (video) 
material was stressed in order to further the discussion on people’s 
ability to form effortless impressions of the trustworthiness of others. 
Indeed, it was found that truth-tellers were rated higher on 
trustworthiness than liars, especially so when the observers’ senses 
were heightened due to being in a state of stress. 
 
 
Consequences of effortlessly formed impressions of (dis)honesty 
 
Just as the aforementioned intuitive factors can signal the 
valence of an action, evaluations of the positivity/negativity of others 
can also serve to prepare behavior toward this other person. 
Evaluations of valence are aligned with an approach/avoid response: 
people have automatic approach tendencies towards positively or 
potentially rewarding stimuli, and automatic avoidance tendencies 
towards negative or threatening stimuli (Chen & Bargh, 1999; 
Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). These automatic tendencies to approach and 
avoid are among the most basic motivational systems associated with 
affect (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990; Elliot, 2006; Russell, 2003). As 
especially judgments of trustworthiness signal valence, these 
judgments are likely to serve the purpose of determining whether to 
approach or avoid another person (Todorov, 2008). Other indications 
that support this idea suggest that when people are asked to inhibit a 
response to certain faces, these faces are later judged to be less 
trustworthy (Fenske, Raymond, Kessler, Westoby, & Tipper, 2005). 
Furthermore, judgments of trustworthiness and approachability (“How 
much would you like to walk up to a person in the street to strike up a 
conversation?”) are impaired in patients with bilateral amygdala 
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damage compared to controls (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998). 
This is consistent with the amygdala’s presumed role in detecting 
threatening stimuli and promoting vigilance and attention under 
conditions of uncertainty, whereby guiding approach and avoidance 
behavior (Davis & Whalen, 2001). These findings suggests that a 
fruitful avenue for future research is to examine approach and 
avoidance tendencies in relation to honest and dishonest others. 
Given the above, an alternative explanation for why findings 
in Chapter 3-6 suggest there is something that observers pick up about 
liars and truth-tellers might be that all judgments are simply more 
negative when observing a liar. Although findings in chapter 3 and 5 
suggest this is not the case (e.g., liars were not judged to have less 
ease of expression, and they were not judged to be more deceptive), 
one might wonder whether next to a judgment of warmth, a judgment 
of competence—the other important dimension underlying person 
perception (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Rosenberg, Nelson, & 
Vivekananthan, 1968)—is also negatively affected by deception. I 
therefore ran a study that asked participants to watch the 3-minute 
truth and lie videos from Chapter 5 and to provide a warmth and a 
competence judgment for each target, next to a behavioral intention 
towards them. The fact that half of the targets was lying when talking 
about themselves was never mentioned to participants. I asked 
participants whether (1) this was a person they would hire for a job, 
(2) whether they liked this person, and (3) whether this person 
appeared competent (see supplemental material, Study 6). This study 
was run online to get a relatively older sample presumed to be more 
experienced with a job interview setting (N = 64, Mage = 35). Although 
these findings therefore need further confirmation, results did indicate 
that when targets lied, they were less likely to get hired and also liked 
less. The effect for competence, however, was not significant. This 
confirms that there is more to impressions formed of liars than a mere 
shift in all judgments toward the negative.   
These results are also in line with other findings that suggest 
that warmth is more important in forming impressions than 
competence (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), and is 
processed earlier and faster (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011; Ybarra, 
Chan, & Park, 2001). Next to this, people use warmth more than 
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competence to seek out others they want to work with (Casciaro & 
Lobo, 2008). Because deception is frequently used in job interviews 
(Weiss & Feldman, 2006), this might be a situation where the 
automatically formed impressions are especially consequential. 
Moreover, it has been found that the frequency of lies told in a 
conversation is related to disliking and that people lie more to those 
who lied to them (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006). Together these 
findings stress the importance of investigating the consequences that 
effortlessly formed impressions bring to those who chose to deceive 
another person. In many real life situations, the effect of liking another 
person just a little less may have significant consequences in the long 
run. Examples that come to mind include voting behavior, excluding 
or helping others, and choosing whom to cooperate with. 
 
 
Indirect versus direct judgments of honesty 
 
Combining the results of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, these 
chapters provide evidence for distinguishability between honesty and 
dishonesty of others when affective indirect veracity judgments are 
made. In Chapter 5 and 6, one of the aims was to replicate and extend 
these effects. It has been previously argued that there is a lack of 
direct comparisons between the effects of direct compared to indirect 
veracity judgments (Levine & Bond, 2014; ten Brinke & Carney, 
2014). Next to this, in Chapter 5 it is also suggested that typical 
studies don’t allow for accurate comparisons due to the fact that direct 
veracity judgments are usually assessed with a binary yes or no 
question (i.e., ‘Is the target person lying?’) whereas indirect veracity 
judgments are assessed on Likert scales. In Study 5.1 both the direct 
and the indirect veracity judgments were assessed on a continuous 
scale, allowing for comparison between the two. Results indicated that 
again, truth-tellers were liked more than liars, while on the direct 
measure they were not judged to be more or less deceptive. This study 
thereby provided direct evidence for the superior ability of indirect 
veracity judgments compared with direct veracity 
judgments. Additionally, Study 5.2 tested whether either one of the 
affective indirect veracity judgments (liking or trustworthiness) was 
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superior to the other. Results indicated that the effect size for both 
these judgments was not significantly different. This suggest that 
these judgments—both previously associated with the effortless 
ability to perceive ‘friend’ or ‘foe’—are equally well equipped to 
distinguish between honesty and dishonesty. Chapter 5 thus further 
adds to the literature by providing direct evidence for the superiority 
of effortless indirect—compared to direct—measures of deception 
detection. 
Looking at the effort that is expended by the observer when 
making a veracity judgment, it also seems important to examine the 
influence of being forewarned of the possibility of deception. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, when participants know they have to detect 
deception, their attention may be shifted toward different cues. If the 
cues people use are not actual indicators of deception, this may lead to 
wrong veracity judgments (Vrij et al., 2001). Furthermore, it is 
reasonable to assume that being forewarned about the fact that 
deception may take place will recruit different mental processes, most 
likely those of a more controlled and deliberate type. Future research 
is advised to take being forewarned into account when examining how 
reliance on different cues affects direct veracity judgments. To further 
disentangle the effect of the effort that is used to make direct veracity 
judgments, an experiment could be considered in which effort is 
manipulated by asking participants to either ‘go with their gut’ when 
deciding whether another person is lying or to provide their reasons 
for this decision. Giving reasons for a decision can have detrimental 
effects (Halberstadt & Levine, 1999; Wilson & Schooler, 1991), and 
similar ‘overshadowing’ of the correct intuitions may happen when 
people are all too deliberately trying to detect deception. 
 
 
Effortless physiological responses to dishonesty 
 
 Next to extending findings concerning the merit of affective 
indirect veracity judgments, the aim of Chapter 5 an 6 was to 
investigate whether correct intuitions about the (dis)honesty of 
another person reflect themselves in the physiology of the observer. In 
Chapter 5 finger skin temperature was measured because previous 
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findings have revealed the importance of temperature in trust and 
interpersonal relationships (e.g., IJzerman & Koole, 2011; IJzerman et 
al., 2012). Longer videos of 3 minutes were used to allow an effect of 
(dis)honesty to unfold over time. Results revealed temperature indeed 
seemed to be affected by whether the target was honest or dishonest. 
However, the reported experiments leave room for improvement. For 
instance, because targets in these videos had to make up a long story, 
their lies may have consisted of a gradient of untrue information. As 
we have seen, right out lies are difficult to come up with. Mixing in 
information that, for instance, happened to someone else may make 
lying easier, and it seems likely targets did this on occasion. In order 
to clarify the observed temperature pattern, a next step would 
therefore be to test the effect of dishonesty on the observers’ 
physiology with liars that tell a continuous story out of their own 
initiative. 
There are still a lot of questions to be answered by research in 
the area of thermoregulation as well as that of pupillometry. It is 
therefore too soon to be able to interpret the exact meaning of the 
findings in Chapter 5 and 6. Even so, the observed patterns warrant 
further investigation. For instance, for pupillary responses a clear 
pattern was observed: while participants were watching the targets' 
answer, their pupil diameter first showed an increase and then a 
decrease. It is likely that this reflects the response of someone who is 
watching another person giving an answer to the ‘did you cheat’ 
question. Importantly, this pattern was more pronounced when 
participants were watching a dishonest answer. In other words, when 
watching a target who lied, participants’ pupil diameter showed an 
increase, more so than for watching a target who told the truth. This 
pattern could, for instance, be an indication of the detection of the 
presence of something unusual or unexpected. It could also be an 
indication of cognitive effort, as it may require more effort to process 
possible disfluency of the deceiver. Future research could verify 
whether these initial findings reflect the idea that observing dishonesty 
is, for instance, more effortful than observing honesty.  
Findings of both Chapter 5 and 6 invoke an association with 
Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis. This hypothesis 
suggests that physiological states ‘mark’ the goodness or badness of 
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certain alternatives. These physiological markers may be present even 
before people become aware of, for instance, whether a decision to go 
with one option rather than the other is advantageous (Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). These markers involve 
physiological changes that constitute emotions and that, on a more 
conscious level, are perceived as “feelings” (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005). When detecting deception, it seems that an increased reliance 
on conscious, deliberated judgments impairs detection abilities 
because a correct ‘gut feeling’ is overwritten or discarded by more 
effortful processing. Because of this, examining psychophysiology to 






The findings discussed in this dissertation demonstrate the 
benefit of looking at deception through a lens that emphasizes the 
cognitive effort that is exerted by both the deceiver and in the 
deceived. More specifically, this lens enabled me to show that while 
people may often show dishonest behavior—especially when this 
behavior can serve self-interest—this behavior occurs to the extent 
that enough cognitive capacity is available. Moreover, when judging 
other people’s deceptive intentions, judgments that are made 
consciously yet that require little effort (i.e., indirect affective 
judgments) seem to be better able to tell honesty and dishonesty apart 
than more effortful considerations of whether deception took place. 
Being on guard can facilitate these effortless judgments—both a 
certain amount of vigilance (i.e., stress) and being forewarned of the 
possibility of deception can bring out correct intuitions. Finally, as I 
have suggested in this dissertation, correct intuitions about another 
person’s honesty may stem from early unconscious processes that 
warrant investigation of physiological markers.  
Research that emphasizes cognitive effort encounters both the 
remarkable capacities of the human mind as well as its frailty. In this 
dissertation I started with research that utilized the limitations of the 
mind in order to study deceptive behavior. Because the task of 
remembering a string of letters competes with other effortful 
processes, this allowed for a test of the effort it takes to be dishonest. 
The capacity to form an impression of another person, in contrast, 
seems to require no such effort; there is no need to memorize 
objective characteristics of another person in order to form an opinion 
about them. Discerning dishonesty in others, therefore, seems to be 
aided by effortless processes. By capitalizing on the effortful and 
effortless processes that characterize the human mind, I hope to have 







Abele, A. E., & Bruckmüller, S. (2011). The bigger one of the “Big 
Two”? Preferential processing of communal information. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(5), 935–948. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.03.028 
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. (1998). The human amygdala 
in social judgment. Nature, 393(6684), 470–474. 
doi:10.1038/30982 
Albrechtsen, J. S., Meissner, C. A., & Susa, K. J. (2009). Can intuition 
improve deception detection performance? Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 1052–1055. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.05.017 
Ambady, N. (2010). The perils of pondering: Intuition and thin slice 
judgments. Psychological Inquiry, 21(4), 271–278. 
doi:10.1080/1047840X.2010.524882 
Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1992). Thin slices of expressive 
behavior as predictors of interpersonal consequences: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 111(2), 256–274. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.111.2.256 
Anderson, D. E., DePaulo, B. M., & Ansfield, M. E. (2002). The 
development of deception detection skill: A longitudinal study 
of same-sex friends. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 28(4), 536–545. doi:10.1177/0146167202287010 
Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 41, 258–290. doi:10.1037/h0060423 
Balcetis, E., & Dunning, D. (2006). See what you want to see: 
Motivational influences on visual perception. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 612–625. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.4.612  
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, 
efficiency, intention, and control in social cognition. In R. S. 
Wyer, Jr., & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition 
(2nd ed., pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
164 
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity 
of being. American Psychologist, 54, 462–479. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.462 
Bauer, D. J., Preacher, K. J. & Gil, K. M. (2006). Conceptualizing and 
testing random indirect effects and moderated mediation in 
multilevel models: New procedures and recommendations. 
Psychological Methods, 11, 142-163. doi:10.1037/1082-
989X.11.2.142 
Beatty, J., & Lucero-Wagoner, B. (2000). The pupillary system. In J. 
T. Cacioppo, G. Berntson, & L. G. Tassinary (Eds.), 
Handbook of psychophysiology (pp. 142–162). Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press.  
Bechara, A., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). The somatic marker 
hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision. Games and 
Economic Behavior, 52, 336–372. 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.010 
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994). 
Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to 
human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50(1-3), 7–15. 
doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90018-3 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1997). 
Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous 
strategy. Science, 275, 1293–1295. 
doi:10.1126/science.275.5304.1293 
Bernholt, T., Fried, R., Gather, U., & Wegener, I. (2006). Modified 
repeated median filters. Statistics and Computing, 16(2), 177–
192. doi:10.1007/s11222-006-8449-1 
Bernstein, M. J., Young, S. G., Brown, C. M., Sacco, D. F., & 
Claypool, H. M. (2008). Adaptive responses to social 
exclusion: Social rejection improves detection of real and fake 
smiles. Psychological Science, 19(10), 981–3. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02187.x 
Betsch, T., Plessner, H., Schwieren, C., & Gutig, R. (2001). I like it 
but I don’t know why: A value-account approach to implicit 
attitude formation. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 27(2), 242–253. doi:10.1177/0146167201272009 
165 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception 
judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 
214–34. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2008). Individual differences in 
judging deception: Accuracy and bias. Psychological Bulletin, 
134(4), 477–92. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.477 
Bond, G. D. (2012). Focus on basic cognitive mechanisms and 
strategies in deception research (and remand custody of 
“wizards” to Harry Potter movies). Journal of Applied 
Research in Memory and Cognition, 1(2), 128–130. 
doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.04.003 
Bonnefon, J.-F., Hopfensitz, A., & De Neys, W. (2013). The modular 
nature of trustworthiness detection. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 142(1), 143–50. doi:10.1037/a0028930 
Boone, R., & Buck, R. (2003). Emotional expressivity and 
trustworthiness: The role of nonverbal behavior in the 
evolution of cooperation. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 27, 
163–182. doi:10.1023/A:1025341931128 
Boudewyns, P. A. (1976). A comparison of the effects of stress vs. 
relaxation instruction on the finger temperature response. 
Behavior Therapy, 7, 54–67. doi:10.1016/S0005-
7894(76)80219-5 
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss. London, United Kingdom: 
Hogarth Press. 
Bradley, M. M., Miccoli, L., Escrig, M. a, & Lang, P. J. (2008). The 
pupil as a measure of emotional arousal and autonomic 
activation. Psychophysiology, 45(4), 602–7. 
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00654.x 
Byrne, R. W., & Corp, N. (2004). Neocortex size predicts deception 
rate in primates. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. 
Series B: Biological Sciences, 271, 1693–1699. 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2004.2780 
Cannon, W. B. (1914). The emergency function of the adrenal 
medulla in pain and the major emotions. American Journal of 
Physiology—Legacy Content, 33(2), 356–372. Retrieved from 
http://ajplegacy.physiology.org/content/33/2/356.abstract 
166 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of 
positive and negative affect: A control-process view. 
Psychological Review, 97(1), 19–35. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.97.1.19 
Casciaro, T., & Lobo, M. S. (2008, August 1). When competence is 
irrelevant: The role of interpersonal affect in task-related ties. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 53(4), 655-684. 
doi:10.2189/asqu.53.4.655 
Chapman, C. R., Oka, S., Bradshaw, D. H., Jacobson, R. C., & 
Donaldson, G. W. (1999). Phasic pupil dilation response to 
noxious stimulation in normal volunteers: Relationship to 
brain evoked potentials and pain report. Psychophysiology, 
36(1), 44–52. doi:10.1017/S0048577299970373 
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The 
perception-behavior link and social interaction. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 893–910. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.893 
Chen, M., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). Consequences of automatic 
evaluation: Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach 
or avoid the stimulus. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 25(2), 215–224. doi:10.1177/0146167299025002007 
Cleophas, T. J., Fennis, J. F., & van’t Laar, A. (1982). Finger 
temperature after a finger-cooling test: Influence of air 
temperature and smoking. Journal of Applied Physiology, 
52(5), 1167–1171. Retrieved from 
http://jap.physiology.org/content/52/5/1167.abstract 
Cosmides, L., Barrett, H. C., & Tooby, J. (2010). Colloquium paper: 
Adaptive specializations, social exchange, and the evolution 
of human intelligence. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 107, 9007–14. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0914623107 
Critchley, H. D., Tang, J., Glaser, D., Butterworth, B., & Dolan, R. J. 
(2005). Anterior cingulate activity during error and autonomic 
response. NeuroImage, 27(4), 885–895. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.05.047 
167 
Cushman, F. (2013). Action, outcome, and value: A dual-system 
framework for morality. Personality and social psychology 
review, 17, 273–92. doi:10.1177/1088868313495594  
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the 
human brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam. 
Darwin, C. (1872/1998). The expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals, 3rd ed. (w/ commentaries by Paul Ekman). Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
Davis, M., & Whalen, P. J. (2001). The amygdala: Vigilance and 
emotion. Molecular Psychiatry, 6(1), 13–34. 
doi:10.1038/sj.mp.4000812 
De Dreu, C. K. W., Nijstad, B. A, Baas, M., Wolsink, I., & Roskes, 
M. (2012). Working memory benefits creative insight, 
musical improvisation, and original ideation through 
maintained task-focused attention. Personality & Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 38, 656–669. 
doi:10.1177/0146167211435795  
De Neys, W., Hopfensitz, A., & Bonnefon, J.-F. (2013). Low second-
to-fourth digit ratio predicts indiscriminate social suspicion, 
not improved trustworthiness detection. Biology Letters, 9(2), 
20130037. doi:10.1098/rsbl.2013.0037 
Debey, E., Verschuere, B., & Crombez, G. (2012). Lying and 
executive control: An experimental investigation using ego 
depletion and goal neglect. Acta Psychologica, 140(2), 133–
141. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy. 2012.03.004  
DePaulo, B. M., Charlton, K., Cooper, H., Lindsay, J. J., & 
Muhlenbruck, L. (1997). The accuracy-confidence correlation 
in the detection of deception. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 1(4), 346–57. 
doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0104_5 
DePaulo, B. M., Jordan, A., Irvine, A., & Laser, P. S. (1982). Age 
changes in the detection of deception. Child Development, 
53(3), 701–709. doi:10.2307/1129383 
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & 
Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in everyday life. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 979–95. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.979 
168 
DePaulo, B. M., Kirkendol, S. E., Tang, J., & O’Brien, T. P. (1988). 
The motivational impairment effect in the communication of 
deception: Replications and extensions. Journal of Nonverbal 
Behavior, 12(3), 177–202. doi:10.1007/BF00987487 
DePaulo, B. M., Lanier, K., & Davis, T. (1983). Detecting the deceit 
of the motivated liar. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.5.1096 
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., 
Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. 
Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 74–118. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.129.1.74 
DePaulo, B.M., & Morris, W.L. (2004). Discerning lies from truths: 
Behavioural cues to deception and the indirect pathway of 
intuition. In P.A. Granhag & L. Strömwall (Eds.), The 
detection of deception in forensic contexts (pp. 15–41). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
DeSteno, D., Breazeal, C., Frank, R. R. H., Pizarro, D., Baumann, J., 
Dickens, L., & Lee, J. J. (2012). Detecting the trustworthiness 
of novel partners in economic exchange. Psychological 
Science, 23, 1549–1556. doi:10.1177/0956797612448793 
Dienstbier, R. A. (1972). The role of anxiety and arousal attribution in 
cheating. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 8(2), 
168–179. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(72)90035-2 
Dienstbier, R. A., & Munter, P. O. (1971). Cheating as a function of 
the labeling of natural arousal. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 17, 208–213. doi:10.1037/h0030384 
Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., & Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious 
facial reactions to emotional facial expressions. Psychological 
Science, 11, 86–89. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00221 
Dunn, B. D., Dalgleish, T., & Lawrence, A. D. (2006). The somatic 
marker hypothesis: A critical evaluation. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 30, 239–271. 
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.07.001 
Ehrlichman, H., & Micic, D. (2012). Why do people move their eyes 
when they think? Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 21(2), 96–100. doi:10.1177/0963721412436810 
169 
Ekman, P. (2003). Darwin, deception, and facial expression. Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences, 1000(1). 
doi:10.1196/annals.1280.010 
Ekman, P. (1989). The argument and evidence about universals in 
facial expressions of emotion. In H. Wagoner & A. Manstead 
(Eds.), Handbook of social psychophysiology. Chichester: 
Wiley, pp. 143–164. 
Ekman, P., Davidson, R. J., & Friesen, W. V. (1990). The Duchenne 
smile: Emotional expression and brain physiology: II. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(2), 342–353. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.342 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Nonverbal leakage and clues to 
deception. Psychiatry, 32(1), 88–106. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/5779090 
Elliot, A. J. (2006). The hierarchical model of approach-avoidance 
motivation. Motivation and Emotion, 30(2), 111–116. 
doi:10.1007/s11031-006-9028-7 
Epstein, S. (2003). Cognitive-experiential self-theory of personality. 
In Millon, T., & Lerner, M. J. (Eds.), Comprehensive 
handbook of psychology, Volume 5: Personality and Social 
Psychology (pp. 159-184). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons. 
Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., & Tesch-Römer, C. (1993). The role 
of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance. 
Psychological Review, 100(3), 363. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.100.3.363 
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003). In two minds: Dual-process accounts of 
reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454–459. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012  
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, 
judgment, and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 
59, 255–78. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 
Farrow, T. F. D., Reilly, R., Rahman, T. A., Herford, A. E., Woodruff, 
P. W. R., & Spence, S. A. (2003). Sex and personality traits 
influence the difference between time taken to tell the truth or 
lie. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 97, 451–460. 
doi:10.2466/PMS.97.5.451-460 
170 
Feeley, T. H., & Young, M. J. (2000). Self-reported cues about 
deceptive and truthful communication: The effects of 
cognitive capacity and communicator veracity. 
Communication Quarterly, 48(2), 101–119. 
doi:10.1080/01463370009385585 
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. 
Nature, 415(6868), 137–140. doi:10.1038/415137a 
Feldman, R. S., Forrest, J. A., & Happ, B. R. (2002). Self-presentation 
and verbal deception: Do self-presenters lie more? Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, 24, 163–170. 
doi:10.1207/S15324834BASP2402_8 
Fenske, M. J., Raymond, J. E., Kessler, K., Westoby, N., & Tipper, S. 
P. (2005). Attentional inhibition has social-emotional 
consequences for unfamiliar faces. Psychological Science, 
16(10), 753–758. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01609.x 
Fiedler, K., Bluemke, M., & Unkelbach, C. (2009). Exerting control 
over allegedly automatic associative processes. In J. P. 
Forgas, R. F. Baumeister, & D. M. Tice (Eds.), Psychology of 
self-regulation: Cognitive, affective, and motivational 
processes (pp. 249–269). doi:10.4324/9780203837962 
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). 
The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(1), 1–17. 
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-
BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S 
Fischbacher, U., & Heusi, F. (2008). Lies in disguise. An 
experimental study on cheating. TWI working paper, (40). 
Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/p/twi/respas/0040.html  
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal 
dimensions of social cognition: Warmth and competence. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 77–83. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.005 
Fiske, S. T., Xu, J., Cuddy, A. C., & Glick, P. (1999). (Dis)respecting 
versus (dis)liking: Status and interdependence predict 
ambivalent stereotypes of competence and warmth. Journal of 
Social Issues, 55(3), 473–489. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00128 
171 
Fiske, S. T. & Taylor, S. E. (2013). Social cognition: From brains to 
culture (2nd ed.). London: Sage. 
Foerster, A., Pfister, R., Schmidts, C., Dignath, D., & Kunde, W. 
(2013). Honesty saves time (and justifications). Frontiers in 
Psychology. 4, 473. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00473  
Forrest, J. A., Feldman, R. S., & Tyler, J. M. (2004). When accurate 
beliefs lead to better lie detection. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 34, 764–780. doi:10.1111/j.1559-
1816.2004.tb02569.x  
Frank, M. G., & Ekman, P. (2004). Appearing truthful generalizes 
across different deception situations. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 86(3), 486–495. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.86.3.486 
Frank, M. G., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1993). Behavioral 
markers and recognizability of the smile of enjoyment. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(1), 83–93. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.64.1.83 
Fried, R., Schettlinger, K., & Borowski, M., (2012). Robfilter: Robust 
time series filters. http://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=robfilter 
Ganis, G., Kosslyn, S. M., Stose, S., Thompson, W. L., & Yurgelun-
Todd, D. A. (2003). Neural correlates of different types of 
deception: An fMRI investigation. Cerebral Cortex, 13(8), 
830–836. doi:10.1093/cercor/13.8.830 
Gilbert, D. T., & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: 
Activation and application of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 509–517. 
doi:10.1037//0022-3514.60.4.509  
Gino, F., & Ariely, D. (2012). The dark side of creativity: Original 
thinkers can be more dishonest. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 102, 445–459. doi:10.1037/a0026406 
Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E., Mead, N. L., & Ariely, D. (2011). Unable 
to resist temptation: How self-control depletion promotes 
unethical behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 115, 191–203. 
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.03.001 
172 
Gintis, H., Henrich, J., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (2008). 
Strong reciprocity and the roots of human morality. Social 
Justice Research, 21(2), 241–253. doi:10.1007/s11211-008-
0067-y  
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. American 
Economic Review, 95(1), 384–394. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132685 
Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2002). Repeated interrogations: 
Verbal and non-verbal cues to deception. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 16(3), 243–257. doi:10.1002/acp.784 
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A, Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & 
Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive load selectively interferes with 
utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107, 1144–1154. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004  
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & 
Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional 
engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 2105–
2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872 
Grèzes, J., Frith, C., & Passingham, R. E. (2004). Brain mechanisms 
for inferring deceit in the actions of others. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 24(24), 5500–5505. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0219-04.2004 
Gunia, B. C., Wang, L., Huang, L., Wang, J., & Murnighan, J. K. 
(2012). Contemplation and conversation: Subtle influences on 
moral decision making. Academy of Management Journal, 55, 
13–33. doi:10.5465/amj.2009.0873  
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social 
intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological 
Review, 108, 814–834. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814  
Hala, S., & Russell, J. (2001). Executive control within strategic 
deception: A window on early cognitive development? 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 80, 112–141. 
doi:10.1006/jecp.2000.2627  
Halberstadt, J. B., & Levine, G. M. (1999). Effects of reasons analysis 
on the accuracy of predicting basketball games. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 29(3), 517–530. 
doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1999.tb01399.x 
173 
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2008). Social evaluation by 
preverbal infants. Pediatric Research, 63(3), 219. 
doi:10.1203/PDR.0b013e318168c6e5 
Harlow, H. (1958). The nature of love. American Psychologist, 13, 
673-685. doi:10.1037/h0047884 
Hermans, E. J., Henckens, M. J. A. G., Roelofs, K., & Fernández, G. 
(2013). Fear bradycardia and activation of the human 
periaqueductal grey. NeuroImage, 66, 278–287. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.10.063 
Hu, X., Chen, H., & Fu, G. (2012). A repeated lie becomes a truth? 
The effect of intentional control and training on deception. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 488. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00488 
IJzerman, H., Gallucci, M., Pouw, W. T. J. L., Weiβgerber, S. C., van 
Doesum, N. J., & Williams, K. D. (2012). Cold-blooded 
loneliness: Social exclusion leads to lower skin temperatures. 
Acta Psychologica, 140, 283–288. 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.05.002 
IJzerman, H., & Koole, S. L. (2011). From perceptual rags to 
metaphoric riches–bodily, social, and cultural constraints on 
sociocognitive metaphors: Comment on Landau, Meier, and 
Keefer (2010). Psychological Bulletin, 137, 355–361. 
doi:10.1037/a0022373 
Isen, A. M. (2000). Some perspective on positive affect and self-
regulation. Psychological Inquiry, 11(3), 184–187. Retrieved 
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449800 
Jonas, E., McGregor, I., Klackl, J., Agroskin, D., Fritsche, I., 
Holbrook, C., … Quirin, M. (2014). Threat and Defense. In J. 
M. Olson & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology (1st ed., Vol. 49, pp. 219–286). San Diego, 
CA: Adacemic Press. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-800052-
6.00004-4 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: 
mapping bounded rationality. The American Psychologist, 
58(9), 697–720. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.697 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking: Fast and slow. New York, NY: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
174 
Kahneman, D., & Beatty, J. (1966). Pupil diameter and load on 
memory. Science, 154(3756), 1583-1585. 
Kang, Y., Williams, L. E., Clark, M. S., Gray, J. R., & Bargh, J. A. 
(2011). Physical temperature effects on trust behavior: The 
role of insula. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 6, 
507–515. doi:10.1093/scan/nsq077 
Keefe, F. J. (1978). Biofeedback vs. instructional control of skin 
temperature. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 1(4), 383–390. 
doi:10.1007/BF00846694 
Keinan, G. (1987). Decision making under stress: Scanning of 
alternatives under controllable and uncontrollable threats. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(3), 639–
644. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.3.639 
Keren, G., & Schul, Y. (2009). Two is not always better than one: A 
critical evaluation of two-system theories. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 4, 533–550. doi:10.1111/j.1745-
6924.2009.01164.x  
Kinnunen, S. P., & Windmann, S. (2013). Dual-processing altruism. 
Frontiers in Psychology. 4:193. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00193  
Kistler, A., Mariauzouls, C., & von Berlepsch, K. (1998). Fingertip 
temperature as an indicator for sympathetic responses. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 29, 35–41. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9641246 
Koford, K., & Penno, M. (1992). Accounting, principal-agent theory, 
and self-interested behavior. The Ruffin Series in Business 
Ethics, 127-142. 
Koning, L., van Dijk, E., & van Beest, I. (2010). An instrumental 
account of deception and reactions to deceit in bargaining. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(1), 57–73. 
doi:10.5840/beq20102015 
Krumhuber, E. G., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2009). Can Duchenne 
smiles be feigned? New evidence on felt and false smiles. 
Emotion, 9(6), 807–820. doi:10.1037/a0017844 
175 
Laeng, B., Sirois, S., & Gredeback, G. (2012). Pupillometry: A 
window to the preconscious? Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 7(1), 18–27. doi:10.1177/1745691611427305 
Lane, S. M., & Vieira, K. M. (2012). Steering a new course for 
deception detection research. Journal of Applied Research in 
Memory and Cognition, 1(2), 136–138. 
doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.04.001  
Landström, S., Granhag, P. A., & Hartwig, M. (2005). Witnesses 
appearing live versus on video: Effects on observers’ 
perception, veracity assessments and memory. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 19, 913–933. doi:10.1002/acp.1131 
Langleben, D. D., Schroeder, L., Maldjian, J. A., Gur, R. C., 
McDonald, S., Ragland, J. D., … Childress, A. R. (2002). 
Brain activity during simulated deception: An event-related 
functional magnetic resonance study. NeuroImage, 15, 727–
732. doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.1003  
Lee, T. M. C., Au, R. K. C., Liu, H.-L., Ting, K. H., Huang, C.-M., & 
Chan, C. C. H. (2009). Are errors differentiable from 
deceptive responses when feigning memory impairment? An 
fMRI study. Brain and Cognition, 69, 406–412. 
doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2008.09.002 
Levine, T. R. (2007). MSU trivia game interviews. Unpublished video 
tapes. East Lansing: Michigan State University. 
Levine, T. R., & Bond, C. F. (2014). Direct and indirect measures of 
lie detection tell the same story: A reply to ten Brinke, 
Stimson, and Carney (2014). Psychological Science. 
doi:10.1177/0956797614536740 
Levine, T. R., Park, H. S., & McCornack, S. A. (1999). Accuracy in 
detecting truths and lies: Documenting the “veracity effect.” 
Communication Monographs, 66(2), 125–144. 
doi:10.1080/03637759909376468 
Levine, T. R., Serota, K. B., Shulman, H., Clare, D. D., Park, H. S., 
Shaw, A. S., … Lee, J. H. (2011). Sender demeanor: 
Individual differences in sender believability have a powerful 
impact on deception detection judgments. Human 
Communication Research, 37(3), 377–403. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2011.01407.x 
176 
Lewicki, R. J., & Robinson, R. J. (1998). Ethical and unethical 
bargaining tactics: An ampirical study. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 17(6), 665–682. doi:10.1023/A:1005719122519 
Li, S., Weerda, R., Milde, C., Wolf, O. T., & Thiel, C. M. (2014). 
Effects of acute psychosocial stress on neural activity to 
emotional and neutral faces in a face recognition memory 
paradigm. Brain Imaging and Behavior, 8(4), 598–610. 
doi:10.1007/s11682-013-9287-3  
Littell, R., Pendergast, J., & Natarajan, R. (2000). Tutorial in 
biostatistics. Modelling covariance structure in the analysis of 
repeated measures data. Statistics in Medicine, 19(2000), 
1793–1819. doi:10.1002/1097-
0258(20000715)19:13<1793::AID-SIM482>3.0.CO;2-Q 
Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on 
behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 65(3), 272–292. doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0028 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). 
Risk as feelings. Psychological Bulletin, 127(2), 267–286. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267 
Loftus, G. R., & Masson, M. E. J. (1994). Using confidence intervals 
in within-subject designs. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
1(4), 476–490. doi:10.3758/BF03210951 
Lohse, J., Goeschl, T., & Diederich, J. (2014). Giving is a question of 
time: Response times and contributions to a real world public 
good. University of Heidelberg Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series, (566). 
Lotito, G., Migheli, M., & Ortona, G. (2013). Is cooperation 
instinctive? Evidence from the response times in a public 
goods game. Journal of Bioeconomics, 15(2), 123–133. 
doi:10.1007/s10818-012-9141-5 
Lykken, D. T. (1998). A tremor in the blood: Uses and abuses of the 
lie detector. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
MacCallum, R. C., Kim, C., Malarkey, W., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J. 
(1997). Studying multivariate change using multilevel models 
and latent curve models. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 
32, 215–253. doi:10.1207/s15327906mbr3203_1 
177 
Martinsson, P., Myrseth, K. O. R., & Wollbrant, C. (2014). Social 
dilemmas: When self-control benefits cooperation. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 45, 213–236. 
doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.09.004 
Masip, J., Garrido, E., & Herrero, C. (2009). Heuristic versus 
systematic processing of information in detecting deception: 
Questioning the truth bias. Psychological Reports, 105(1), 11–
36. doi:10.2466/PR0.105.1.11-36 
Mason, J. W. (1968). A review of psychoendocrine research on the 
pituitary-adrenal cortical system. Psychosomatic Medicine, 
30(5), 576-607. Retrieved from 
http://journals.lww.com/psychosomaticmedicine/pages/default
.aspx  
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest 
people: A theory of self-concept maintenance. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 45, 633–644. doi:10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633 
Mazar, N., & Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its 
policy implications. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 
25(1), 117-126. doi: 10.1509/jppm.25.1.117 
Mazar, N., & Ariely, D. (2009). “What the hell”: Continuous 
temptations and escalation of dishonesty. Unpublished 
manuscript, Rotman School of Management, University of 
Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
Mead, N. L., Baumeister, R. F., Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E., & Ariely, 
D. (2009). Too tired to tell the truth: Self-control resource 
depletion and dishonesty. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 594–597. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.02.004 
Miller, G. F. (2007). Sexual selection for moral virtues. The Quarterly 
Review of Biology, 82(2), 97–125. doi:10.1086/517857 
Oei, N. Y. L., Veer, I. M., Wolf, O. T., Spinhoven, P., Rombouts, S. 
A. R. B., & Elzinga, B. M. (2012). Stress shifts brain 
activation towards ventral “affective” areas during emotional 
distraction. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(4), 
403–12. doi:10.1093/scan/nsr024 
Oosterhof, N. N., & Todorov, A. (2009). Shared perceptual basis of 
emotional expressions and trustworthiness impressions from 
faces. Emotion, 9(1), 128–133. doi:10.1037/a0014520 
178 
Partala, T., & Surakka, V. (2003). Pupil size variation as an indication 
of affective processing. International Journal of Human 
Computer Studies, 59(1-2), 185–198. doi:10.1016/S1071-
5819(03)00017-X  
Piovesan, M., & Wengström, E. (2009). Fast or fair? A study of 
response times. Economics Letters, 105(2), 193–196. 
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.07.017 
Podlesny, J. A., & Raskin, D. C. (1977). Physiological measures and 
the detection of deception. Psychological Bulletin, 84, 782–
799. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/693743 
Porter, S., England, L., Juodis, M., ten Brinke, L., & Wilson, K. 
(2008). Is the face a window to the soul? Investigation of the 
accuracy of intuitive judgments of the trustworthiness of 
human faces. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 
40(3), 171–177. doi:10.1037/0008-400X.40.3.171 
Pouw, W., Flore, P. C. & IJzerman, H. (2012). Measuring 




Preston, S. D., Buchanan, T. W., Stansfield, R. B., & Bechara, A. 
(2007). Effects of anticipatory stress on decision making in a 
gambling task. Behavioral Neuroscience, 121(2), 257–63. 
doi:10.1037/0735-7044.121.2.257 
Qin, S., Hermans, E. J., van Marle, H. J. F., Luo, J., & Fernández, G. 
(2009). Acute psychological stress reduces working memory-
related activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Biological 
Psychiatry, 66(1), 25–32. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.03.006 
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012). Spontaneous 
giving and calculated greed. Nature, 489, 427– 430. 
doi:10.1038/nature11467 
Rand, D. G., Peysakhovich, A., Kraft-Todd, G. T., Newman, G. E., 
Wurzbacher, O., Nowak, M. A., & Greene, J. D. (2014). 
Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation. Nature 
Communications, 5, 3677. doi:10.1038/ncomms4677 
179 
Reinhard, M. A. (2010). Need for Cognition and the process of lie 
detection. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(6), 
961–971. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.06.002 
Reinhard, M. A., Greifeneder, R., & Scharmach, M. (2013). 
Unconscious processes improve lie detection. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 105(5), 721–39. 
doi:10.1037/a0034352 
Reinhard, M., Scharmach, M., & Müller, P. (2013). It’s not what you 
are, it's what you know: Experience, beliefs, and the detection 
of deception in employment interviews. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 43, 467–479. doi:10.1111/j.1559-
1816.2013.01011.x 
Rimm-Kaufman, S. E., & Kagan, J. (1996). The psychological 
significance of changes in skin temperature. Motivation and 
Emotion, 20, 63–78. doi:10.1007/BF02251007 
Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekananthan, P. S. (1968). A 
multidimensional approach to the structure of personality 
impressions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
9(4), 283–294. doi:10.1037/h0026086 
Rotteveel, M., & Phaf, R. H. (2004). Automatic affective evaluation 
does not automatically predispose for arm flexion and 
extension. Emotion, 4(2), 156–172. doi:10.1037/1528-
3542.4.2.156 
Rousselet, G. A., Thorpe, S. J., & Fabre-Thorpe, M. (2004). How 
parallel is visual processing in the ventral pathway? Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 8(8), 363–370. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.06.003 
Ruedy, N. E., Moore, C., Gino, F., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2013). The 
cheater’s high: The unexpected affective benefits of unethical 
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105, 
531–548. doi:10.1037/a0034231  
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction 
of emotion. Psychological Review, 110(1), 145–172. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.1.145 
Scheepers, D., de Wit, F., Ellemers, N., & Sassenberg, K. (2012). 
Social power makes the heart work more efficiently: Evidence 
from cardiovascular markers of challenge and threat. Journal 
180 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1), 371–374. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.06.014 
Schoofs, D., Preuss, D., & Wolf, O. T. (2008). Psychosocial stress 
induces working memory impairments in an n-back paradigm. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 33(5), 643–53. 
doi:10.1016/j.psyneuen.2008.02.004 
Schweitzer, M. E., Ordóñez, L., & Douma, B. (2004). Goal setting as 
a motivator of unethical behavior. Academy of Management 
Journal, 47(3), 422–432. doi:10.2307/20159591 
Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M. J. J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2011). 
Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals 
modifies ethical perceptions and behavior. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 181–190. 
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.02.001 
Shalvi, S., Eldar, O., & Bereby-Meyer, Y. (2012). Honesty requires 
time (and lack of justifications). Psychological Science, 23, 
1264–1270. doi:10.1177/0956797612443835  
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic 
human information processing: II. Perceptual learning, 
automatic attending and a general theory. Psychological 
Review, 84(2), 127–190. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.127 
Shiv, B., & Fedorikhin, A. (1999). Heart and mind in conflict: The 
interplay of affect and cognition in consumer decision 
making. Journal of Consumer Research, 26, 278–292. 
doi:10.1086/209563  
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2013, January). Life 
After P-Hacking. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the 
Society for Personality and Social Psychology, New Orleans, 
LA. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2205186 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2205186 
Sleegers, W. A., & Proulx, T. (2015). The comfort of approach: Self-
soothing effects of behavioral approach in response to 
meaning violations. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1568. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01568 
Sleegers, W. A., Proulx, T., & van Beest, I. (2015). Extremism 
reduces conflict arousal and increases values affirmation in 
181 
response to meaning violations. Biological Psychology, 108, 
126–131. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.03.012 
Spence, S. A., Farrow, T. F., Herford, A. E., Wilkinson, I. D., Zheng, 
Y., & Woodruff, P. W. (2001). Behavioural and functional 
anatomical correlates of deception in humans. NeuroReport, 
12(13), 2849–2853. doi:10.1097/00001756-200109170-00019 
Spence, S. A., Hunter, M. D., Farrow, T. F. D., Green, R. D., Leung, 
D. H., Hughes, C. J., & Ganesan, V. (2004). A cognitive 
neurobiological account of deception: Evidence from 
functional neuroimaging. Philosophical transactions of the 
Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 359, 
1755–1762. doi:10.1098/rstb.2004.1555 
Spielberger, C.D., Gorsuch, R.L., Lushene, R.E., Vagg, P.R., Jacobs, 
G.A., 1977. Stait–Trait Anxiety Inventory for adults. Redwood 
City, CA: Mind Garden. 
Starcke, K., & Brand, M. (2012). Decision making under stress: A 
selective review. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 
36(4), 1228–1248. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.02.003 
Starcke, K., Wolf, O. T., Markowitsch, H. J., & Brand, M. (2008). 
Anticipatory stress influences decision making under explicit 
risk conditions. Behavioral Neuroscience, 122(6), 1352–60. 
doi:10.1037/a0013281 
Steele, C. M., & Josephs, R. A. (1988). Drinking your troubles away: 
II. An attention-allocation model of alcohol’s effect on 
psychological stress. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97(2), 
196–205. doi:10.1037//0021-843X.97.2.196 
Stel, M., van Baaren, R. B., & Vonk, R. (2008). Effects of mimicking: 
Acting prosocially by being emotionally moved. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 965–976. 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.472 
Stirrat, M., & Perrett, D. I. (2010). Valid facial cues to cooperation 
and trust: Male facial width and trustworthiness. 
Psychological Science, 21(3), 349–354. 
doi:10.1177/0956797610362647 
Szymkow, A., Chandler, J., IJzerman, H., Parzuchowski, M., & 
Wojciszke, B. (2013). Warmer hearts, warmer rooms. Social 
Psychology, 44(2), 167–176. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000147 
182 
Talwar, V., Gordon, H. M., & Lee, K. (2007). Lying in the elementary 
school years: Verbal deception and its relation to second-order 
belief understanding. Developmental Psychology, 43(3), 804–
810. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.43.3.804 
ten Brinke, L., Stimson, D., & Carney, D. R. (2014). Some evidence 
for unconscious lie detection. Psychological Science, 25(5), 
1098-1105. doi:10.1177/0956797614524421 
Teper, R., Inzlicht, M., & Page-Gould, E. (2011). Are we more moral 
than we think? Exploring the role of affect in moral behavior 
and moral forecasting. Psychological Science, 22(4), 553–
558. doi:10.1177/0956797611402513 
Teper, R., Tullett, a. M., Page-Gould, E., & Inzlicht, M. (2015). Errors 
in moral forecasting: Perceptions of affect shape the gap 
between moral behaviors and moral forecasts. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(7), 887-900. 
doi:10.1177/0146167215583848 
Teper, R., Zhong, C., & Inzlicht, M. (2015). How emotions shape 
moral behavior: Some answers (and questions) for the field of 
moral psychology. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 1(9), 1–14. doi: 10.1111/spc3.12154 
Tinghög, G., Andersson, D., Bonn, C., Böttiger, H., Josephson, C., 
Lundgren, G., … Johannesson, M. (2013). Intuition and 
cooperation reconsidered. Nature, 498(7452). 
doi:10.1038/nature12194 
Todorov, A. (2008). Evaluating faces on trustworthiness: An 
extension of systems for recognition of emotions signaling 
approach/avoidance behaviors. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1124, 208–224. 
doi:10.1196/annals.1440.012 
Todorov, A., Baron, S. G., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2008). Evaluating face 
trustworthiness: A model based approach. Social Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience, 3(2), 119–127. 
doi:10.1093/scan/nsn009 
Todorov, A., Pakrashi, M., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2009). Evaluating 
faces on trustworthiness after minimal time exposure. Social 
Cognition, 27(6), 813–833. doi:10.1521/soco.2009.27.6.813 
183 
Tolin, D. F., Lohr, J. M., Lee, T. C., & Sawchuk, C. N. (1999). Visual 
avoidance in specific phobia. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 37(1), 63–70. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00111-9 
Trémolière, B., De Neys, W., & Bonnefon, J.-F. (2012). Mortality 
salience and morality: Thinking about death makes people 
less utilitarian. Cognition, 124, 379–384. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.05.011.  
Trivers, R. 2011. Deceit and self-deception: Fooling ourselves the 
better to fool others. London: Penguin.  
Tsiamyrtzis, P., Dowdall, J., Shastri, D., Pavlidis, I. T., Frank, M. G., 
& Ekman, P. (2006). Imaging facial physiology for the 
detection of deceit. International Journal of Computer Vision, 
71, 197–214. doi:10.1007/s11263-006-6106-y 
Tyler, J. M., Feldman, R. S., & Reichert, A. (2006). The price of 
deceptive behavior: Disliking and lying to people who lie to 
us. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(1), 69–77. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.02.003 
Ulatowska, J. (2010). The influence of providing the context of the 
assessment on the accuracy of the indirect method of 
deception detection. Problems of Forensic Sciences, LXXXIV, 
380–391. Retrieved from 
http://www.forensicscience.pl/pfs/84_ulatowska.pdf 
Ulatowska, J. (2014). Different questions – different accuracy? The 
accuracy of barious indirect question types in deception 
detection. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 21(2), 231–240. 
doi:10.1080/13218719.2013.803278 
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2006). Manipulations of emotional 
context shape moral judgment. Psychological Science, 17(6), 
476–7. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01731.x  
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2008). The duality of virtue: 
Deconstructing the moral hypocrite. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 44, 1334–1338. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.03.010.  
van den Hout, M. A., Engelhard, I. M., Smeets, M. A. M., Hornsveld, 
H., Hoogeveen, E., de Heer, E., … Rijkeboer, M. (2010). 
Counting during recall: Taxing of working memory and 
reduced vividness and emotionality of negative memories. 
184 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24(3), 303–311. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1677 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Gallucci, M. , Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015). 
Unconscious deception detection measured by finger skin 
temperature and indirect veracity judgments—results of a 
registered report. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 672. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00672  
van ’t Veer, A. E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2015). The registration 
recipe—Reasons and guidelines for conducting pre-registered 
research. Manuscript under review. 
van ’t Veer & Stel (2014). Deception, attitudes toward. In Levine, T. 







van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015). Detecting 
deception from repeated statements: Indirect affective 
judgments as guides to dishonesty. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015). In the eye of the 
beholder: Observers’ pupillary responses and affective 
reactions toward deception. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2014). Limited capacity 
to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 9(3), 199–206. Retrieved 
from http://journal.sjdm.org/13/131120/jdm131120.pdf 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015). Detecting 
dishonesty and trustworthiness under stress. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., van Beest, I., & Gallucci, M. (2014). 
Registered report: Measuring unconscious deception detection 
by skin temperature. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 442. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00442 
185 
van ’t Wout, M., & Sanfey, A. G. (2008). Friend or foe: The effect of 
implicit trustworthiness judgments in social decision-making. 
Cognition, 108, 796–803. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.07.002 
Verplaetse, J., Vanneste, S., & Braeckman, J. (2007). You can judge a 
book by its cover: The sequel. A kernel of truth in predictive 
cheating detection. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28(4), 
260–271. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.04.006 
von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011). The evolution and psychology 
of self-deception. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(1), 
1–16. doi:10.1017/S0140525X10001354 
Vrij, A., Edward, K., & Bull, R. (2001). Police officers’ ability to 
detect deceit: The benefit of indirect deception detection 
measures. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 6(2), 185–
196. doi:10.1348/135532501168271 
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Mann, S., & Leal, S. (2008). A cognitive load 
approach to lie detection. Journal of Investigative Psychology 
and Offender Profiling, 5(1-2), 39–43. doi:10.1002/jip.82 
Vrij, A., & Granhag, P. A. (2012). Eliciting cues to deception and 
truth: What matters are the questions asked. Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1(2), 110–117. 
doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.02.004 
Vrij, A., & Mann, S. (2001). Telling and detecting lies in a high-stake 
situation: The case of a convicted murderer. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 15, 187–203. doi:10.1002/1099-
0720(200103/04)15:2<187::AID-ACP696>3.0.CO;2-A 
Vrij, A., Mann, S. A., Fisher, R. P., Leal, S., Milne, R., & Bull, R. 
(2008). Increasing cognitive load to facilitate lie detection: 
The benefit of recalling an event in reverse order. Law and 
Human Behavior, 32, 253–265. doi:10.1007/s10979-007-
9103-y  
Vrij, A., Oliveira, J., Hammond, A., & Ehrlichman, H. (2015). 
Saccadic eye movement rate as a cue to deceit. Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4(1), 15–19. 
doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.07.005 
186 
Vrij, A., & Semin, G. R. (1996). Lie experts’ beliefs about nonverbal 
indicators of deception. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior. 
doi:10.1007/BF02248715 
Walczyk, J. J., Mahoney, K. T., Doverspike, D., & Griffith-Ross, D. 
A. (2009). Cognitive lie detection: Response time and 
consistency of answers as cues to deception. Journal of 
Business and Psychology, 24(1), 33–49. doi:10.1007/s10869-
009-9090-8 
Wang, J. T., Spezio, M., & Camerer, C. F. (2010). Pinocchio’s pupil: 
Using eyetracking and pupil dilation to understand truth 
telling and deception in sender-receiver games. American 
Economic Review, 100, 984–1007. doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.984  
Weiss, B., & Feldman, R. S. (2006). Looking good and lying to do it: 
Deception as an impression management strategy in job 
interviews. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 1070–
1086. doi:10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00055.x 
West, B. T. (2009). Analyzing longitudinal data with the linear mixed 
models procedure in SPSS. Evaluation & the Health 
Professions, 32, 207–228. doi:10.1177/0163278709338554 
Whitsett, D. D., & Shoda, Y. (2014). An approach to test for 
individual differences in the effects of situations without using 
moderator variables. Journal of experimental social 
psychology, 50, 94-104. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.08.008 
Williams, L. E., & Bargh, J. A. (2008). Experiencing physical warmth 
promotes interpersonal warmth. Science, 322, 606–607. 
doi:10.1126/science.1162548 
Willis, J., & Todorov, A. (2006). First impressions: Making up your 
mind after a 100-ms exposure to a face. Psychological 
Science, 17(7), 592–8. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01750.x 
Wilson, T. D., & Schooler, J. W. (1991). Thinking too much: 
Introspection can reduce the quality of preferences and 
decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
60(2), 181–92. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.60.2.181 
Winston, J. S., Strange, B. A., O’Doherty, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2002). 
Automatic and intentional brain responses during evaluation 
of trustworthiness of faces. Nature Neuroscience, 5(3), 277–
283. doi:10.1038/nn816 
187 
Winter, L., & Uleman, J. S. (1984). When are social judgments made? 
Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(2), 237–252. 
doi:10.1037/h0090437 
Wojciszke, B., Bazinska, R., & Jaworski, M. (1998). On the 
dominance of moral categories in impression formation. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(12), 1251–
1263. doi:10.1177/01461672982412001 
Yang, D., Qi, S., Ding, C., & Song, Y. (2011). An ERP study on the 
time course of facial trustworthiness appraisal. Neuroscience 
Letters, 496(3), 147–151. doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2011.03.066 
Ybarra, O., Chan, E., & Park, D. (2001). Young and old adults' 
concerns about morality and competence. Motivation and 
Emotion, 25(2), 85–100. doi:10.1023/A:1010633908298 
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no 
inferences. American Psychologist, 35(2), 151–175. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.35.2.151 
Zaki, J., & Mitchell, J. P. (2013). Intuitive prosociality. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 22(6), 466–470. 
doi:10.1177/0963721413492764 
Zeelenberg, M., Nelissen, R. M. A., Breugelmans, S. M., & Pieters, R. 
(2008). On emotion specificity in decision making: Why 
feeling is for doing. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(1), 18–
27. 
Zeger, S. L., Liang, K. Y., & Albert, P. S. (1988). Models for 
longitudinal data: A generalized estimating equation 
approach. Biometrics, 44, 1049–60. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3233245 
Zhong, C.-B. (2011). The ethical dangers of deliberative decision 
making. Administrative Science Quarterly, 56, 1–25.  
Zhong, C.-B., & Leonardelli, G. J. (2008). Cold and lonely: Does 
social exclusion literally feel cold? Psychological Science, 19, 
838–842. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02165.x 
Zuckerman, M., Depaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and 
nonverbal communication of deception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (vol. 14, pp. 1–









Supplemental Study 1 and 2     11 
 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015, July 29). Effortless 




Supplemental Study 3 and 4     150 
 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015, July 29). Effortless 




Supplemental Study 5      151 
 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015, July 29). Effortless 




Supplemental Study 6      156 
 
van ’t Veer, A. E., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015, July 29). Effortless 














This dissertation presents an experimental social 
psychological investigation of both deception and its detection with an 
emphasis on the role of automatic, ‘effortless’ processes. The work in 
this dissertation is connected to recent debates in moral psychology 
about the intuitive nature of prosocial and moral behavior, as well as 
to findings from the evolutionary, developmental, neuroscientific, and 
response time literatures. Building on the premises that successfully 
navigating the social world requires intuitive moral decisions and 
evaluations of the moral character of others, and that these judgments 
and decisions are often made under circumstances that are not well 
equipped for moral deliberation, three aspects of dishonesty were 
investigated.  
First, cognitive effort involved in deceiving others was 
examined. Previous research that speaks to the question whether being 
honest or dishonest is the automatic tendency has resulted in mixed 
findings, possibly due to a focus on time as an indication of 
deliberation. Therefore, in this dissertation cognitive load, rather than 
time, was manipulated. Findings suggest that when enough cognitive 
capacity is available and people can serve their self-interest by being 
dishonest, they will often do so. Yet without this cognitive capacity, 
people are honest regardless of the fact that self-interest could have 
been served. This dissertation provides direct evidence for the 
prediction that being dishonest takes more cognitive effort than being 
honest. 
Secondly, the work in this dissertation tests theoretical notions 
about people’s ability to effortlessly form a correct impression of the 
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trustworthiness of another person in the realm of deception detection. 
Theories from different research areas suggest that people’s 
impressions of others reflect an automatic ability to determine whether 
another person’s intentions are good. This kind of skill would allow 
people to successfully choose cooperation partners and form 
coalitions with others who reciprocate when help is needed. However, 
well-established findings from the deception detection literature reveal 
that veracity judgments are often biased and wrong. A possible reason 
for this could be that when people make a judgment of whether 
someone else is lying, they deliberate too much. Therefore, in this 
dissertation people’s affective responses towards (dis)honest others 
were examined. Unequivocally the (pre-registered) research in this 
dissertation reveals that whereas people are not able to distinguish 
between liars and truth-tellers when they are asked to judge veracity 
directly, their affective (i.e., liking, trustworthiness) judgments do 
favor a truth-teller over a liar. This was observed when participants 
were presented with a brief (dis)honest answer by a target about a 
transgression committed earlier, when presented with relatively longer 
stories told by targets who were lying or being honest about their 
personal life, and when liars and truth-tellers were well rehearsed and 
therefore came across with more ease of expression. Being on guard 
seemed to facilitate these effortless veracity judgments—both a 
certain amount of vigilance (i.e., stress) and being forewarned of the 
possibility of deception can bring out relevant intuitions.  
Finally, several experiments in this dissertation were aimed at 
examining the previously unexplored physiological responses in the 
observer of (dis)honesty. The above-mentioned intuitions about 
another person’s (dis)honesty may stem from early unconscious 
processes that can be reflected in a physiological reaction that marks 
the (un)friendly intent of others. Two different physiological 
responses within the observer of (dis)honesty were investigated. The 
first physiological response, finger skin temperature, reflects trust and 
unfolds slowly over time. The second physiological response, 
pupillary dilation, is a more fine-grained time sensitive measure of 
mental processing. Results revealed that people’s physiology was 
differentially affected by the (dis)honesty of others. When people 
observed liars their skin temperature consistently dropped, whereas 
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when they observed truth-tellers this depended on whether they were 
forewarned about the possibility of deception. Additionally, when 
people observed a dishonest compared to an honest target, this evoked 
a greater pupillary response, even though the face area of honest and 
dishonest targets was monitored similarly. Together the findings in 
this dissertation demonstrate the benefit of considering deception 
through a lens that emphasizes the cognitive effort that is exerted by 
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